BROWNSON'S

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ART. I. — *Liberalism and Catholicity. A Letter from a Protestant Minister, with a Reply.*

THE following letter comes to us from a very estimable young Protestant minister of our acquaintance, and for whom we have personally a very high regard. It was occasioned by a conversation we recently had with him, in which we labored to impress upon his mind that he was bound in prudence and in morals to give the great question of Catholicity, at least, a fair, candid, and thorough investigation. We do not know whether he expected us to publish his letter or not; but it deserves a reply, and a more elaborate reply than we are just now able to give it, unless we may at the same time make it answer the purpose of an article in our Review. Moreover, the "obstacles" of which he speaks may be in the way of others as well as of himself; and therefore, in replying publicly, we may be doing a service not only to him, but also to a whole class, and perhaps a very numerous class. We suppress his name and residence, that we may not have even the appearance of betraying any confidence, expressed or implied, which he may have reposed in us.

"——— *April* 9, 1846.

"DEAR SIR: —

"I have considered your arguments, saving this month's number, which I have not yet read. But there are certain obstacles which prevent the reasonings from having much weight, and seem to me to make the case logically hopeless.

"I. I do not object to your position, that 'faith is impossible out of the Catholic Church'; for the only 'Catholic Church' I can acknowledge at present comprises 'those who share the faith and sal-

vation of Christ,' so that this becomes an identical proposition. The epithet 'Roman' to me neutralizes that of 'Catholic.'

"II. Again, if *faith* means any thing else than trust, or apprehension of things spiritual, whichever definition I choose to take (as distinct from intellectual belief of given propositions), or if *salvation* means any thing else than the progressive enlightenment, freedom, and spiritualizing of the soul (as distinct from the deliverance from impending torture in the flames of hell), you must be aware that such other interpretations of these words require some authorized interpreter to sustain them. You cannot suppose I am ready to accept such interpretation without proof; and you would hardly be guilty of such a paralogism, as to make use, in argument, of a proposition sustained by an authority which it is the very purpose of your argument to lead me to accept. And if you quote Scripture (as Mark xvi. 16 and Heb. xi. 6), you must be aware, that, even granting absolute authority to every word of Scripture (which is the utmost limit of intellectual faith a non-Romanist can have), I am at perfect liberty, by my own principles, to give any such explanation to any of the words as is in accordance with my general belief and prevailing habits of thought. As a matter of logic, then, whatever else your arguments may be, they cannot have any force to draw me towards accepting your position. As I said before, logical Romanism and logical Liberalism are each complete and consistent in itself, and there is no passage-way of reasoning between them. As for illogical Protestantism, you may seize on its inconsistencies, and force it logically to one or the other of these two positions; but when it has reached either of them, it takes something besides argument to bring it over to the other.

"III. There is another difficulty in the way of your argument, which you have not met to my own satisfaction. To accept the claims of the Roman Church either involves an 'act of faith,' or it does not. If it does, this is the same as saying that an act of faith (granting your own definition and usage of the phrase) is required, preliminary to any possible, or even supposable, act of faith; which is absurd. If, on the other hand, such acceptance does not involve an act of faith, then the investigation of the claims of that Church becomes a purely intellectual process, requiring only the clearness of mind and moral honesty which any other intellectual process requires. And on my ground (I do not say on yours), it is utterly wicked and absurd to denounce any penalty beforehand upon any result deliberately and candidly arrived at. Such denunciation would be a defiance of the first and simplest axiom of all reasoning together between man and man; namely, that no threats must be introduced, or any extraneous element whatever, to influence the determination either way.

"I do not say that no Protestant can ever become a Romanist.

This would be to contradict well known facts. But I do say that no purely logical process can suffice for such a result; and this impossibility your own arguments have abundantly shown. Of course, until your proposition of the authority of the Roman Church is accepted, your deduced assertions or corollaries (such as the impossibility of faith without it, the superiority of its culture, and the peculiar blessedness of its belief or ritual) must go for nothing at all. You must be logician enough to see this, and its bearing on the minds of your Protestant readers. And I do not see how you can avoid perceiving that your whole train of reasoning is a paralogism; because the authority and necessity of the Roman Church are assumed in every single step, and consequently your arguments can have no logical weight with one who does not accept them.

"I do not blame you for thus assuming and continually bringing forward what has become the principle and groundwork of your faith. It would be inconsistent with my own principles not to welcome, or at least respect, every evidence of faith and sincerity, coming from any quarter of that Holy Catholic Church or spiritual communion, which includes every pure thought, and righteous desire, and holy life of every age. It would be painful to meet one who differs from me, even in grave matters, as perforce an antagonist. The Roman hierarchy, not the faith of Romanists, is what, with my understanding, I am steadily opposed to; and far be it from me to reproach any one for his adherence to that which gives him life and strength. But I do wonder a little that you should use the arguments and appeals you do, supposing they can have effect on those you mean to influence; or else that by a false show of logic you should seek unfairly to bewilder, and perhaps convert, those who are not prepared to understand or appreciate the real points of difference. You could not much value such conversion as that.

"You rightly speak of this as (on your ground) the gravest question that a man can propose to himself. You cannot consent that it should be answered in a bewildered, sophisticated, and hurried state of mind. And the real answer to it, as you must know, is through the history of the Church and the world. A profound historical investigation, a thorough appreciation of the grounds of historical evidence, a familiarity with the events and lessons of past ages, and especially a clear and systematic understanding of the religious and intellectual culture, as well as political and social institutions, of the human race, are the essential preliminaries to the intelligent and independent determination of that question. My argument (III.) must convince you that this is the only way to answer it; at least, the only way in which I should be willing to answer it. And for those who have not ability or leisure for such an inquiry, we need not imagine their case must be hopeless. As I believe the

Roman Church itself acknowledges unavoidable ignorance will be pardoned; and the true condition of salvation is, that each should act up to the measure of faith or of light he has.

"There are two methods of argument by which one may be led from his own to another form of belief. The one is purely logical, proceeding from certain common principles, known and acknowledged on both sides. I think I have abundantly shown that this method can have no weight with a consistent and intelligent Protestant. The other is historical; based on a critical investigation of past facts and institutions, and involving an amount and kind of labor and learning, which must, from the nature of the case, be attainable by very few. As to this latter, which I maintain to be the only legitimate method of establishing your position, you must be aware how very incompetent I am at present to carry it to a certain conclusion. In the mean time, it is only laying claim to that amount of honesty which every opponent of common sense must allow (or else all his arguments are but worthless bullying and sophistry), to say, that whatever shall seem to me established I shall acknowledge and profess, whether Romanism or 'No-Church.' And from the axiom (which every religious inquiry demands), that a just and merciful God presides over the issues of human life, I cannot possibly feel any alarm or distrust in pursuing such an investigation with perfect independence of mind; or feel the smallest hesitation or scruple in acting consistently with my present convictions, until a course of reasoning like that I have indicated shall compel me to abandon them.

"Till then I am yours in respect, though in dissent."

The first remark we make on this letter is, that it fully concedes, what we have so often asserted, and what is becoming a very general conviction, that there is no middle ground between Liberalism — No-Churchism as we call it — and Catholicity. This is much, and augurs well. It proves that the writer has good stuff in him, that he is no *via media* man, trying to steer his course equidistant between truth and falsehood, — no time-server, no trimmer, no logical coward, shrinking from the avowal of the legitimate and necessary consequences of his own premises. It is true, he at present inclines strongly to the side of Liberalism, but this does not discourage us. He will hardly need to try Liberalism as long and as thoroughly as we tried it, before he rejects it, and gladly embraces Catholicity. If he retains any consciousness of a single religious want, if he ever feels himself, as all not utterly reprobate do and must feel themselves, oppressed with a load of guilt, and beset on every hand with numerous, powerful, and vigilant

enemies to his virtue ; or if, in some trying moment of his life, he is forced to send an anxious glance into the darkness which for him must brood over the tomb, and which no ray from natural reason can furrow, even for a single instant, he will never be able to content himself with mere Liberalism, but must demand, whether he find it or not, something less vague and negative, something more positive, more illuminative, more effective to heal, to elevate, to protect, and to sanctify the soul.

In replying to the objections urged in the letter before us, we shall not follow precisely the order adopted by the writer, but an order which better suits our own convenience, and which will better enable our readers to perceive the bearing, connection, and force of what we have to offer. Whatever the writer of the letter intended, his objections are, strictly speaking, not so much objections to the Church, as to our method of setting forth and defending her claims ; but we shall consider them both as they affect our own reasoning and as they affect the question of the Church herself. The principal objections urged are resolvable into the two following, namely: —1. The authority of the Church is, in its nature, unprovable. 2. An act of faith in the Catholic sense is impossible. These are regarded as objections *a priori* to Catholicity, and requiring to be removed before any argument or testimony in her favor can be introduced.

I. The authority of the Church is, in its nature, unprovable. This the writer contends is evident from our own arguments ; all the arguments we have used or can use in support of the Church involve a paralogism ; for they all proceed from premises which it requires the authority of the Church to furnish or legitimate. We begin with what concerns the arguments we have ourselves used. The writer alleges in effect against them : You conclude the Church, without which faith is not possible, from the necessity of faith to salvation. But the Church is as necessary to prove to me that faith is necessary to salvation, or that there are or can be such things as faith and salvation in the sense you contend, as it is to enable me to elicit an act of faith. We reply, —

1. That our argument involves a paralogism, when adduced in defence of the Church against those who do not admit salvation and faith as its indispensable condition in the sense we allege, may be true ; when adduced as an *argumentum ad hominem* against those who admit both, we deny. But it was only as an *argumentum ad hominem* we adduced the special argument

objected to. We were reasoning against those Protestant Christians who admit our premises ; and our design was to show them, that, on their own principles, they are bound either to accept the Catholic Church, or to deny the possibility of salvation.

2. Though in one part of our argument we argue as the objection alleges, yet in the main argument itself we do not. By recurring to the article entitled *The Church against No-Church*, in our Review for April, 1845, pp. 143, 144, the only article we have published in which we give a general argument for the Church, it will be seen that our point of departure is farther back, and that we proceed to argue to the Church from the necessity of faith to salvation not till after we have established both faith and salvation in the very sense in which we take them in the argument. That we began by assuming "the divine origin and authority of the Christian religion" we grant, because we were defending the Church against one who claimed to be a Christian, and a Christian minister ; and we judged it, as we said expressly, to be discourteous to reason with him as we would with a Jew, Pagan, Mahometan, or Infidel. We presumed we had a right to take him at his word, and that it would be supérfluous to go farther back in our argument than to the simple assumption of the Christian religion as a divine and authoritative religion. Assuming the divine origin and authority of the Christian religion, we proceeded to establish, by authorities that could not be objected to without rejecting Christianity altogether, that all who receive it at all are logically bound to receive the Catholic Church, or admit that Christian salvation, whatever it may mean, is impossible. This argument is legitimate, not only against those who admit salvation, and faith as its indispensable condition, but also against all who admit the Christian religion at all as a divine and authoritative religion.

3. If only a part of our general argument be taken, it involves a paralogism when urged against those Protestant *Christians* who reject Christianity altogether, we concede ; that it does when taken as a whole, we deny. The writer objects to the argument because he takes only that part of it which had a special purpose, and overlooks it as a whole. In the article referred to, pp. 174 – 179, which we shall soon quote at length, when turning to the positive proofs of the Church, or the divine commission of the *ecclesia docens*, we go back of Christianity itself, and point out and defend the method by which the divine authority of the Church may be established against those who

reject all revelation, on the ground of our correspondent, that the supernatural is not provable. We then show that the authority of the Church is provable without any *argumentum ad hominem*, or the assumption of any premise which reason is not competent to furnish or legitimate. It must be shown what we have there said is not to the purpose, is unsound in principle, or unsustained by facts, before we can be rightfully accused of attempting to prove the Church by a paralogism.

4. Moreover, we publish, Reviewer as we are, our arguments in detached essays, and nowhere profess in any one essay to give a complete view of the argument for the Church, or of all we may have to adduce in her defence. It is necessary to take what is urged in one essay, though not in another, so far as pertinent, as an integral part of our general argument. The essay our correspondent has noticed is simply a reply to some special objections raised by the *Episcopal Observer* to a part of the reasoning in our previous article on *The Church against No-Church*, the main purpose of which was not to prove the Church against all classes of objectors, but against a special class, as its title indicates ; though, in prosecuting the argument, we took occasion incidentally to indicate the method of defending the Church against several classes. But in the same number (April, 1845), we insert, from the French of the celebrated Dr. Évariste de Gypendole, an article which professes to defend the Church, not against one class of objectors only, but against all objectors, past, present, and to come ; and which actually contains, amid a world of wit and pleasantry, not duly appreciated by our unbelieving readers, an argument absolutely conclusive, in which we defy all the intellects in the world to find the least flaw or fallacy. If Christianity had a miraculous origin, or if the phenomena it exhibits are inexplicable without a miracle, it is from God, is his truth, and you have nothing to do but to receive it as such. Mrs. Jones, at her distaff, or any old woman in the land, of either sex, knows enough to know this. If you deny miracles, be so good as to explain the introduction of Christianity into the world, its reception, spread, and preservation as a divine, authoritative religion for eighteen hundred years, down to the present moment, among what on all hands must be conceded to be the most civilized, enlightened, and moral portion of mankind. There stands the fact before you, and there it has stood in all ages and in all lands for eighteen hundred years, no more to be denied or mistaken than the nose on your face. In some way you must explain it ; and it

will require a miracle a million times greater to explain it without a miracle, than it will to explain it with a miracle. Here is what the excellent Doctor proves, and which you do not seem to have remarked.

Does our Protestant minister doubt it? Let him reflect, that, however agreeable or acceptable the Christianity he contends for may be to natural reason and the natural heart, the Christianity the race has believed, and still persists in believing, is quite another thing. The Christianity it has believed, and still persists in believing, is repugnant to our whole nature. It mortifies our pride, crucifies our natural propensities, balks and baffles our reason, commands our detachment from the world, the abandonment of our dearest and most cherished interests, the entire renunciation of ourselves, and the total surrender of even our reason and will, all that we have, and all that we are, to an absolute authority, in whose decisions we have no voice, and which, be they what they may, we must receive without question, and from the heart and conscience obey, without reserve and without reluctance. Does this commend itself to our young friend? Is he prepared to accept this religion? Will he go down on his knees before a man like himself, perhaps even a sinful man, and tell him all the secrets of his life, all his offences, his most filthy acts and thoughts, even those which he reddens to recall in the silence and solitude of his own self-examination? Will he? Not he. He can hardly restrain himself as he reads our statement. All that he regards as noble and manly in his nature rises indignant, as he contemplates this religion even at a distance. He feels that such a religion outrages all his rights and dignity as a man. He looks with a sort of loathing on the mean-spirited slaves who not only consent to wear, but even voluntarily bow down their necks to receive, its degrading and debasing yoke. It is too much for him. His benevolence is fired, his higher and nobler instincts are aroused, and, as it were, call out to him from the very depths of his humanity to rise, arm himself, go forth and strike, and strike home, for freedom, — to break asunder the bonds of the insulting tyrant, and liberate his long enslaved brethren from their thraldom, — to knock off, and for ever, those fetters which have rusted into their flesh, and eaten into their very souls. So feels, so speaks, human nature in our young friend, when he contemplates the Catholic religion. But human nature in all ages, and in each individual, is essentially what it is in our young Protestant minister; and in all, and in every age, then, it must, so far as human nature,

have manifested the same repugnance to this religion it does in him, and been as opposed to its reception as he finds it. Does he think this religion could ever, without a miracle, have gained a footing in a world presenting such an opposition as his? Could even he, without a miracle, embrace it? Yet it has gained a footing, and become the dominant, the only progressive, religion of the race. Men have received it, have believed it, have submitted their reason to it, bowed down their stubborn wills to it, have fought for it, have suffered the extremest tortures for it, died for it, allowed themselves to be burnt, to be crucified, to be torn by wild beasts for it, and, perhaps, more than all, have *lived* for it, and lived it. How, on the principles of human nature, without the intervention of Almighty God, without a miracle, a perpetual miracle, could this religion make its way in the world, — not only without, but in despite of, the civil authority, against an opposition as strong as that which our young friend experiences, perpetually renewed in each age and in each individual submitting to it? But if you concede the intervention of the Almighty, if you concede miracles, it is from God, is his religion; the controversy is ended, and the "bite in the head" is radically cured. Here is no paralogism, but a rigid induction from incontestable facts, and absolutely conclusive against all objectors, past, present, and to come, as the excellent Dr. Evariste de Gypendole justly maintains. This argument, though extracted from an admirable little French work, and translated for us by an eminent member of the Catholic hierarchy in this country, we have a right against the opponents of the Church to claim as ours. The writer of the letter is mistaken, then, when he assumes that we argue to the Church only from premises not attainable without assuming the authority of the Church.

5. Nor does what the writer alleges, with regard to our use in controversy of the Holy Scriptures, sustain his assumption that we respond to our opponents only by a logical fallacy. There are two senses in which we can legitimately quote the Scriptures: — 1. Against all classes of opponents, as simple historical documents, not authenticated by the authority of the Church, but in the same way as we authenticate Herodotus or Thucydides, Xenophon or Diodorus Siculus, Livy or Tacitus, Eusebius or Ammianus. In this sense, after having authenticated, we have just the same right to quote them for the historical facts they record, as we have any other historical documents; and these facts are legitimate against all objectors, from what

ever point of view they object. 2. The second sense is as authority against all who profess to hold them to be the word of God, and to take them as the sufficient and exclusive rule of faith; on the ground, that every man is bound by the logical consequences of his own principles, that it is lawful to conclude against a man from his own admissions, to convict him on the testimony of his own witness. In this last sense, the argument is an *argumentum ad hominem*. In the essay on *The Church against No-Church*, and in the subsequent articles we have published in defence of it, we have quoted the Scriptures, it is true, but never except in one or the other of these senses. When reasoning against those who do not hold the Scriptures to be the word of God, we quote them only as simple history, but as an authentic history, which no one can successfully question; but when reasoning against those who concede them to be the word of God, we quote them in either sense. The objection so common among Protestants, that Catholics cannot quote the Scriptures in defence of the Church, without involving themselves in a *vicious* circle, arises from their not distinguishing between the Scriptures as historical documents, and the Scriptures as the inspired word of God. To prove that they are the inspired word of God, and therefore matter for divine faith, we need the authority of the Catholic Church; but to prove them to be historical documents, and good authority in regard to the historical facts they record, we do not need this authority. We cannot prove them in that sense in which they may be a rule of faith, without the authority of the Church; and if we quoted them in this sense in defence of our positions, save as an *argumentum ad hominem*, we should indeed be guilty of the paralogism alleged. But this we do not do. In the sense of history, we do not depend on the authority of the Church to authenticate them, and therefore may legitimately quote them in defence of our positions against all classes of objectors, without being guilty of any logical fallacy at all, any more than we should be in quoting the public acts of the Jews and Romans, or the historical facts which make in our favor, recorded or alluded to by Pliny, Tacitus, Celsus, or Julian. Is this distinction, which is very real, too nice, too subtile, for our Protestant doctors? If not, why do they disregard it, and constantly allege that we take the Church to prove the Scriptures, and the Scriptures to prove the Church?

6. Nor are we debarred, by danger of a paralogism, from quoting Scripture in defence of our positions, by the fact, that

our opponents have the same right to put their explanations upon the words of Scripture that we have to put ours upon them. Grant, says the objector, in effect, absolute authority to the words of Scripture, still I have a perfect right to give them such explanations as are in accordance with my general belief and prevailing habits of thought, and these explanations you cannot set aside without assuming that authority of the Church which you are to prove, but have not as yet proved, because it is the very point in question. But it is necessary to distinguish. If his explanations do not violate the plain, natural sense of the words in the connection they stand in, and are authorized by the ordinary rules of understanding books, discourse, or language in general, we concede his right to give them; otherwise, we deny it. For, if he were at liberty to give an arbitrary meaning to the words, an obscure, unheard of, or unnatural meaning, — as if, where he reads *yes*, he should understand *no; God*, he should understand *man; grace*, he should understand *nature; life*, he should understand *death; heaven*, he should understand *hell*, — he would not yield absolute authority to them, which the objection concedes; indeed, he would yield to them no authority at all, and admit in them no independent sense by which he would or could be bound. If he concedes the absolute authority of the words of Scripture, he can have no right of explanation incompatible with that authority. He must, then, in all cases, be bound by the plain, obvious, natural sense of the words, according to the ordinary rules of understanding language in general. If not, language would at once be annihilated, and there would be an end to all interchange of thought between man and man.

But as either party has the same right to his explanations, and as there is as yet no umpire to decide between them when their explanations clash, both parties must, as a matter of necessity, confine themselves, in their use of Scripture, to what is clear, express, about which there is and can be no reasonable dispute; we do not say about which there may be no cavil, for there is nothing at which there may not be cavil; but about which there can be no reasonable question, — no question, in a fair, candid, or prudent exercise of reason. But so long as we confine ourselves to what is clear and express, to what is expressly said or *necessarily* implied, if the words are to be taken in a plain, obvious, and natural sense, we have a right to quote Scripture in defence of our positions, and in doing so, we fall, necessarily, into no paralogism or logical fallacy.

In what we quote from the Scriptures, we confine ourselves always to what is clear and express to our purpose, and never adduce texts in any sense but that in which it is evident they must be taken, if taken in any sense at all. Our Protestant minister, then, we repeat once more, is mistaken in his assumption; we do never employ the logical fallacy he assumes we do, — as he himself would have perceived, if he had considered our arguments more attentively, before raising his objections to them.

II. But it is time to pass from the objection as it concerns the arguments we have used, and to consider it more immediately as it concerns the arguments which may be used. The writer's thesis, we must bear in mind, is, that the authority of the Church is logically unprovable. "I say," he says, "that no logical process can suffice for this result [the conversion of a Protestant to Catholicity], and this impossibility *your own arguments have abundantly shown.*" That our own arguments do not show this is evident from what we have said. The most he can say against our arguments is simply that they do not prove that the authority in question is provable; but from this he cannot legitimately conclude that there are *no* arguments that can prove it. Moreover, the only argument of ours he has noticed, and from which he argues against us, is simply an *argumentum ad hominem*, designed to convince those Protestant Christians who profess to believe in salvation, and faith as its condition *sine qua non*, that they must accept the Church, without which faith is not possible, or deny the possibility of salvation. To argue, from the fact that this argument does not prove the authority of the Church to those Protestant *Christians* who reject Christianity altogether, that the authority of the Church cannot be proved by argument, is very much like arguing, from the fact that a certain cobbler is not a good sculptor, that there is not and cannot be a good sculptor; but it is hardly lawful to conclude, because a given thing is not done in doing a certain other thing, that it cannot be done at all.

But what else does he bring forward to sustain his position that the authority of the Church is unprovable? Nothing, nothing at all. He has, in fact, offered not a single reason to show that it is not as provable as any other position which may be taken. He begins by telling us that he has considered our reasoning, but there are certain obstacles which make the case logically hopeless. He assumes that there are certain *a priori* objections, which place the authority of the Church on such a

footing that no argument in its defence can be entertained. This he should have made appear, but this he has not done. He has surprised us with no new objection, and the objections he has urged are nothing but objections which might have been taken from ourselves, *minus* our answers. We anticipated him in all he has said on this point, and answered him in advance, — as he would have seen, if he had read what we wrote, or taken leisure to master what he read. We assure him that we do not understand his right to urge against us objections we have ourselves taken up, without condescending, at least, to notice our answers. It may be a convenient way to refute a man, to take up the objections he raises against himself, and suppress his answers, and one of which Protestants in their controversies with Catholics not unfrequently avail themselves, as we have in our own case had occasion to remark; but whether it is the most honest or even honorable way in the world or not, we leave to others to settle.

The objection of our friend, simply stated, is, that the authority of the Church, being supernatural, and lying out of the range of natural reason, cannot be legitimately argued to from any premises which natural reason can supply, or which can be valid for natural reason. This objection is precisely the objection we raised against ourselves, and attempted to answer, in our essay in defence of the Church, already more than once referred to. That we cannot argue to it from premises supplied by natural reason alone, as the object of divine faith, we concede; but that we cannot as the object of human faith, we deny; and this is sufficient for our purpose; for, if we are able to argue to the authority of the Church from premises that are valid for natural reason in that sense in which reason objects to it, it is false to say that it is not provable to natural reason. In proof that it is provable by natural reason to natural reason, which is the real point, as we shall hereafter show, we simply quote what we replied when raising the objection ourselves to the Church as the supernatural witness to the fact of revelation, in the article, *The Church against No-Church*, Vol. II., pp. 174–179.

"But it is objected, that, if the witness to the supernatural must be itself supernatural, the supernatural can never be witnessed to natural reason, and therefore man can never have any good grounds for believing the supernatural, unless he be himself supernaturally elevated above his nature. For the competency of the supernatural witness is a supernatural fact which can be proved only by another supernatural witness, which in turn will require

still another, and thus on, *in infinitum*, which is impossible. But we must distinguish between the competency of the witness to testify to the fact of revelation and the motives of the credibility of the witness. The competency of the witness depends on its supernatural character; the motives of credibility are such as natural reason may appreciate. The credibility of the witness is supernaturally established to natural reason by means of miracles. A miracle is a supernatural effect produced in or on natural objects, and therefore connects the natural and supernatural, so that natural reason can pass from the one to the other. Since the miracle is wrought on natural objects, it is cognizable by natural reason, and natural reason is able to determine whether a given fact be or be not a miracle. From the miracle the reason concludes legitimately to the supernatural cause, and to the divine commission or authority of him by whom it is wrought. Having established the Divine commission or authority of the miracle-worker, we have established his credibility by having established the fact that God himself vouches for the truth of his testimony. The miracle, therefore, supersedes the necessity of the supposed infinite series of supernatural witnesses, by connecting the natural immediately with the supernatural. It is God's own assurance to natural reason, that he speaks in and by or through the person by whom it is performed. Then we have the veracity of God for the truth of what the miracle-worker declares, and therefore infallible certainty; for God can neither deceive nor be deceived.

"The supernatural, it follows from what we have said, is provable. Consequently the character of the Apostolic ministry, as the supernatural witness to the fact of revelation, is provable, that is, is not intrinsically unprovable. It becomes a simple question of fact, and is to be proved or disproved in like manner as any other question of fact falling under the cognizance of natural reason. The process of proof is simple and easy. The miracles of our blessed Saviour were all that was necessary to establish his Divine authority to those who saw them; for it was evident, as Nicodemus said to him, 'No man can do these miracles which thou doest, unless God be with him.' St. John, iii. 2. These accredited him as a teacher from God. Then he was necessarily what he professed to be, and what he declared to be God's word was God's word. This was sufficient for the eyewitness of the miracles.

"But we are not eyewitnesses. True; but the fact, whether the miracles were performed or not, is a simple historical question, to which reason is as competent as to any other historical question. If it can be established infallibly to us that the miracles were actually performed, we are virtually and to all intents and purposes in the condition of the eyewitnesses themselves, and they are to us all they were to them. Then they accredit to us, as to them, the Divine commission of Jesus, and authorize the conclusion that whatever

he said or promised was infallible truth; for whether you say Jesus was himself truly God as well as truly man, or that he was only divinely commissioned, you have in either case the veracity of God as the ground of faith in what he said or promised.

"Now, suppose it to be a fact that Jesus appointed a body of teachers, and promised to be always with them, protecting them from error and teaching them all truth; and suppose, farther, that the appointment and promise are ascertainable by natural reason, infallibly ascertainable. We should have infallible certainty that Jesus Christ does speak in and through this body, that it is infallible in what it teaches, and therefore what it declares to be the word of God is the word of God; for it is infallibly certain that Jesus Christ will keep his promise, since the promise is made by God himself, and it is impossible for God to lie, or to promise and not fulfil. In this case, calling this body of teachers the Catholic Church, we could make our act of faith without the least room for doubt or hesitation. 'O my God! I firmly believe all the sacred truths the Catholic Church believes and teaches, because *thou* hast revealed them, who canst neither deceive nor be deceived.'

"Assuming the facts in the case to be as here supposed, the only points in this process to which exceptions can possibly be taken, or which can by any one be alleged to be not infallibly certain, are, 1. The competency of natural reason from historical testimony to establish the fact that the miracles were actually performed; 2. Admitting the facts to be infallibly ascertainable, the competency of reason to determine infallibly whether they are miracles or not; 3. The competency of reason from the miracle to conclude to the Divine authority of the miracle-worker; 4. Its competency from historical documents to ascertain infallibly the fact of the appointment of the body of teachers, and the promise made them. These four points, unquestionably essential to the validity of the argument, are to be taken, we admit, on the authority of reason. Can reason determine these with infallible certainty? But, if you say it can, you affirm the infallibility of reason, and then it of itself suffices, without other infallible teacher; if you say it cannot, you deny the possibility of establishing infallibly the infallibility of your body of teachers.

"We reply by distinguishing. Reason is infallible within its own province, we grant; but in regard to what transcends its reach, we deny. To deny the infallibility of reason within its province would be to deny the possibility not only of faith, but of both science and knowledge, and to sink into absolute skepticism, — even to 'doubt that doubt itself be doubting,' — which is impossible; for no man doubts that he doubts. Revelation does not deny reason, but presupposes it, and supplies its defect by faith. The objection to reason is not that it cannot judge infallibly of *some* matters, but

that it cannot judge infallibly of *all* matters. But because it cannot judge infallibly of all matters, to say it can judge infallibly of none is not to reason justly. As well say, I am not infallibly certain that I see the tree before my window, because I cannot see all that may be going on in the moon. It is infallibly certain that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time; that two things respectively equal to a third are equal to one another; that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; that what begins to exist must have a creator; that every effect must have a cause, and that every supernatural effect must have a supernatural cause, and that the change of one natural substance into another natural substance is a supernatural effect; that every voluntary agent acts to some end, and every wise and good agent to a wise and good end. These and the like propositions are all infallibly certain. Reason, within its sphere, is therefore infallible; but out of its sphere it is null.

"Human testimony, within its proper limits, backed by circumstances, monuments, institutions, which presuppose its truth and are incompatible with its falsehood, is itself infallible. I have never seen London, but I have no occasion to see it in order to be as certain of its existence as I am of my own. History, too, is a science; and although every thing narrated in it may not be true or even probable, yet there are historical facts as certain as mathematical certainty itself. It is infallibly certain that there were in the ancient world the republics of Athens, Sparta, and Rome; that there was a peculiar people called the Jews, that this people dwelt in Palestine, that they had a chief city named Jerusalem, in this chief city a superb temple dedicated to the worship of the one God, and that this chief city was taken by the Romans, this temple burnt, and this people, after an immense slaughter, were subdued and dispersed among the nations, where they remain to this day. Here are historical facts, which can be infallibly proved to be facts.

"Now the miracles, regarded as facts, are simple historical facts, said to have occurred at a particular time and place, and are in their nature as susceptible of historical proof as any other facts whatever. Ordinary historical testimony is as valid in their case as in the case of Cæsar's or Napoleon's battles. Reason, observing the ordinary laws of historical criticism, is competent to decide infallibly on the fact whether they are proved to have actually occurred or not. Reason, then, is competent to the *first* point in the process of proof, namely, the fact of the miracles.

"It is equally competent to the *second* point, namely, whether the fact alleged to be a miracle really be a miracle. A miracle is a supernatural effect produced in or on natural objects. The point for reason to make out, after the fact is proved, is whether the effect actually witnessed be a *supernatural* effect. That it can do

this in every case, even when the effect is truly miraculous, we do not pretend; but that it can do it in some cases, we affirm, and to be able to do it in one suffices. When I see one natural substance changed into another natural substance, as in the case of converting water into wine, I know the change is a miracle; for nature can no more change herself than she could create herself. So, when I see a man who has been four days dead, and in whose body the process of decomposition has commenced and made considerable progress, restored to life and health, sitting with his friends at table and eating, I know it is a miracle; for to restore life when extinct is no less an act of creative power than to give life. It is giving life to that which before had it not, and is, therefore, an act which can be performed by no being but God alone. Reason, then, is competent to determine the fact whether the alleged miracle really be a miracle. It is competent, then, to the second point in the process of proof.

"No less competent is it to the *third*, namely, the Divine commission of the miracle-worker. In proving the event to be a miracle, I prove it to be wrought by the power of God. Now, I know enough of God, by the natural light of reason, to know that he cannot be the accomplice of an impostor, that he cannot work a miracle by one whose word may not be taken. The miracle, then, establishes the credibility of the miracle-worker. Then the miracle-worker is what he says he is. If he says he is God, he is God; if he says he speaks by Divine authority, he speaks by Divine authority, and we have God's authority for what he says. The third point, then, comes within the province of natural reason, and may be infallibly settled.

"The *fourth* point is a simple historical question; for it concerns what was done and said by our blessed Saviour in regard to the appointment of a body of teachers. It is to be settled historically, by consulting the proper documents and monuments in the case. It is not a question of speculation, of interpretation even, but simply a question of fact, to which reason is fully competent, and can, with proper prudence and documents, settle infallibly."

Here we prove clearly and conclusively, that the authority of the Church is provable, or not *a priori* unprovable; and also how it may be proved, and proved with infallible certainty, — not with the infallible certainty of divine faith, of course, but with that of human faith, — which is all the certainty we for the moment were concerned with, and which, since it is all reason can demand, is infallible in relation to reason. In doing this, we prove that we have a good case, that we may be permitted to come into court, and adduce testimony in our defence. Our Protestant minister, then, must yield or join issue with us, not on the law, but on the evidence; and this issue we of course are

prepared to meet. But he will not trust himself to this issue. There never would have been much controversy concerning the facts in the case, if the authority they are adduced to prove had not been assumed in the outset to be unsusceptible of proof. Christianity is rejected, whenever it is rejected, before the facts which sustain it are discovered to be uncertain or insufficient. Their doubtfulness or insufficiency is an after-thought, resorted to to justify the rejection to ourselves or to others.

III. The second general objection urged is, that faith, in the Catholic sense, is impossible. We do not understand the author of the letter to deny the possibility of faith in general, but the particular species of faith we contend for. He denies what Catholics call divine faith, but not simply intellectual or human faith. This we gather from what he himself says. He defines faith to be trust or apprehension of spiritual things; and though he distinguishes this from intellectual assent to given propositions, we do not understand him to mean that intellectual assent is never to be yielded to any propositions at all, but only to a given class or order of propositions. That he wrote the letter before us is a given proposition, to which the intellect assents or does not assent. *Our* intellect assents to it. Is this assent unauthorized? If he says it is not, he concedes intellectual assent; if he says it is, he also concedes intellectual assent, because he cannot deny that it is authorized, without assenting intellectually to a proposition. Two and two are four. Here is a given proposition, in regard to which he must say he intellectually assents to it, intellectually dissents from it, or is unable to say whether he assents or dissents; but in one case or another he intellectually assents to a given proposition, though not to the same proposition. He who denies affirms; for the denial affirms the falsity of what is denied; and when the denial and affirmation are in the same order, both as to the subject and as to the object, one is as much an act of faith as the other. When, by the grace of God, I deny Liberalism to be the revelation of God, I make an act of faith as well as when by the same grace I affirm the truth of Catholicity. Universal denial is impossible; because he who denies at least affirms his own existence as the subject denying; and no man can doubt that he doubts. Moreover, the writer, in defining faith to be trust or apprehension of things spiritual, necessarily concedes faith in the sense of intellectual assent to given propositions. He

will not say, most assuredly, that in that apprehension of things spiritual, which he calls faith, the things apprehended are denied, but must concede that they are affirmed. If affirmed, there is intellectual assent to a given proposition; for nothing but propositions are ever affirmed or denied. Trust also implies belief, and belief as distinguished from that intellectual assent termed knowledge; for it refers always to the future, of which we have and can have no direct and positive knowledge. The sun will rise to-morrow, is a given proposition. The writer doubtless *trusts* that the sun will rise to-morrow; but he could not so trust, did he not so believe. Belief is necessarily in all cases the basis of trust. But belief is always and necessarily an intellectual assent to a given proposition; since it would obviously be a contradiction in terms, either to say that a man believes what he does not intellectually assent to, or that he believes without believing any thing. We are, therefore, bound, in simple justice to the writer, to presume, that, when he distinguishes faith from intellectual assent to given propositions, it is not his intention to deny all intellectual assent, nor all faith in the sense of intellectual assent to given propositions, but only intellectual assent to given theological propositions, or that species of faith which Catholics denominate divine faith. Hence the impossibility of eliciting faith, which he asserts, we must restrict then to divine faith, and not extend to all faith, whether human or divine. Furthermore, we do not, in the objection we are about to consider, understand the objector to affirm the impossibility of eliciting faith on the ground that the authority is not possible, but on the ground that it is not possible to elicit it by means of the authority. If he took the first ground, this objection would resolve itself into the one we have just examined, and would be answered in what we have already said. But he distinguishes it from that, and evidently does not intend to adduce it as an additional proof of the impossibility of the authority, but as a proof that the authority, if proved, would avail nothing, since it is impossible by its aid to elicit an act of faith in the Catholic sense. The evident intention of his argument is to disprove, not the possibility, but the utility, of authority. Hence, we must so interpret it as to save the possibility of the authority. This premised, we proceed to the argument.

"To accept the authority of the Roman [Catholic] Church either involves an act of faith, or it does not. If it does, this is the same as saying that an act of faith is required preliminary to any possible or even supposable act of faith, which is absurd;

if it does not, then the investigation of the claims of that Church becomes a purely intellectual process, requiring only the clearness of mind and moral honesty which any other intellectual process requires." From which, we suppose, he would conclude that an act of faith is impossible, or, if possible at all, possible only as merely intellectual or human faith, neither of which Catholicity can admit. We reply, — To the first part of the dilemma, we concede the supposition, but deny the consequence ; because the act of faith necessarily, as faith, includes both antecedent and consequent, and therefore the acceptance of the authority is the act of faith, not its preliminary. To the second part, we deny of course the supposition, but concede the conclusion. There is a difference between the investigation of the claims of authority, and its acceptance by an act of divine faith. The investigation is unquestionably a purely intellectual process, but the faith elicited on it may be not merely intellectual, but divine, as Catholicity asserts ; because the investigation never motives the assent, but simply removes the intellectual obstacles to it.

The conclusion, in the first part, evidently rests on the assumption, that the acceptance of authority is distinct from and prior to the act of faith elicited on it, and therefore requires to be motived by a distinct and prior authority. This we deny, because, —

1. It involves a contradiction. If the objection proves any thing, it is not the impossibility of eliciting faith by authority, but the impossibility of authority itself, since it denies authority can authorize till accepted by us, — which is to deny it to be authority ; for it is the essence of authority to authorize *per se*. But to deny the possibility of authority is to contradict the intention of the argument, which, as we have seen, was to concede the possibility of authority, and to prove its inutility. Moreover, the assumption involves a contradiction in terms, and is not supposable. There is a contradiction in terms, where the subject is denied in the predicate. But the assumption does deny the subject in the predicate. The subject is the authority of the Church ; the predicate is, that it cannot authorize unless accepted by us, or simply that it depends on us for its authoritativeness. But that which depends on any thing not contained in itself for its authoritativeness is not authority ; for, as we have said, the essence of authority is to authorize *per se*. In making your assumption, you either suppose authority or you do not. If you do, you deny it in your predicate, since your predicate

denies that it is in itself authority. If you do not, your argument concludes nothing, for your predicate has no subject.

The writer intended by this argument either to prove the impossibility of authority, or the impossibility of faith by authority. Not the first, as is evident from the terms of the argument itself, and from the fact, that if he had he would have been only repeating the argument in another form, which he had just urged, and which we have refuted in proving the authority provable ; for, if provable, it cannot be metaphysically impossible. Then the second ; but if so, he contradicts his intention, and makes the unsupposable supposition of an unauthoritative authority. He who supposes authority at all supposes, by the very force of the word, that which can authorize without any virtue but its own. This objection, then, is less creditable to the dialectician than to the "consistent Protestant."

2. We retort the argument. The objector, as we have seen, admits, at least, the possibility of human faith. But his argument, if it proves any thing, proves that no act of faith, not even of human faith, is possible. The assumption in the argument is, that authority cannot authorize *per se*, by its own virtue, but must be accepted by a preliminary act before it can motive an act of faith. This preliminary act of acceptance must be itself an act of faith ; for it is absurd to pretend that we can elicit faith on an authority that we do not believe, or that the assent *on* it can transcend the order of assent *to* it. Then this preliminary act of faith will require a prior and distinct authority to motive it, and this in turn will require to be accepted by a new act of faith motived by a new authority, and thus on *in infinitum ;* so that no act of faith can be assumed to be possible without the assumption of an infinite series of acts of faith, motived by an infinite series of authorities, which is infinitely absurd. According to this reasoning, there can be no authority for faith, and no faith on authority. But all faith is on authority ; for the very definition of faith, as our correspondent well knows, is *assent on authority*. Therefore there can be no faith. This definition of faith is *per genus*, not *per differentiam ;* and therefore assent on authority must be essential to faith in general, common to all the species of faith, and therefore to human faith as well as to divine faith. Faith, then, is assent on authority. But either the acceptance of the authority involves an act of faith, or it does not. If it does, this is the same as saying an act of faith is required preliminary to any

possible or even supposable act of faith, which is absurd. If it does not, then no act of faith is possible; for it is absurd to say there can be faith on an authority not believed. Our correspondent, then, must either deny the possibility of an act of even human or intellectual faith, or abandon the principle of his objection, and concede that authority may be competent to motive its own acceptance, and therefore its acceptance not necessarily imply a preliminary act motived by a distinct and prior authority.

If the writer insists, and denies that he concedes the possibility of even human faith, as specifically defined, we will go further, and retort his argument in the region of what is called knowledge. His argument, if admitted, proves not only that faith specifically defined is impossible, but that all science and intuition are impossible. He is a bold man who is prepared to deny all human faith, all human belief, and proves that he does not fear to take his stand on the very edge of the gulf of absurdity; but he who is prepared to deny all knowledge, whether discursive or intuitive, proves that he has already taken the plunge into the gulf itself. But he, who asserts that authority cannot authorize till its acceptance is motived by another authority, does deny not only all faith, but all knowledge, whether discursive or intuitive. Faith and knowledge, though specifically distinguishable, are generically the same. Both are assent, and assent on authority. The denial of all assent on authority is, therefore, the denial of all knowledge, as well as of all faith.

That all knowledge, whether discursive or intuitive, is assent on authority, is as certain as any thing can be to natural reason. Demonstration, as the word itself indicates, merely *shows* the mind the conclusion in its relation to some principle or principles which the mind holds to be indubitable. It is the preamble to the assent yielded, but in no conceivable case its motive; and hence it is, that we not unfrequently find persons, not destitute of intellectual ability, who resist the force of the clearest demonstration. Two things respectively equal to a third are equal to one another. The demonstration of this consists in the discursive process which enables the mind to perceive that the equality predicated in the one case is the equality predicated in the other. The motive of the assent yielded to the conclusion is the principle that the same is the same, things identical are identical, what metaphysicians call the principle of contradiction or of non-contradiction. In every demonstration, the process is the same. The demonstra-

tion does not demonstrate its principle, but reduces the demonstrable matter to the principle or principles applicable in the case, and the mind assents solely on the authority of the principles. In discursive knowledge, it is clear, then, that there is, contrary to the principle of the objection, immediate assent on authority.

In intuition, whether internal or external, whether of principles or of material objects, it is the same. The same is the same; the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time; whatever begins to exist must have a cause; no contingent being can exist without a sufficient reason, &c.;—are principles, however variously they may be expressed, which every reasonable being admits and must admit; but which cannot be proved, since every process of proof demands them as its postulates. We may be told that they are intuitively beheld; but this only means that they are beheld as constituent principles of reason, or simply as that which the reason declares immediately to be necessary truth. The intuition does not seize them *in se*, but simply in the reason, and the assent to them has and can have no motive but reason herself. Suppose the authority of reason, their validity is supposed; deny the authority of reason, and their validity is denied. The assent, then, to what are called first principles is solely assent on authority. In external intuition, the assent is also on authority. I behold a tree, a house, the sun; at least, so I say, but question the authority of my senses; how, then, could I say so? The assent I give to the proposition, I see a house, a tree, a man, the sun, or that in either of them I see a real object, rests for its motive on the authority of my perceptive power, and therefore is assent on authority. The whole of human knowledge, turn the matter as we will, resolves itself, in the last analysis, into assent on the authority of our faculties, that is to say, belief in our faculties; in science, belief in reason, in perception, in the perceptive power. No metaphysical analysis of either the objects apprehended, or of the faculties apprehending, can get behind this, as is easily proved; because, in attempting to verify the authority of our faculties, we must assume them, and the proof of them is necessarily the proof of the same by the same.

Now, to accept the authority of our faculties either involves an act of faith, or it does not. If it does, this is the same as saying an act of faith is required preliminary to any possible or even supposable act of faith, which is absurd. If it does not, then

no act of knowledge is possible. Therefore, either no knowledge is possible, or an act of faith does not necessarily demand an antecedent act of acceptance of its authority by virtue of an antecedent authority. Our young friend, then, must either abandon the principle of his objection, or deny all knowledge. But this last he cannot do, if he would ; because he can make the denial only by virtue of his faculties, and in making it necessarily supposes their authority. But, their authority supposed, it is false to say there can be no knowledge. Moreover, he cannot affirm his objection against us, without making an act of faith in the faculties on whose authority he affirms it. This act of faith is legitimate, or it is not. If it is, his objection is unfounded, because a legitimate act of faith is possible ; if it is not, the objection is unfounded, by the very terms of the proposition, because it is made on an illegitimate authority. So in either case the objection falls to the ground, and the writer is precluded from the right to urge it.

4. The assumption on which the argument rests confounds the act of faith with the act of reasoning. It denies faith to be possible, because it is not discursive ; which is as if we should say, an act of faith is not possible, because, if possible, it would be an act of *faith*, and not an act of *reasoning ;* or as if we should deny the possibility of Peter, because, if he should exist, he would be Peter, and not John. The argument assumes that in faith the authority is concluded by one act, and that which is received on it is concluded from it by another act, and then asks, But from what is the authority concluded ? But this process is reasoning, not believing, — the act of discursion, not of faith. Faith, if it be faith, is *immediate* assent on authority, and therefore necessarily includes *in one simple, indivisible act of assent* both antecedent and consequent. This is faith ; and faith, in this sense, we have shown, we must admit, or else deny the possibility of all demonstration and of all intuition. The solution of the whole difficulty lies in this distinction between faith and discursion. In discursion, we proceed by successive steps from antecedent to consequent ; but in faith we do not. In reasoning we first conclude the authority, and then what the authority proposes ; but faith does not conclude at all ; it includes in one simple, indivisible affirmation both the authority and that which the authority proposes. Had our young friend been aware of this rather important fact, he would have spared us his objection ; for he would himself have seen that the acceptance of the authority in the act of faith does not require

faith does not require an act precedent to the act of faith motived by a distinct and prior authority. Hence, our denial of the consequence in the first part of the dilemma is justifiable, and for the reason assigned, namely, because the act of faith, as faith, necessarily includes both antecedent and consequent, and therefore the acceptance of the authority is the act of faith, and not its preliminary.

IV. This distinction between the act of faith and the act of reasoning solves also the difficulty there may seem to be implied in the second part of the dilemma, namely: — If the acceptance of the authority does not involve an act of faith, "the investigation of the claims of the Church becomes a purely intellectual process, requiring only the clearness of mind and moral honesty which any other intellectual process requires." The investigation of the claims of the Church, on either alternative proposed, is a purely intellectual process; for only the intellect investigates, and whatever objection to Catholicity this implies, we must meet it, on the supposition that the acceptance of the authority does involve an act of faith, just as much as on the supposition that it does not. But there is no objection implied, unless Catholicity teaches, or is obliged to teach, that the assent in the act of faith is by virtue of the investigation, or motives or reasons which investigation discovers and adduces, as is evident of itself. But this she neither does nor is obliged to do. For, —

1. It involves a contradiction in terms. Faith is immediate assent on authority, without any other motive than is contained in the creditive subject and the credible object, as already established. To make it depend on the motive adduced by investigation would be to make it depend on some motive not contained in the creditive subject and the credible object, and to make it, not faith, but reasoning; for then it would be mediate, not immediate, assent, — a logical inference from a given antecedent. But to assert that faith is reasoning, a logical inference, is to contradict one's self in terms, for it is to deny the subject in the predicate.

2. The assent to any proposition is never, in any case whatever, by virtue of the preliminary investigation, or previous reasoning. This is evident from the analysis of the act of demonstration already given. In the act of reasoning there is never, strictly speaking, a new act of assent; for nothing is allowed to enter into the conclusion not previously contained

and declared in the premises. The conclusion only repeats, in a more clear and definite form, if you will, what had already been asserted in the premises ; and consequently, in assenting to it, we only assent to what we had already assented to in another form and under other conditions. No reasoning can be carried on for a single moment, unless all that is to be concluded is admitted before reasoning begins ; and all that reasoning ever does is to clear up our knowledge, and show that sometimes, perhaps always, in assenting to what we do assent to, we assent to more than we are aware of, or that our principles have a wider and more varied application than we at first perceived or suspected. This is evident in regard to syllogistic reasoning, as the opponents of that species of reasoning have clearly demonstrated. But all reasoning is syllogistic, and there is no actual or possible argument that may not, as logicians show, be reduced to a regular syllogism. The distinction set up by some writers on logic between syllogistic reasoning and inductive reasoning has no foundation in reality. Every induction is an enthymem, and the suppressed premise may be easily supplied. But, however this may be, there is no advance of knowledge, that is, no new assent in induction. What is understood by induction, as the term is generally used, is simply generalization or classification, — that is, the assertion of a general law from the observation of a certain number of particulars ; but the generalization, the moment it transcends the particulars observed, or is applied to other particulars, save so far as identical with these, and therefore improperly called *other* particulars, is in the predicament of the syllogistic conclusion which concludes what is not declared in the premises, and is a mere assertion, hypothesis, conjecture, or fancy. There is, then, and can be, in reasoning no new matter assented to ; consequently, the assent given in the conclusion is only a repetition of the assent previously given in the premises, and as that was given prior to the act of reasoning, it cannot be motived by it, or be in virtue of it.

These two considerations show beyond the possibility of dispute, that Catholicity is not obliged to suppose the assent of faith to be by virtue of the intellectual process of investigation, and could not do so without placing herself in conflict with all the laws of belief and of science. Reasoning never does and never can motive the assent ; all that it is or can be in any supposable case is the mere preamble to the assent, removing such obstacles as may intervene intellectually between the creditive

subject and the credible object. A great deal of useless labor would have been spared, if this fact had been more generally borne in mind. But Catholicity not only is not required to suppose the assent is by virtue of the investigation, not only has no right to do so, and would condemn herself if she did, but she actually does not. For,

3. The assent on the part of the subject she teaches is by virtue of the *donum fidei*, or supernatural gift of faith. The investigation, however successful, could not give us faith; it could only show us that the authority of the Church and what she proposes are involved in what is already believed or assented to by us, — or simply, that we must either accept the Church and what she proposes, or deny the fundamental principles of reason. But this would not be what she understands or intends by faith, nor the least conceivable approach to it. The act of faith, in her sense, is a supernatural act, requiring a supernatural object and a supernatural subject. Simple human reason is not the creditive subject, and cannot elicit the act of faith, unless supernaturalized, that is, supernaturalized *in quantum* creditive subject, by the *donum fidei*, which is not the act of faith, but the virtue of faith, — a supernatural elevation of the natural *vis creditiva*, or power to believe. This is the gift of God; not a natural gift, that is, not a gift given in the fact that we are human beings, but given supernaturally, in elevating us from the order of nature to the order of grace. Thus supernaturalized, the creditive subject is placed on the plane of the supernatural credible object, and they are thus correlatively creditive and credible; and if no obstacle intervene, the act of faith is not only elicitable, but elicited, without other motive than is contained in the subject and object, as is the case with every act of faith, whether human or divine,— by virtue, not of the preliminary process of reasoning, but of the *donum* or gift of faith supernaturally bestowed on the subject. This is what Catholicity teaches, and she affirms the possibility of faith on these conditions and no others. Therefore, conceding the investigation of the claims of the Church to be a purely intellectual process, it does not follow that the act of faith itself, whether understood of the assent to the authority, or of assent to what the authority proposes, is a purely intellectual act, or an act of faith on simple human reason or authority.

V. But our Protestant friend may reply, — Granting all this, it follows that you do not conclude the authority by a logical

process; and this is precisely what I tell you. "I do not say no Protestant can ever become a Romanist [Catholic]. This would be to contradict well known facts. But I do say that no purely logical process can suffice for such a result, and this impossibility your own arguments abundantly show." And is not this precisely the sum and substance of what you have now, *ex professo*, proved?

1. This objection does not take us by surprise, nor find us unprepared with an answer. In the first place, we remark that the objection is here supposed in a sense somewhat different from the one intended in the letter. The objection there is not that a logical process cannot suffice because the subject cannot be, in relation to the supernatural object of faith, *creditive* subject, unless supernaturalized by the infused virtue of faith, or the *donum fidei*; but because the arguments we use in proving the credibility of the Church all involve a paralogism, or the fallacy of attempting to prove the same by the same. This we have denied, and shown that our arguments in relation to their purpose as arguments are sound, and as strictly logical as arguments can be. This answers the objection in the sense intended by the writer.

2. In the second place, we have never pretended that the actual conversion of a Protestant to a Catholic demanded nothing more than a logical process, or that the assent of faith could be the logical consequent of a logical antecedent. To that conversion, to that assent, we have uniformly contended that the grace of God, the supernatural gift of faith, was not only useful, but necessary as the medium. The logical process was simply to show that such assent, though above our natural reason, is in accordance with it, and has all the conditions natural reason can demand or conceive to be essential. It was not urged as the motive of assent, or that by virtue of which the assent is elicited; for that we knew it was not, and could not be, for that it is not even in human faith. If the writer intended, then, to allege that the logical process is insufficient because it does not and cannot supply the motive or virtue by which the act of faith is elicited, he objected to what was not in question, and was betrayed into the fallacy called *ignorantia elenchi*.

3. But, thirdly, we deny that the assertion of the absolute necessity of the *donum fidei*, as the virtue by which the act of faith is elicitable and elicited, militates in the least against the sufficiency of the logical process. There may be, and undoubtedly are, many operations for which logic does not suffice. It

does not suffice to impart soundness to a gangrenous limb, to build a house, to navigate a ship, to paint a Madonna, or to chisel a crucifix; for in all these there is required a power which logic does not and cannot generate or furnish; but it would be absurd for this reason to pronounce the logical process insufficient, if it sufficed for what in any of these operations it is needed, or for which it would not be illogical to demand it. That logical process suffices, which suffices for the legitimate purpose or end of a logical process, or which accomplishes all which, according to the nature of logic, there is for it to accomplish. In the case supposed, the conversion of a Protestant or unbeliever to Catholicity, ascertain what there is for which logic is needed, or for which logic, according to its office in other cases, can be demanded, and if it suffice for that, it cannot be pronounced insufficient, but must be held to be sufficient. This premised, we proceed to determine what it is logic, in the supposed case, is needed for.

1. The logical process is not needed, either in human faith or in divine faith (for in this respect both are the same), to supply any of the *positive* conditions of faith. The subject and object must both be given independently of the logical process, or not given at all; and the subject must also be given as creditive, and the object as credible. The logical process never furnishes, and is never required to furnish, the subject with the faculty of believing, or the object with the capacity of being believed. Our Protestant friend would hardly expect by a logical process to bring his horse to believe his Liberalism, and the demonstration does not *make* the object credible, but merely *shows* it to be so. But all the positive conditions of faith are supposed when the subject and object are supposed, the one creditive, the other credible; because faith is immediate assent, demanding no motive or virtue but what is contained in the subject assenting, and object assented to, and this, too, whether the object be naturally or supernaturally credible, and the subject naturally or supernaturally creditive.

2. The logical process is never wanted in the case of actual believers, or in that of the children of the faithful, until they make an act of infidelity. Nothing is wanting or can be added, where all the conditions of faith are present. The believer has in the Sacrament of Baptism received the *donum fidei*, or grace of faith, and by this is creditive subject, and the Church has through her pastors and teachers proposed the credible object, and he has therefore all that is necessary or can be conceived

as necessary to elicit an act of faith, and an act of faith having all the legitimacy any act of faith ever has, or which reason ever does or can demand. So in the case of the children of the faithful. They receive, when brought to the Sacrament of Baptism, the *donum*, or virtue of faith, which gives them the power (as soon as their reason shall be so far developed as to render them capable of performing a proper *human* act) of believing, and the Church is present to instruct them, to propose the credible object, and they elicit the act of faith at once, without the necessity of any previous investigation or logical process whatever. This faith is not blind, is not credulous, is not illegitimate; because it has all the conditions of faith which reason demands or can conceive. It is as reasonable, as enlightened, and stands on as high and as firm ground, as the faith of the most erudite scholar, the acutest dialectician, and the profoundest philosopher, elicited only after the most laborious researches, the most patient investigation, and the most penetrating and subtile analysis. Logic is not needed for believers, or for children, in case the children are baptized and properly instructed. These, then, we may leave out of the question, as sufficiently provided for, and as having no occasion, either in order to become believers, or to justify their faith to themselves, to resort to a logical process.

3. The logical process can be necessary only in the case of unbelievers, when they would inquire into the reasonableness of the faith, and when we would convict them of being unreasonable in not believing. In a word, the only occasion or necessity there is for a logical process is furnished by infidels and heretics. These are to be converted, and logic may sometimes be used as an effective instrument for their conversion. It is here, then, we are to look for the precise work there is for the logical process; and if it suffices for what there is here for it to do, it suffices for all for which logic is needed, and is, therefore, sufficient.

4. As none of the positive conditions of faith depend on the logical process, we are concerned with unbelief only as it coexists with these conditions. If there is no belief because no creditive subject or no credible object, the difficulty is not a logical one, and it is illogical to demand its removal of logic. If all the conditions be present, the unbelief can arise only from some obstacle which obstructs their operation. This obstacle must be on the part of the object or on the part of the subject. It cannot be on the part of the object, if the Church be present supernaturally proposing it, or within reach of the subject, if disposed

to listen to her instructions. It must, then, be on the part of the subject. If on the part of the subject, it must be either in the defect of the *donum*, or on the part of the will, or the intellect, or both together. If in the defect of the *donum*, as that is one of the positive conditions of faith, it does not now concern us. Logic cannot obtain it, and we do not pretend that divine faith can be elicited without it ; and yet it is always the unbeliever's own fault, if he have it not. If it is on the part of the will, the obstacle is a moral one, and we have nothing to do with it at present. It is, then, the individual's own fault that there is an obstacle to his believing, and to believe at any time is possible to him if he wills it. Nothing remains, then, but the obstacle on the part of the intellect, and it is only with intellectual objections that logic ever deals, or is expected to deal. What the logical process, then, is needed for, is simply to remove the obstacle to assent which is interposed by the intellect.

5. The intellect may and does raise numerous objections to the Church ; alleges that God has never revealed himself supernaturally to men ; that he has never founded a Church with authority to teach ; that the Roman Catholic Church is not the true Church, that it has become corrupt, is not what it was, has failed, and should no longer be suffered to cumber the ground ; in a word, the objections urged by our young friend, and all that variety of objections quite too numerous to mention, which may be read — if one have the conscience to do it — in infidel and heretical books. These objections are nothing for the believer, because, having the *donum*, he has a higher authority for his faith than the simply human intellect, and therefore a higher authority than these objections can possibly claim or pretend to ; and to him, therefore, it is of no manner of consequence whether he knows the intellectual answer to them or not. But in the case of unbelievers, they obstruct the operation of grace, and hinder them from following it to the Holy Sacrament, in which they would receive the *donum*, and be able to elicit faith. They require in the case of these to be removed, and the ordinary instrument to which we resort for their removal is the logical process ; though the grace of God may, and sometimes does, suffice to remove them without any preliminary logical process at all, or to produce faith in spite of them, and it is always better to rely on that, than on our investigation. But be this as it may, for those who demand a logical process, here is its work, its precise work, and its only work, — simply what we are doing or trying to do in the case of our young

friend, to show that the objections urged by the intellect are unfounded, not authorized even by the intellect.

6. Now the precise question before us is, — Does or can the logical process suffice for this work? If it can, it suffices for all for which it is needed, and our young Protestant minister is refuted; if it cannot, we may be right in our belief, but mistaken in our logic. That the logical process can and does suffice for this we have shown in the former part of this present article, in reply to the objection that the supernatural is not logically provable, for we have shown there that it is logically provable. The supernatural does not require, as we have said, to be proved to the believer, because he has for his faith in the *donum fidei* what is above proof, and sufficient to override any objection the intellect can suggest; for by virtue of the *donum* he knows the truth of what he believes with an altogether higher certainty than it is possible for the objector to have in the case of the objection. In his faith, he has the authority of God against the objection; in the objection, he has only the authority of man against God. So long, then, as he is attentive to the graces he receives, and does not by his culpable neglect or deadly sin lose the *donum*, or obstruct its operation, it is absolutely impossible for him to doubt; for only the human intellect can doubt, and he has the supernaturalized intellect overriding the human, and silencing each of its questionings in the very inception. Thus faith, the undoubting faith of the believer, which secures him so much serenity and peace, does not arise from a blind obedience to authority, and a wilful closing of our eyes to inquiry, as unbelievers and Protestants foolishly allege, but from the fact that he has really in the gift of faith a spiritual apprehension above all purely natural apprehension, and is able to affirm the truth from a higher stand-point than the boldest impugner of his faith can any one of his objections. For this no logical process, as we have said over and over again, can suffice or is needed. But this is possible to all who interpose no obstructions, that is, none of the will, and none of the intellect. Those of the will we have dismissed, as not concerning our present purpose; but we may remark, by the way, that the removal of the intellectual objections will do little for the actual conversion of the unbeliever, if his will remains opposed to the Church; and as a matter of fact, in most cases, in a country where the Church is known or is accessible, if we find a man who rejects her, we may at once conclude the principal cause is in the will, and that his intellectual objections are

brought merely to sustain him in his moral repugnance to the Church, and determination to resist her authority. If there were no obstacles in the will, those in the intellect would amount to very little, and would soon disappear entirely. But the intellectual objections are all that now concern us, and these all have their seat in the intellect, as their subject, and rest on its authority alone. To remove them, by showing from intellectual *data* that they have really no foundation in the intellect, is perfectly logical; for, if we in replying to them assume the human intellect, we only assume what you assume in making them; and if our refutation is valid only in the sphere of the human intellect, your objections, granting them all that can be claimed for them, are valid only in the same sphere, since you have no more right to conclude from the human intellect *against* the supernatural, than we have to conclude for it. If you deny the legitimacy of this, we retort your argument; for its whole force consists in the fact that we cannot conclude the supernatural from the natural, since there can be nothing in the conclusion not in the premises, and the supernatural is not in the natural. But to conclude the supernatural negatively is still to conclude it, and this is what you do when from the natural you conclude against the supernatural. The proposition, that the supernatural is *not*, is no more in the natural, than the proposition, that the supernatural *is*. Your objections, then, can be assumed to have force or validity only in the sphere of the human intellect; all that is required for their logical refutation is, then, simply to show that they have no force or validity even in that sphere. The logical process, as a logical process, suffices, then, for their removal, for it meets them with an authority as high as that on which they stand; and if from the human intellect we show they are without foundation, you must either abandon them or admit that the human intellect can contradict itself; and when we have driven an opponent to this alternative, he is refuted, in the only sense in which the word is ever used.

7. But our Liberal minister, not quite comprehending our argument, may perhaps be disposed to object, — Granting that the logical process removes, or is competent as a logical process to remove, the objections the intellect may raise, still it does not suffice, for it does not prove the Church. We say it does; for to remove all the objections the intellect can raise to a proposition is precisely what is meant, and all that ever is or can be meant, by the word *prove*. The proof in no conceivable case ever goes

beyond the removal of the *prohibens*, the objections the intellect raises, as is evident from the fact we have established, that the assent is always immediate, without any other positive motive or reason than is contained in the subject assenting and object assented to, and in the further fact, that there never can be in the conclusion any thing not previously declared and assented to in the premises. To believe is normal, and to elicit faith nothing is needed but to remove obstructions; and as this is all, and because to believe is normal, and always follows the removal of obstructions, unless voluntarily withheld, the process of removing the obstructions is called demonstration, or proof. But, in strictness, the proof, the demonstration, is never positive, but always negative. When, then, we have removed the obstructions, shown that reason has nothing further to object, we say, and we have the right to say, according to the law in the case, and the uniform usage of language, that we have proved, demonstrated, substantiated, our proposition.

8. This holds good, also, in regard to human testimony. Not to believe on human testimony at all would be as unreasonable as not to believe, on the authority of the principle of identity, or the principle that the same is the same, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. To believe human testimony is normal; and hence children always believe every one, and all that is told them, till by experience they have learned to distrust. But in after life, however distrustful we may have been rendered by experience of the duplicity of men, we always believe every man's testimony when there are no considerations which impeach it or which tend to take away its credibility. We have and can have no positive reasons for believing, for, if we were to insist upon them, we could never believe any one man without an infinite series of vouchers for his veracity. Why I should believe a fellow-man I know not; but I know it is a principle of my nature to believe him, when I have nothing to object to his credibility. The verification of human testimony is only a negative process; and yet what is established on human testimony, against which no valid objection can be brought, is established, proved, in as high a sense as we ever prove any proposition whatever: and the certainty resting on it, and which is called *moral* certainty, is as high as *metaphysical* certainty. Consequently, when we have shown that in those matters which fall under human testimony, and those which are said to demand demonstrative proof, the mind according to its own principles or laws has nothing to object, and cannot object

without contradicting those laws or principles, we have done all that is or can be understood by proving a proposition. The logical process we have pointed out does this in the case of the Church, and therefore it *proves* it, and the human intellect cannot refuse to accept the Church for what she professes to be, without doing violence to itself.

9. That we here clear up the whole mystery of the elicitation of an act of faith, we are far from pretending, if by clearing up is meant removing the remote as well as the proximate mystery. How the subject can be creditive, or how the object can be credible, what is the secret virtue of the believing faculty of the one and of the credibility of the other, we know not, save so far as we see the effects. But this is nothing to us in particular, for, if it is an objection, it is one which concerns others as well as ourselves, since an act of intuition or of discursion as well as of faith, an act of human faith as well as of divine faith, involves it. What constitutes the subject cognoscitive? what constitutes the object cognoscible? the subject able to know, and the object capable of being known? The question is old, and few who have entered somewhat into metaphysical studies can be wholly ignorant of the efforts which philosophers, ancient and modern, have made, by investigation of the cognoscitive subject or the cognoscible object, to wring out the secret, and tell us, not that we know, but how we know. No one has pushed his researches farther in this direction than Immanuel Kant in his *Critik der reinen Vernunft;* but he has ended where he began, simply telling us we know because — we do. All that any man by natural reason can say is, we know because Almighty God has made us intelligent beings, and placed us in relation with cognoscible objects, that we believe because he has made us creditive subjects, and placed us in relation with credible objects, and we should not be what we are, if we did or could not. In supernatural faith, we believe because we are made by the *donum* supernaturally creditive, and by the presence of the Church are in relation with a supernaturally credible object. Here is all natural reason says or can say. That this leaves a mystery unexplained, we do not deny; there is mystery everywhere, could we but see far enough into things to detect it; but here is no special mystery, no peculiar mystery, only the one great mystery common to every act of human life, which lies at the bottom of all things, and which none but God alone can clear up. This is enough; for when we have reduced the special mystery in some particular case to the one

general mystery which envelopes all, we have done all that ever is or can be understood by clearing up or explaining it.

Yet somewhat farther than this the Catholic believer may and does go. To the eye of natural reason, every act of human life, discursively considered, if you wish to go behind reason, involves a *vicious* circle, from which by way of conclusion from a given antecedent it is impossible to extricate ourselves; and were it not for the act of faith which we make immediately in our faculties, we never should get out of it, or perform a single human act. This act of faith, human faith we mean, including in one simple indecomposable act both antecedent and consequent, by a pure and bold affirmation, lifts us from the circle, and life proceeds. Here is the fact which has turned the heads of our Transcendentalists, and which they have known so little how to use, — an immense fact, not always duly appreciated, but which no sound philosophy can neglect. Yet this act, this pure affirmation, man's first act and the most astonishing act of his whole life, has no logical validity, and, if we insist on concluding it from an antecedent, is logically impossible; for there is no conceivable antecedent from which it can be concluded. Logically considered, it involves the precise absurdity our correspondent thinks he discovers in the act of divine faith. Hence, in the history of all ages, while the mass of men believe in their faculties, and live a practical life, the few who demand a reason for all they do, though practically believing with the multitude, yet in their speculations have an almost irresistible tendency to universal skepticism. They make, indeed, with the rest of us, their act of faith in the reason, for this they cannot help doing; but speculatively this has in their eyes no validity, and they see not how universal doubt is to be escaped. Men recoil instinctively from the terrible conclusion that there is no certainty, that a man is not really certain that doubt is doubting, and in all ages there have been philosophers who have struggled manfully against it. Plato and Aristotle among the ancients, Descartes, Leibnitz, Malebranche, Kant, Reid and Stewart, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Cousin, among the moderns, have all tried to overcome the speculative doubt, and legitimate this primitive act of faith; but we need hardly say that they have done so without the least conceivable success. M. Cousin has spoken as well on the subject as any philosopher, ancient or modern, with whom we are acquainted; yet he has done nothing but place the difficulty more prominently before our eyes. He thought he had found its solu-

tion in the distinction between spontaneity and reflection, the subjective reason and the objective reason. He supposed the act was by the spontaneous virtue of the objective and impersonal reason, which, as objective and impersonal, was independent of us, and logically antecedent to the primitive affirmation. But we have only our subjective reason as authority for the objective, and by our subjective reason only are we able to say there is an objective reason; which necessarily destroys the independence of the objective reason, and reduces its authority to that of the subjective and personal. This M. Cousin's bitter enemy, M. Pierre Leroux, the leader of the progressist or modified Saint-Simonian school, discovered, and he thought to escape the objection by seizing on the fact, that in every intellectual phenomenon there are subject and object, which, in our apprehension, are always *me* and *not me*. But nothing was gained; because there was nothing except our faculties to vouch for the fact that the *not me* was not *me*. Turn which way we will, by natural reason alone there is no escape, as she herself asserts; because it is demonstrably evident that we have nothing but reason with which to verify reason, and in every effort to verify it we must begin by assuming it.

It is only in the Catholic faith that we are able to find the solution of this difficulty. In the *donum fidei*, which is a *supernaturally* infused power or virtue, we have, as it were, a supernatural reason, superior to natural reason, the antecedent from which it may be concluded, and its primitive act of faith legitimated. We receive the Church on the authority of the *donum*, the supernatural gift, and therefore on an authority above and more ultimate than reason. The authority of the Church, by virtue of this supernatural principle of assent, is really above and more ultimate than reason, and not, as those who are outside of the Church commonly imagine, merely the authority of reason in a disguised form. This authority is, then, really authority for reason, and whatever it proposes is an antecedent from which reason may logically conclude, without any danger of concluding *idem per idem*. Now, the Church teaches us that man was made to the image and similitude of his Maker, and that this image and similitude are in his rational nature. In his rational nature, man participates of the Divine nature, and in that sense in which the essence of the Divinity is to know, and to know without other medium than itself. Hence, it would be a contradiction in terms to suppose the reason could not make the affirmation in question.

This solution is substantially the solution M. Cousin himself gives, but with this difference: he professes to obtain it from the reason itself, from which it is not obtainable; whereas we obtain it by means of supernatural faith elicited by the *donum*, which makes all the difference in the world. If we ask him to verify his solution, he can answer only by a paralogism; but if he ask us to do it, we can answer by the supernatural authority of faith, logically antecedent to reason. Reason in its sphere is valid, because it is a participation of the divine nature, as the *donum fidei* is in the order of grace, and the *lumen gloriæ* in the beatified state; but reason herself cannot affirm that she is this participation, for she is too feeble a participation for that, and therefore cannot legitimate herself; and herein is it specifically distinguished from the *donum fidei* and the *lumen gloriæ*, each of which participates in a sufficient degree to affirm its own participation. Reason once known to be a participation of the Divine nature is known to be valid in all its normal acts, because it is in some sense God himself who sees and affirms, so to speak, in its intuitions or affirmations. In believing it, *in its sphere, and in its normal exercise*, it is indeed God that we believe; for it is in him we live and move and are, and therefore that we see, and know, and affirm, — substantially the *vision in God* of Malebranche, a doctrine materially true; but formally false, when asserted, as he asserts it, on the authority of natural reason itself; for, as we have seen, it is not discoverable by natural reason, and can be known and established only by the authority of the supernatural faith. This is not the only instance in which philosophers have stolen their solutions from faith, and sent them back to us as the property of natural reason itself.

But, admitting that by the *donum fidei* we legitimate the Church by an authority antecedent to reason, and by the Church we legitimate reason in showing that in its sphere and degree it is a participation of the Divine nature, we are able, by means of the Catholic faith, to get out, not only of practical skepticism, but of speculative or philosophical skepticism also, and to establish human science on a solid and imperishable foundation. But it is only by the Catholic faith this can be done; for it cannot be done without a principle more than human, and that precise supernatural principle which we have in Catholicity. Hence, in a deeper and nobler sense than is commonly imagined, at least by those not Catholics, is revelation the only solid basis of philosophy, — not only because it furnishes *data* not furnished

by natural reason, from which conclusions may be drawn throwing much light on natural phenomena, but because it enables us to verify reason itself, the instrument of philosophy, and without whose verification there can be no sound philosophy.

10. Some will, perhaps, object, since we deny the necessity of all investigation into the motives of credibility, in the case of actual believers, and of children validly baptized and properly instructed from the first, that we lay down the dangerous principle of believing without examining, and throw open the door to the reception of falsehood as well as of truth. The common notion among those outside of the Church is, that no faith can be reasonable which has not been preceded by examination of its motives, and in their case this may be true ; because there are obstacles in their way, and they cannot, or will not, believe till they are removed. To them, therefore, we say always, examine patiently, thoroughly, in a meek and humble and prayerful spirit, and you will believe ; and we should not feel authorized in calling upon them to believe, if we had not sufficient reasons, which we can offer them, to remove every objection which reason can suggest against believing. But this is an exception to the general rule, rendered necessary in their case, because they are out of the normal order. To others we do not say, examine and then believe ; for they already have all that examination can give them. The normal order of life is to begin by believing, not by reasoning ; for, till we believe, we have nothing to reason from. To begin in the order of grace by believing is not anomalous, irregular, but conformable to the general law of all life, and therefore cannot be reasonably objected to.

As to the dangerousness of the principle, it is purely imaginary. The *donum fidei* is not a general *vis creditiva*, but simply *vis creditiva* in relation to its special correlative, the supernatural credible object. Its special correlative is God supernaturally revealing himself. As it is a supernatural gift for the express purpose of enabling us to believe this supernatural object, it would be a contradiction in terms to suppose it a power to believe any thing else, and impious to suppose it could be the power to believe any object not strictly and absolutely true. It is not the power to believe where there is no credible object, and where the truth is not there is for it no credible object, and there no faith is or can be elicited. In a word, the creditive subject, made creditive subject by the special infused grace or participation of Almighty God, can elicit no act of faith with-

out a credible object ; and no object, not strictly true, can be, in relation to it, credible object, unless we deny the veracity of God, and allege that he can deceive or be deceived ; for in the *donum* it is by him, and only by him, that we believe, and it is, in some sense, he that believes in us.

Moreover, all faith is belief on authority, and the authority itself is the primary object of the faith ; that which it proposes is only the secondary object, believed inasmuch as we believe the authority proposing. To the elicitation of an act of divine or supernatural faith, not only the supernatural elevation of the subject, by the infused habit or virtue of faith, is necessary, but also the *supernatural authority* proposing itself, and what is to be believed on it as the credible object. This authority must be that of God himself ; for, in the act of divine faith, it is not only by him that we believe, but he himself whom we believe. Then, unless God, who is truth itself, and infinitely *verax*, can propose and believe falsehood, it is utterly impossible to elicit the act of faith, save on condition of a credible object strictly and absolutely true.

This meets, in advance, the objection which might at first sight seem to arise in the case of children of heretics and schismatics. If these children are validly baptized, as they may be, what is to hinder them from believing the doctrines of the sect in which they are born, as readily and as firmly as the children of Catholics do the doctrines of the Church ? These children, if validly baptized, receive the *donum* or virtue of faith, which is all they need or can have before coming to years of discretion ; and if they die in infancy, they will undoubtedly be saved. If, when they come to years of discretion, they obstruct it by no mortal sin, it is in them a power to elicit the act of faith, if the credible object be present, and they will infallibly elicit it. But in the bosom of the sects the credible object is not present, but is wanting, in most cases, even in its secondary sense, in all in its primary sense, namely, the authority proposing itself, and without whose proposition what is to be believed on it, as the dogmas or several articles of faith, is not believable. This authority none of the sects, even by their own confession, have ; they deny all such authority, and make it a capital sin in us that we allege that there is such authority, and that we have it in our Church. Not having this authority, they have not the credible object ; and therefore, even if they have the *donum*, they have not the essential conditions of eliciting an act of faith. Therefore it is impossible, in the bosom of any

of the sects, to make an act of faith, as we have heretofore, on several occasions, proved.

We do not disguise from ourselves that this conclusion may seem harsh and illiberal to our sectarian friends ; and if it rested on our authority alone, we should not dare utter it. But it is not we who say so, but the truth itself ; and we should be wanting in that charity which loves our neighbour as ourselves, if we sought to conceal or to soften it. It is no charity to those who are in error to be left to think their condition is not perilous. We may be as liberal as we will in what is our own, but there is no place for our liberality in that which is not ours, but God's. It is not we, but he, who makes the conditions of salvation, and such conditions as seem to him good ; and it is fair to presume that we could make no better ones, were the matter left to us. Our business, and that of every rational being, is to find out the conditions of salvation actually established in the divine order, and to conform to them, without disturbing ourselves with the question, whether they are liberal or illiberal, pleasing to the unbeliever or displeasing. The Almighty is not very likely to do wrong, or to exact what he does not impart the ability to give. That sectarians do not and cannot elicit an act of faith is no more than they themselves know, or are morally bound to know. Our young friend, himself a minister, and occupying one of our old Puritan pulpits, not only begins by a virtual confession of his want of faith, but writes his whole letter to prove that an act of faith, properly so called, is utterly impossible. Chillingworth, decidedly the ablest champion the Protestant cause has ever counted, confesses that divine faith is not possible on Protestant principles, and boldly contends that God does not demand it. Doubtless, sectarians may generally *think* they have all the faith that it is possible for us human beings to have, but they know that what they have is not properly faith ; for they cannot be ignorant that faith, to be faith, must exclude doubt, and — unless the power of believing is obstructed by sin — even the possibility of doubt. The best among them, those the most firmly persuaded of their orthodoxy, know nothing of the calm, tranquil faith of the Catholic believer, — have no absolute certainty, such certainty as would make them feel it absurd, even by way of hypothesis, to suppose their sect may possibly err ; for every one confesses his sect is fallible, and denies that there is any infallible church. They may think they are as certain as others are, as certain as they can be ; but surely they are not so certain but they would

gladly be more certain. If they could have a higher certainty, how thankfully would they receive it, and from how much secret misgiving would it relieve them! "We *think* we are right; we *think* we cannot be deceived; we hope we are not; we pray that we may not be; we close our eyes and ears to whatever would suggest that we are; yet we do not know; it is possible we are mistaken; we are all liable to err; we try to be right, and we trust a merciful God will pardon us, if we are not." This is the most that we have ever known sectarians able to say; and if sometimes they attempt to say more, it is, if they are not evidently laboring under some hallucination, because they are conscious that more is requisite to come up to the standard of faith. Now, in all this there is no faith, not the most distant approach to faith. Sectarians are, then, not only without faith, but, unless altogether more stupid than we believe them, they know they have no faith; at least, the doubt and mistrust they experience indicate a sufficient knowledge of their want of faith to render them culpable, if they do not to the utmost of their ability inquire if a certain faith be not possible, — a faith so certain that they can conceive nothing more certain, and in which they can affirm the credible object as certainly as they can now their own existence, and more certainly than the mathematician, with natural reason alone, can that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. In every land, the Church is at their door, assuring them such a faith as this is possible, and the indispensable condition of salvation. Do they examine to see if what she says is true? Not at all. They will not seek, therefore they do not find; and whose the fault? It is not ours to say; but we leave it to them to decide, if, when they come to the judgment bar of God, it turns out, as it will, that the Church is right, what valid plea they will have for not having been true, devout Catholics. There stands the Church, or there stands Christ in the Church, knocking at the door of their hearts, his locks wet with the dew of the night, entreating them to arise and let him enter. What excuse have they for bidding him begone, and not trouble their rest? It is for them, and not for us, to answer. All we say is, "faith comes by hearing," and "without faith it is impossible to please God."

11. When we have established the Church to the human intellect, by removing the intellectual obstacles to its reception, we have the right in all subsequent controversies to appeal to it, as authority which even they who do not as yet receive it by

divine faith are bound, by the laws of their own reason, to acknowledge and submit to. On its authority we then tell them, and they cannot object, since by the very supposition no valid objection can be brought, that they are bound to elicit the act of divine faith, and that if they do not, whoever or wherever they are, it is their own fault; for, on the same unobjectionable authority, we tell them again that there is a preparatory grace given unto all men, which, if not resisted, — and which need not be resisted, for the act of resistance is a free, voluntary act on the part of him who resists, — will be immediately efficacious in disposing them to believe, and conducting them to the Holy Sacrament of Baptism, in which they will infallibly receive the *donum fidei*, and become able to elicit the faith required. Thus to believe is always in their power, if they will to believe. If they resist the grace of God, if they remain unbelievers, if they persist in opposing the word, however honest and sincere they may fancy themselves, we tell them, on the authority which their own reason declares to be paramount to all others, that they are in fault, are guilty before God, and have no right to expect any thing but everlasting condemnation. "He that believeth not shall be condemned." Here we obtain a motive that may operate on the will, and induce it not to resist divine grace, but to suffer it to be efficacious in preparing and finally completing the conversion. Hence the importance, in conjunction with divine grace, of the logical process.

VI. We have now answered the principal objections urged by the letter before us. We have endeavoured to make the answer conclusive, and, at the same time, as simple and popular in its form as the nature of the subject allowed. The reply is long, but it is well known that an objection may be stated in a single line, which will require a volume to refute. If we had been called upon to answer only for philosophers and theologians, we could have answered in much briefer space, and with far greater ease to ourselves; but all readers are not philosophers or theologians, and it requires not seldom less labor to prepare the answer than it does the majority of readers to receive it. We have aimed to adapt our remarks to the understanding of men of strong and clear minds of all classes and pursuits, and hope we have escaped the fault of being too popular for the professional and too scholastic for the general reader. A few additional remarks, in reply to certain miscellaneous objections

presented in the letter, and we close this already too protracted discussion.

1. Our correspondent tells us, that there are only two methods by which the claims of the Church can be established: the one, arguing from principles common to both parties; and the other, the historical method. The first he condemns as proving nothing, inasmuch as it assumes, but does not prove, the principles. Will he tell us how it is possible for two parties mutually opposed to argue together, if not from principles common to them both, and therefore from that on which they are not opposed, but agreed? He decides in favor of the historical method; but this, so far as it involves argument at all, involves arguments from principles common to both parties. Nothing can be concluded from history by either party for itself or against the other, save so far as both agree on the facts of history; and these facts, when agreed on, become principles common to both parties, from which conclusions may be drawn. One method, in fact, no more proves its principles than the other; for reasoning never proves its principles, but must always proceed from premises *given*, not obtained.

We grant the question of the Church is simply an historical question; yet a question not of all history, but of certain definite facts. The writer of the letter is mistaken in supposing it involves a thorough investigation of the manners, customs, laws, political, civil, and literary institutions and influences of past ages; for it would be impossible from these to conclude any thing for or against the divine origin and constitution of the Church. He, in assuming this investigation to be necessary, assumes that we have in our natural reason a standard or measure of infallibility, — not merely of what is relatively infallible, infallible in relation to reason, and what pertains to its own legitimate province, — but of what is absolutely infallible; which we have not, and cannot have; for, if we had, we should know all that God knows, and be what the devil falsely told our first parents they would be, if they should eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Here is a fact which Protestants seldom appreciate. It was not appreciating this fact which led Professor Park to commit the blunders in his Lecture on *The Intellectual and Moral Influence of Romanism*, which we exposed in our Review for last October. The Protestant forgets, that, if the Church be true, be from God, her teaching must be his reason, the principle or standard by which he is to judge the influences of history, not these the

standard by which he is to judge her teaching. He carries with him always the assumption of private reason as the ultimate authority on all questions which can come up, — not reflecting, that, if private reason be the ultimate authority, there can be no church authority. The Church concluded by private reason, no matter from what *data*, would not be authoritative, for the authority would be that of private reason which concluded it; and in believing what it proposes we should not believe it, but private reason. The assumption of the authority of private reason negatives in advance that of the Church, and renders the proposed investigation ridiculous. It is, as we said, in replying to Professor Park, a plain begging of the question, or the decision in advance against the Church. Yet it is always after having assumed the ultimate authority of private reason, and after having thus decided against the Church, that our Protestant logicians proceed to inquire if the Church be or be not authoritative. And it is precisely this course our young friend unconsciously adopts in the historical investigation he proposes as necessary. Yet he prides himself on his reason, and laughs at Catholic logicians. A little reflection, one would think, would suffice to teach him his mistake, and to show him that it is very necessary to understand the precise question at issue, before proceeding to its solution. All that history can do, all that it is required to do in the case, is to establish two simple facts: — 1. That our Lord did found a Church with authority to teach; and 2. That the Roman Caholic Church is the one he founded. These two facts historically established, as we would establish any other historical facts, all is established, and reason has no further office but to apprehend and submit to what the Church teaches. A very little study will enable our correspondent, with his present knowledge of history in general, to establish these; for they are established by plain and public facts, readily come at, and easily verified. The method he proposes involves the precise paralogism he began by objecting to, and, if pursued, would only bewilder him in a mass of details, from which he could derive no light on the real problem to be solved. We cannot, therefore, understand his incompetency to decide forthwith all there is for him to decide; and we by no means agree that it is necessary for him to delay his obedience to the commands of his God, till he has wasted the better part of his life in a useless investigation. We, of course, do not want him or any one to come blindly into the Church; and we assure him he will find few priests

ready to receive him, till he can give a reason for the faith he hopes to receive; but he has only to resolve to open his heart to the truth, to abate his confidence in his own infallibility, or power, by unassisted reason, to judge infallibly of revealed truth, and earnestly to pray God to incline his will to his holy word, and to open his understanding to its reception, and the doubt and darkness will flee away, the day-star will arise in his heart, he will experience the ineffable joy of believing, and like the blessed Apostle St. Thomas, but more blessed than he, exclaim, "My Lord and my God!"

2. Our correspondent mistakes the teachings of the Catholic Church, when he fancies she teaches that the "true condition of salvation is that each should act up to the measure of faith or of light he has." She teaches, and all her children are bound to believe, that out of the pale of her communion there is no salvation; for she teaches that "without faith it is impossible to please God"; and faith, we have proved, over and over again, in the sense she takes the word, is impossible without her. God does not command what is impossible; or, if he commands what is naturally impossible for men to do, he never commands it without bestowing the grace which renders it possible; and therefore, if they do not always and everywhere do what he commands, the fault is theirs, in resisting the grace given them, and which, if not resisted, would have been efficacious.

Our correspondent has been misled by what some of our theologians say concerning invincible ignorance, and which he totally misapprehends. That God will condemn no man for *invincible* ignorance is readily conceded; but whether there ever was or ever can be a case of real invincible ignorance, as to what the Church teaches is necessary to be explicitly believed as the medium of salvation, may well be doubted, and is, from the nature of the case, unsusceptible of proof. All baptized children, by whomsoever baptized, are in the communion of the Church, and, if dying in infancy, or before committing any mortal sin, will undoubtedly be saved; but the most liberal construction of invincible ignorance ever adopted by any Catholic theologian falls far short of the latitudinarian principle assumed. No one is ever admitted to be invincibly ignorant, who has had any possible means of knowing what the Church requires him to believe as the medium of salvation; and no one, even if invincibly ignorant, can be saved, unless, when dying, he is free from mortal sin; — two things which can with difficulty, to say the least, be assumed of any adult person out of

the Church, especially of any Protestant. It is hard to conceive any Protestant who could not know what the Church teaches, if he wished. His very Protestantism brings the Church to his notice, and in its history and doctrines tells him so much of her, that he is inexcusable, if he do not go farther, and ascertain what she is and what she requires. If he does go farther, and ascertains what she teaches, he is not in ignorance; and if he then does not believe her, he is a heretic; and heresy, the blessed Apostle assures us, is a *deadly* sin. At any rate, whatever may be said in the case of some, the plea of invincible ignorance cannot avail our young friend. He is an educated man; has studied theology; and he professes to be a minister of the Gospel; he knows there is a church called the Catholic Church, and he has had ample means of knowing what she teaches. His position outside of her, then, if she be the true Church, as she most assuredly is, must be not a little perilous, and altogether unjustifiable.

3. Our young Protestant minister says, it is "utterly wicked and absurd to denounce any penalty beforehand upon any result deliberately and candidly arrived at"; for there must be in "reasoning, between man and man, no threats introduced, or any extraneous element whatever, to influence the determination." In reasoning between man and man, we concede it; but this is not a question between man and man, but between man and his Maker; and the threats or consequences of believing or not believing are intrinsic, not extraneous, elements of the question to be decided. Between man and man, all reasoning, all faith even, is free, and no man has the right to call another to an account for his faith, whatever it may be; for we recognize no human authority in matters of faith. Before God, too, man is free to believe or not to believe, as it seems to him good; but not free to hope the same recompense, whether he believes or disbelieves. Almighty God has promised eternal life to the believer, and threatened the unbeliever with eternal death. "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be condemned." St. Mark, xvi. 16. You can believe or not, as you choose. If you choose not to believe, eternal death will be your doom; if you choose to believe, you may aspire to eternal life. This is an integral part of that very word you are to believe or not believe, into the credibility or incredibility of which you are to inquire. Where is the wickedness in proposing such a word, or in us in telling you that God has revealed such a word, and in urging

you to inquire if we are not right in telling you so? Here is no extraneous element introduced to influence the determination, for nothing is introduced not integral in the question itself. The indignation expressed, then, is misplaced.

Moreover, our correspondent proceeds on a supposition which we cannot grant him. He supposes that men may deliberately and candidly inquire into the authority of the Church and come to different results, or that the authority of the Church is a matter about which men may *honestly* differ in opinion. We do not concede this. Faith is not a matter of opinion; and there can be, after proper examination, no honest difference of opinion about it. The Almighty has not committed the indiscretion of making a revelation for us, and of leaving it so uncertain and doubtful, that men may honestly differ from one another as to what it is. Such indiscretion, or such want of foresight and proper adaptation of means to ends, we might look for in weak and imprudent men, but not in the all-wise and all-powerful God. He, if he has made a revelation at all, must have made it to be believed; and also have made the means of believing it so accessible, so certain and sure, that no one, with ordinary prudence, can honestly seek and not find. If you examine honestly, meekly, candidly, in an humble and reverential spirit, the only proper spirit in which to inquire at all, you will infallibly find that the Catholic Church is the living and authoritative Church of God; for, if you so inquire, you will be submissive to the grace which is given you, and that will subdue your moral repugnance to the Church, and open the eyes of your understanding to her claims. We tell you this, and you have no right to dispute us till you have so inquired, or till you bring us an instance of some one having so inquired, and failed. But if you inquire with a proud and contracted spirit, with haughty reliance on your own infallibility and self-sufficiency, resolutely resisting divine grace, you will not find, and will not deserve to find; for you will inquire amiss, — in a disposition, not to receive, but to reject the truth. And here is the reason why so many who think they are honest inquirers do not find. At bottom you will always find exorbitant pride, an overweening self-conceit, though, it may be, aping the form of humility. There is a want of perfect ingenuousness, of true earnestness, of a loving and reverential disposition. Then, again, thousands who say they inquire do not inquire. How many of those Protestants who condemn Catholicity in such unmeasured terms have ever sat one hour for instruction at the

feet of those authorized to give it? He who would know the Catholic faith should always seek instruction from the living teacher authorized by the Church to teach, and he will never have inquired properly till he has done so.

4. The writer of the letter professes himself to hold to the Catholic Church; so firmly rooted in all men is that article of the creed, "I believe in the holy Catholic Church," and so difficult is it for any one even to conceive the possibility of being a Christian without acknowledging the Catholic Church. The Church hovers over them; and in their wildest extravagances some shadow of her majesty is always present to their hearts and imaginations,—a fact worth meditating long and well. The writer says, the "Catholic Church comprises all who share the faith and salvation of Jesus Christ." Another precious admission, which involves the whole doctrine of exclusive salvation; for if the Church comprises all who share that faith and salvation, then none whom the Church does not comprise do or can share the faith and salvation of Jesus Christ,—and what more do we say, when we say faith and salvation are not possible out of the communion of the Catholic Church?

But who are these who share the faith and salvation of Jesus Christ? The members of the Catholic Church. Agreed. Are they members because they share the faith and salvation, or do they share the faith and salvation because members? If you say the latter, you must determine the Church, and become a member of it, before you can share the faith and salvation, or be truly a Christian; which is the Catholic doctrine. Then what, where, or which is the Catholic Church, or church of which you must be a member in order to share the faith and salvation of Jesus Christ? Here is a very significant question, and which must be answered first of all. If you say the former, that you are members because you share the faith and salvation, which is what we suppose you would say, then you must hold that you get the faith and salvation without the Church. Now, how without the Church do you contrive to get the faith and salvation? How do you determine what they are? How do you determine what are the means of eliciting the faith and securing the salvation? These, you will perceive, are for you, as well as for us, fundamental questions, and must be answered in some way. How do you answer them? and how establish the soundness and sufficiency of your answer? Here is a difficulty you must not evade, but one which you must meet at the very threshold.

You may answer us, as your Liberal Christian friends in general do, that Christianity is a life, — the life of Christ; and that he who truly lives this life has all that is or can be required of him. Agreed, again. We say Christianity is a life, — the life of Christ, — and that all who truly live it have all that they need, either for this world or for that which is to come. But can this life be begotten and lived out of the communion of the Catholic Church? Here is the question. You assume it can, and that you or some of you live it, and by virtue of the fact of living it are brought into the Church. This is a very pretty theory, but will you just favor us with its proofs? You demand of us proofs; do not take it unkindly, then, if we demand proofs of you. We suspect, however, that this is a point on which you do not happen to have any proofs to adduce. You make an assumption, which is demanded by the exigencies of your condition, we admit, but for which you have not the shadow of any authority. You reason in this way: "We who are out of the Church do or may live the true life, and therefore we do or may live the true life out of the Church; and by living it out of the Church, come, *ipso facto*, into the Church." This is Liberal Christian logic, and yet it is the best you have. We utterly deny your assumption. None of you who are outside the Roman Catholic Church do live, approach, or even truly conceive the Christian life. The Christian life is not in the natural order; it is the supernatural life of justice, which places him who lives it on the plane of a supernatural destiny; and it is not and cannot be lived without supernatural faith, — "the just shall live by faith," — and supernatural faith is not possible without the Church. Faith is not, as our Liberalist divines hold, something *in addition* to the Christian life, but that in which the Christian life begins, and without which it cannot be. We have seen that the proper natural human life begins and must begin in an act of faith, in a pure simple affirmation; so in the order of grace, or the supernatural order, the proper Christian life can begin only by a primitive act of supernatural faith, a pure affirmation, which affirms in one and the same act both the antecedent and consequent. For — remark well — the Christian life is not a *continuation and development of our natural human life*, but a new life, which for the individual begins absolutely *de novo*, and therefore demands necessarily a "new birth," properly a *birth;* and therefore all the necessary conditions of birth in general, inconceivable in the special case of the Christian birth without the Church, the Immaculate Bride of the Lamb, the joyful MOTHER of all the faithful.

Nothing is more absurd than to make the children anterior to the mother, and to assume that the spiritual children procreate their own spiritual mother, as is assumed when it is assumed the Christian life may be begotten and lived without the Church, and that the Church is simply the offspring of those in whom it is so begotten, and who so live it. This reverses the whole order of both nature and grace. We cannot, then, accept *your* Catholic Church, nor concede that you, in the remotest degree, while out of the Roman Catholic Church, live the Christian life, or share the faith and salvation of Jesus Christ. We concede you many amiable qualities, many natural virtues, which in their place are respectable; we grant that many of you do all that can be really expected of simple human nature, wounded as it has been by the Fall; we even concede you all the real worth of character you claim for yourselves; but we see in it no approach to the Christian life; and it is because you cannot be born again and live the Christian life out of the Church that you are so earnestly entreated to come into her communion. It is not that we underrate your virtues, but that you underrate the Christian life, when you imagine that you are or can be living it.

Our correspondent thinks that the epithet "*Roman*" applied to the Church neutralizes the epithet *Catholic*. We think differently. Unity is essential to catholicity; for that thing which you call catholic must be one, or it cannot be catholic or universal, but will be multiple, and therefore particular. The unity must be predicable in the same order, too, as the catholicity or universality. If you assume a church, catholic in the visible order, as you do when you speak of it as extended or capable of extension in space, you must predicate unity of it in the same order, or what you term catholic will not be catholic, but a collection or aggregate of particulars. We commend this fact to the learned and metaphysical *New York Churchman*, and to our "Reformed Catholics" of the Anglican and Protestant Episcopal sect generally, who pronounce the word *catholic* with so much emphasis, and who would fain persuade us that they are so innocent as really to believe that the world will recognize the *Catholic* Church in an aggregation of particular communions, each distinct and independent of the other, and bound together by no visible bond of unity. If your unity is invisible, your catholicity must also be invisible, and to assert a visible catholic church with no visible unity is nothing more nor less than a simple contradiction in terms. These "*Reformed* Catholics," who would be much more effectually

reformed if at once *reformed* by the grace of God into what they call *Romanists*, must not laugh at our young friend for his notion of a catholic church, made up of isolated individuals, dispersed over the globe, and bound together by no bond of unity, visible or invisible; for they adopt precisely his doctrine, only they take particular communions for their units, and he simply individuals.

The proper name of the Church is "The Holy Catholic Apostolic Church," and the epithet *Roman* is added, not to restrict the meaning of *Catholic*, but simply to mark the visible centre of unity; and since it undeniably must have such a centre of unity somewhere, or not be catholic or universal, it is obvious that the epithet *Roman*, so far from neutralizing the meaning of the word *Catholic*, serves to confirm it, and to make the universality or catholicity of the Church more striking and unmistakable. It defines at once to you the Catholic Church by directing you to its centre of unity. One is struck at times with the slender stock in trade of critical and philosophical knowledge on which our Protestant friends attempt to do business. A little reflection, a little sober thought, would save them from many laughable blunders, as well as from the incivility of applying nicknames, and calling us *Romanists*, a term exceedingly ill adapted to designate our faith or character. Nevertheless the blunders and incivility are theirs, not ours.

5. "The Roman hierarchy, not the faith of Romanists [Catholics], is what I am steadily opposed to," says our estimable young preacher. What would he think of the play of Hamlet with the part of the Prince of Denmark left out by particular request? Not much, we apprehend, of the play itself, and still less of those by whose particular request the part was left out. Very much in the same light as this would strike him does his declaration strike us. "The Holy Catholic Church" is an article of faith in the Catholic's creed and the hierarchy is not, in his faith, an excrescence of the Church, nor a mere accidental appendage to it, but essential to its very being as the Church. The Catholic faith teaches that the hierarchy of bishops, or pastors and teachers, under their chief, the successor of St. Peter, is of divine institution, and no Catholic can oppose it without opposing his whole faith. The authority on which that rests is the authority on which his whole creed rests, and, if he should admit it to be insufficient for the hierarchy, he would admit it to be insufficient for the other articles of his creed, and then he would have no faith left. No

man, then, can oppose the Catholic hierarchy without opposing directly the whole Catholic faith. Alas! man is a poor church builder, a miserable church reformer. There stands the Catholic Church, as she has stood for these eighteen hundred years, and as she will stand unto the consummation of the world. Either she is the Church of God, or she is not. If she is not, away with her; we have nothing to do with her, and want nothing which is hers. If she is, as she is as certainly as God exists, then you must take her as she is, as a whole; you have no questions to ask, no suggestions to make, no improvements to recommend. Your sole business is to bow down your reason and will to her, as the visible representative of Almighty God, and to believe and do simply what she commands you. If she does not please you, if she does not suit your taste or judgment, it does not follow that she is in fault. The Almighty was not bound to take you or me into his councils, and it is not likely that it would have been of any great advantage to him, if he had actually consulted us. Men are a little too ready to counsel the All-wise, and to inform him how he ought or ought not to do. It is but becoming modesty to presume that he knew as well as we how to constitute his Church, and that it is for us to seek to conform ourselves to her, and not for her to seek to conform herself to us. The objection is a silly one, if the Church be not of God; it deserves a harsher name, if she be of God.

In conclusion, we assure our young friend that we duly appreciate his liberality in not *blaming* us for becoming a Catholic, and intimating that he can still respect us. We honor his liberality as it deserves. But, after all, the question is not one of human praise or blame, of human respect or disrespect. Human respect, however pleasant it may be, is of no great value, and should never be suffered to weigh in the balance with the love and approbation of Almighty God. If we have his consent or approbation for what we do, it matters little what men may think or say of us. It is not what we think of our young friend's Liberalism, or he of our Catholicity, that is to decide the character and value of either. The Catholic is not likely to feel that he is the party which stands most in need of commiseration, or that he calls for any remarkable stretch of liberality. His great difficulty is in being sufficiently grateful to his Divine Master for making him a Catholic, when so many others, no worse by nature, are left to perish in their error. If he obeys his Church, he knows he is well enough off; that he has a hundred-fold here, and the promise of the life to come.

Our young Protestant friend may think lightly of all this now; for he is fresh from the schools, in the heyday of life, with his spirits elastic, and his prospects radiant. Youth, health, talents, learning, eloquence, troops of affectionate and applauding friends, — how can he look upon life as he will one day when these disappear or lose their value in his estimation, and, with his ideals all unrealized, he is obliged to look round for something solid and permanent on which he may rest, some safe shelter from the storms and tempests of life? "Beatus qui intelligit quid sit amare Jesum, et contemnere seipsum propter Jesum. Oportet dilectum pro dilecto relinquere, quia Jesus vult solus super omnia amari. Dilectio creaturæ fallax et instabilis. Dilectio Jesu fidelis et perseverabilis. Qui adhæret creaturæ, cadet cum labili. Qui amplectitur Jesum, firmabitur in ævum. Illum dilige, et amicum tibi retine, qui, omnibus recedentibus, te non relinquet, nec patietur in fine perire. Ab omnibus oportet te aliquando separari, sive velis, sive nolis. Teneas te apud Jesum, vivens ac moriens; et illius fidelitati committe, qui, omnibus deficientibus, solus potest juvare." * We know the writer well. We know God has once spoken by his grace to his heart, and called his attention to the Church, and, as secure as he may now feel, as secure as all his education has tended to make him feel, the great question, What shall I do to be saved? will one day press upon his heart, and demand an answer. The answer with which he now amuses himself and his people will then appear to him a bitter mockery, a sort of Mephistopheles laugh over the deep agony of the once innocent, now guilty, Margaret. When that question comes up, may the good God grant him to be true to the promptings and inspirations of divine grace!

We have concluded our reply. We have answered our young friend at full length. We have not spared his reasonings, but we trust we have said nothing to wound his sensibilities, or to indicate any want of that esteem for him we began by expressing. We beg him to read and *study* what we have replied, for it concerns the most momentous question that can possibly occupy the thoughts of man. If what we have said fail to satisfy him, we shall be happy to receive his objections, and pledge ourselves, in advance, to remove, as far as a complete logical reply can remove any objections, whatever objections he can urge, without denying that very reason on the

* De Imitatione Christi, Lib. II., Cap. 7.

authority of which he objects. All we ask is, that he do not repeat his old objections, without undertaking to show that our replies are not to the point, are unsound in principle, or not sustained by the facts in the case.

Art. II. — 1. *Manuel des Confesseurs.*
2. *Praxis Confessarii*, Auctore S. Alphonso de Ligorio.
3. *The Catholic Question in America.* New York. 1813.
4. *Le Prêtre, et la Femme de Famille*, par Michelet.
5. *Entire Absolution of the Penitent.* A Sermon preached by Dr. Pusey, in Christ Church Cathedral. Oxford. February, 1846.

It may be allowed us, like the scribe of the Gospel, to bring forth from our treasures old things and new, in treating of a usage coeval with Christianity, but which has recently been assailed with no ordinary violence, whilst it has received the homage of a numerous and distinguished class of the Anglican clergy. A veil of mystery hangs over the confessional. The whisperings of the penitent reach the ear of the confessor, there to die away without impress or echo. The counsels, reproofs, exhortations, and injunctions of the spiritual father share in the privilege of secrecy. As might be expected, persons practically unacquainted with this tribunal view it with vague apprehension ; and where prejudice has clouded the mind, distrust, suspicion, and evil surmises are indulged of proceedings dark and foul, defying proof and eluding investigation. For some ages, the training for this function of the ministry partook of its secret character, it being deemed unsafe to commit to writing the sacramental forms, or the rules by which the priest was to be guided in the difficult science of directing conscience, — *ars artium regimen animarum*, — but that period of reserve has long since passed away. The *disciplina arcani* is scarcely conceivable, now that the press has divulged and spread abroad, not only the mouldering volumes of the monastic libraries, but even the loose sheets to which confidential communications were sometimes committed ; and the Gospel adage, that no secret shall remain unrevealed, is now literally fulfilled in the many treatises which prepare the priest for the exercise of the absolving power. Of these we have noted two at the head of

our list; — the first, a French manual for confessors, which the Anglican Bishop of St. David's, Dr. Thirlwall, on occasion of the Maynooth discussion last year, mentioned with commendation; — the second, a treatise of St. Alphonsus de Liguori, embodying the principles of his famous work on Moral Theology, and applying them to practice. A glance at this work will satisfy the reader that the holy author was a stranger to the Oxford principle of reserve in communicating knowledge, since he contemplates every imaginable abuse of the ministry, in order to mark its penalties and remedies.

The sermon of Dr. Pusey, recently delivered on his resuming the function of preaching in Christ Church cathedral, at Oxford, after three years' suspension on suspicion of orthodoxy, presents him still laboring for the restoration of ancient doctrine and discipline, which he fancies may be recovered from the ruins of the English Church. He boldly advocates the power of forgiveness, and highly commends the practice of confession, deeply deploring its neglect; but, as if it were not allowed him to see the whole truth, or to proclaim it, from his present position, he spoils his manly advocacy of the forgiving power, by presenting confession as a disciplinary rite, which, although of great advantage, is not of absolute necessity. This is the more surprising, since it appears, from a letter which, a few months ago, he addressed to an inquiring friend, that he recommends the most detailed examination of conscience on the ten commandments, the seven deadly sins, and other particulars, as a preparation for confession; which could not be reasonably hoped to be made so minutely, if no divine precept rendered it necessary. We may, however, congratulate ourselves on the near approach of this distinguished man to correct sentiments, and his high esteem of a practice which generally forms the most serious obstacle to conversion; and we may hope that light will soon be granted him to view it as it truly is, — a divine ordinance, in which the mercy and wisdom of our Saviour-God are wonderfully displayed.

In truth, the reasoning of the learned professor on the power communicated to the Apostles should have led him to acknowledge the divine institution of confession; for the power is manifestly discretionary and judicial, to be exercised wisely and justly; consequently, with full cognizance of the cause on which judgment is to be passed. Christ cannot be thought to have sent his Apostles to forgive or retain sins, at their good pleasure, but rather so as to give to the penitent full assurance of pardon,

and leave the impenitent burdened with their sins. If the power, as Dr. Pusey contends, was real and effectual, and not a mere proclamation, in general terms, to whoever might prove fit to enjoy its benefit, it belonged to the Apostles and their successors to inquire, examine, and judge, — to ascertain the guilt of the applicant, and his repentance, — to determine his obligations, — to prescribe the conditions which he must fulfil, — and, finally, to pronounce sentence. The authority of acquitting or condemning necessarily implies the right to sit in judgment.

The fact related in the nineteenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles may be fairly considered an instance of special confession of sins committed after baptism. When the sons of Sceva had adjured some possessed persons in the name of Jesus, whom Paul preached, a man possessed by an evil spirit rushed on them, and compelled them to seek safety in flight. This filled with terror the inhabitants of Ephesus, of whom many who had already made profession of Christianity were awakened to a sense of their sins, and many also resolved to abandon altogether whatever might lead them to relapse into superstitious practices; "many of them who believed came confessing and declaring their deeds."* From the Greek verb, which is in the perfect participle, it is clear that they had been already believers, consequently members of the Church by baptism. Their confession regarded special acts, as the Greek term indicates. It embraced, as Kuinoel and Bloomfield acknowledge, "sins of every kind," since distinct mention is made by the sacred writer of the two classes of penitents, of whom the latter offered their magical books to be consumed. The burning of bad books is an evidence of conversion, such as penitents have, at all times, been called on to give, when suing for pardon. There is, then, every reason to believe that a detailed confession of sins was made on this occasion. Bloomfield maintains that the confession consisted in the open avowal of their sinful practices, not in a confidential communication made in secret to a minister of religion; but of this there is no proof in the sacred historian. The publicity of the act which followed, namely, the burning of the books, does not prove that the confession was public. It is clear, at least, that it was a special confession, which could not lose its sacramental character, if made to the priest of God, in the presence of the faithful.

In the early ages of the Church, confession was regarded as

* Acts xix. 18.

so essential and prominent a part of penance, that the whole penitential discipline was frequently called by the Greek term ἐξομολόγησις, which strictly denotes confession, and which is borrowed from the passage of the Acts just quoted. This was urged as the only means by which the sinner could quench the flames which his iniquity had enkindled. "If still you draw back," said Tertullian, "let your mind turn to that eternal fire which confession will extinguish; and that you may not hesitate to adopt the remedy, weigh the greatness of future punishment."* This stern African sees no alternative but confession or hell-fire. St. Cyprian, in milder language, expresses the same sentiment: — "I entreat you, brethren, let all confess their faults, while he that has offended enjoys life; while his confession can be received, and while the satisfaction and pardon imparted by the priests are acceptable before God". † St. Basil affirms the same necessity: — "Necessarily," he says, "our sins must be confessed to those to whom has been committed the dispensation of the mysteries of God." ‡

If Dr. Pusey will consult Lactantius, he will feel bound to put a term to his hesitancy, and pass from a society from which confession has been long since discarded, practically, if not in theory, to the true Church, whose title to the Catholic name is confirmed by her tenacity in retaining this divine institution. "Now," he writes, "as all heretical sects deem themselves particularly Christians, and think theirs is the Catholic Church, it should be known, that, where is confession and penance, by which the sins to which weak men are subject are cancelled, there is the true Church." §

We long to see the amiable Doctor relieved from the awkwardness of his position, and enjoying the consolations for which his heart evidently yearns. He now proclaims the Eucharistic sacrifice in churches without altars; he affirms the power of forgiveness in the midst of his brethren, who disavow the sublime authority; whilst others, once associated with him in the work of restoration, are gathered around altars on which the perpetual sacrifice is offered, and humbly kneel at the confessional to receive the assurance of divine forgiveness.

For a considerable time past, the Puseyite school have acknowledged that confession was practised in the early ages, but they maintain that it was public, originally springing from

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* De Pœnit., c. xii.
† De Lapsis.
‡ Reg. brev. q. cclxxxviii.
§ Inst., Lib. IV., c. xxx.

the desire of self-humiliation, and afterwards enjoined by the Church as an important portion of the penitential discipline which she found it necessary to establish, in order to check vice and repair scandal. The fathers, however, as we have shown, speak of it as absolutely necessary, and trace it to the divine law. If it be allowed that *public* confession is not divinely enjoined, they must surely be understood of that which is private and sacramental. In fact, the discipline established by the penitential canons was grounded on the conditions, divinely prescribed, on which pardon was proffered from the commencement. By the divine ordinance, sin was to be humbly acknowledged and atoned for, that the sinner might hope for reconciliation. The Church required, that, in certain cases, the acknowledgment should be public, and the satisfaction protracted during a long period. In this view, the penitential canons were reasonable and just; otherwise they must appear arbitrary and intolerable.

If confession was not originally a part of penance, — if it was not a condition for forgiveness, — it cannot be understood how public confession could at all be required. We may conceive, that, where the feelings of the faithful had been shocked by some enormity, the culprit might be called upon to express penitence for his crime; but it is not easy to comprehend how he could be required to disclose other sins, if no divine precept demanded this humiliation, even to one man. The law that would extend the obligation beyond the necessity of repairing scandal would be excessively severe. From the establishment of public penance enforcing the conditions of forgiveness, it is strange to argue that neither confession nor penitential satisfaction is enjoined by the divine law.

It is clear, from the testimony of Origen, that private confession to a priest was to precede and regulate public confession. He advises the penitent to use diligence and caution in the selection of his spiritual physician, since his judgment is to determine whether the disease is to be made known in the assembly of the faithful.* The Penitentiary, established at Constantinople, received in private the confessions of penitents, and instructed them what sins they should publicly acknowledge for self-humiliation. Although Nectarius, in consequence of a grievous scandal, abolished the office, and left all at liberty to approach communion, according to their conscientious convic-

* Hom. II. in S. xxxvii.

tions of their own fitness, private confession continued to be practised there, as well as elsewhere, throughout the Church. Pope Leo found it necessary to forbid the avowal of sins which subjected the offenders to legal penalties; and sustained the prohibition by showing the sufficiency of private confession. "It is enough," said he, "that the guilt of conscience be made known to the priests alone by private confession." *

The zeal of Dr. Pusey and his friends to restore the practice of private confession has been successful to a certain extent; but it cannot be attended with a general return to the ancient practice, as long as the divine obligation is denied. Individuals distressed in mind may seek comfort in private conferences, and may occasionally disclose in confidence something that burdens conscience. To open all the secret wounds of the soul requires something more than a desire of counsel or of sympathy; it must proceed from a high sense of strictest duty, and be supported by entire confidence in the ministry. Those who know that the validity of Anglican orders is strongly contested, and that secrecy is no part of the observance among Anglicans, will be slow to intrust a minister with the knowledge of their frailties. In many cases, these so-called confessions may easily degenerate into what Hannah More styles "the coquetry of religion." "Though far from thinking auricular confession the worst part of another church," this zealous moralist did not approve of its revival in the form of consultations of young ladies with young ministers. "Under the humble guise of soliciting instruction and obtaining comfort, they propose to them doubts which they do not entertain, disclose difficulties which do not really distress them, ask advice which they probably do not intend to follow, and avow sensibilities with which they are not at all troubled."* We have heard of young ministers on this side of the Atlantic who are closely pressing, in this respect, on the footsteps of their Oxford brethren; but these imitations are little calculated to give any idea of the humiliation of the penitent, who, by the entire disclosure of his sins, seeks the remedy which Christ has provided. Empirics are calculated to bring the medical profession into disgrace. How different from *tête-à-tête* conferences is the process in the divine tribunal! "The confessional is a depository of secrets, where the Christian can be unreserved without display, and make revelation of self

* Ep. CXXXVI. alias LXXX. ad Episc. Camp.
* On Domestic Errors.

without egotism; where he may find authority without harshness, and compassion without over-indulgence." *

The eloquent writer of the article in the *British Critic* (Mr. Ward, if we are not misinformed) gives a just view of this institution, although he had not at that time a practical acquaintance with it. Mr. Faber, after some experiments in hearing confessions, as an Anglican minister, deemed it proper to renounce the occupation, not being quite confident in his own power to absolve. Both these estimable gentlemen, with Mr. Newman and many others, have since presented themselves as penitents to Catholic priests, and are now in the enjoyment of that peace of heart which surpasses all understanding. How is it that Dr. Pusey, with his high esteem of confession, still remains without?

From the sermon of the Oxford divine, whose deficiencies in faith we would fain supply, we turn to the less grateful task of correcting the foul misrepresentations of the Parisian professor, against whose impure romance Dr. Pusey seasonably cautioned his hearers. The piety of woman is evidently a source of pain and mortification to Michelet, who would deprive her of mental independence, and of the virtues and graces with which religion invests her. To the confessional he traces her dissent from the impious propositions of an infidel husband, her attachment to religious observances, and her veneration for the priesthood; and, strangely enough, he argues that it must be corrupt and debauching! He invests it with gloom, placing it in a dark recess of the Church, and presents the penitent as approaching when the shades of evening are falling, as if the hour and place were chosen for most unhallowed purposes. But who does not know that in France, and in all Catholic countries, the confessional is placed in an open and conspicuous place, according to the prescription of the Ritual, — "patenti conspicuo et apto ecclesiæ loco"? Who is ignorant that confessions, for the most part, are heard in the early part of morning, and that it is forbidden to hear the confessions of females after sunset? With us, the press of penitents, and the dependent situation of domestics, prolong this duty to a late hour; but the surrounding crowd are a guaranty against evil suspicion. Wherever, as in the early missions of this country, confessionals were not erected in the churches, the sacristy, in which the priest sat, was encompassed by a crowd, likely to perceive the slightest motion, and

* British Critic.

even in some danger of overhearing the whisper of the penitent. When the missionary erected a temporary altar in the farm-house, far from any church, the same protection was found in the number of the faithful that pressed forward to avail themselves of his ministry. It may well suit romance to imagine the penitent and confessor in some lonely cell, or darksome cave, where innocence is powerless; but the plain matter of fact is, that confessions are publicly heard, in circumstances that afford complete protection.

Some rail at confession itself as improper and indelicate. They consider it grossly unbecoming that hideous and foul sins should be specified, especially by females, whose modesty naturally recoils from such details. The shamefulness of sin is in its commission, not in its avowal, when made with humility and compunction; and "there is not a worse symptom in our nature than that we blush to own what we have not been afraid to do."* The innocent and pure have nothing to acknowledge. The delicate and refined, whose fastidiousness shrinks from the mention of disgusting improprieties, should have recoiled with horror from their commission. The acknowledgment of them is a painful but necessary atonement to offended virtue, and, far from being immoral, is the first step to a return to rectitude. The disgust experienced in reviewing the frailties which once afforded delight is a bitter medicine, which serves to insure permanent recovery, — the pain with which their exposure is attended is part of the penalty which divine justice inflicts on the sinner. The confession of unnatural and enormous excesses gives glory to God in proportion to the humiliation of the penitent. As he sinks down abashed and overwhelmed with shame, the angels bear on high his sighs, tears, and prayers, which are more fragrant than incense, and sweeter than hymns of praise. God, from his high throne, regards the trembling sinner with compassion, casts all his iniquities into the bottom of the sea, remembers no longer all the prevarications by which he has prevaricated, but accepts him as a child who was dead and has come to life, and gives him assurances of mercy and love.

Many cannot conceive how foul sins may be confessed in decent language; they fancy that the very mention of them is like the breath of pestilence. In the confessional, however, as an eloquent writer observes, "the Christian may steadily, be-

* Hannah More, *Cœlebs*, c. xlviii.

cause sternly and shamefully, 'look sin in the face,' and name what out of that solemn connection the saints may not name with clean lips, and into a chaste ear."* The accusation of the penitent is far different from the narrative of the adventurer, or the description of the novelist.

> "'T is not a tale; 't is not a jest,
> Admired with laughter at a feast."

In few words, plain but modest, the sinner declares the nature and number of his offences. He states facts stripped of all exciting circumstances; he enters into no unnecessary details, but simply exposes the grievous wounds of his conscience. When David said, "I have sinned," he acknowledged himself guilty of adultery and bloodshed, and humbled himself before God and the prophet. The penitent states, indeed, more minutely his evil habits and the frequency of his offences; but he is taught to avoid exciting descriptions. The shame which he feels is at once a preservative from freedom of speech, and a remedy for past excess. It is thus that divine wisdom has provided for our frailty by punishing our pride, forcing us to come forth from our lurking-place and abide the sentence of our judge. "The necessity which private confession to a priest imposes of some approach, at least, towards *a definite enumeration*, and so (indirectly) towards a vivid impression, of some of the more grievous and unmentionable sins, is a most powerful security for the amount of shame requisite towards all true penance. . . . . By adding to the cup of penitence this one powerful ingredient of shame, she [the Church] has transformed it, by her divine alchemy, from a mere soothing and perhaps not harmless potion, into a medicine of bitter taste, indeed, but most sovereign efficacy." †

It is almost impossible to give to the uninitiated a correct idea of the severe simplicity and strict modesty which characterize the communications of penitent and confessor. Some, who have read over the table of sins in prayer-books, fancy that the confessor puts to each penitent the questions there proposed; whereas they are only designed to aid in self-examination. Others, mistaking the object of our moral treatises, which enter at large into the most delicate matters, assert that our theological students are thus trained to qualify them for the cross-examination of penitents, all of whom, even the purest

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* British Critic, for April, 1843. † Ibid.

and most refined, they consider to be subjected to these disgusting interrogatories. This is a most egregious mistake.

The variety of human maladies is treated of, that the physician may be qualified for every emergency. If he is consulted by one suffering from a cold, or a headache, it will not be necessary for him to inquire after symptoms which mark Asiatic cholera, or dropsy; much less need he enter into all the mysteries of obstetrics. The confessor is furnished with general knowledge, that he may understand the nature of each case which may possibly be presented for his judgment, and so may avoid all unnecessary questions. His duty is to hear and to judge; interrogatories are made only to supply the deficiency of the penitent, whose previous disclosures regulate them. If the strictest reserve be enjoined on the penitent in detailing his offences, the tongue of the priest, consecrated to the Gospel, is guarded, that no incautious word, no superfluous question, may escape him. "Let the priest take care," cries the Roman ritual, "not to detain any one, especially the young, of either sex, or others, with curious or useless interrogations, imprudently questioning them as to what they may be ignorant of, lest they suffer scandal and learn thence to sin." To the authoritative warning of the ritual nothing need be added; yet, for the satisfaction of those who have heard the changes rung on Peter Dens, we refer to this much calumniated theologian. He reminds the confessor that questions regarding impurity are to be put "*sparingly*, *chastely*, *and cautiously*"; and explaining the meaning of each term, he says, — "Sparingly, so as to make no curious and superfluous interrogations; chastely, so as to propose them in modest terms; cautiously, to discover the true state of the conscience, without imparting any dangerous knowledge." * The extract from the Manual, recited in parliament by Dr. Thirlwall, is to the same effect: — "It would be impossible to use too much reserve in interrogations relating to the subject of purity, or subjects connected with the breach of the sixth commandment; especially when there is danger of losing a greater benefit than the material completeness of confession. Not to excite passions where they are dormant is a much greater good than the material completeness of the confession." St. Alphonsus directs the confessor to inquire only, in modest and general terms, as to obedience, which

"Is woman's highest honor, and her praise";

* Vol. I., p. 379.

and to be silent as to other points, unless brought under his notice by the questions of the penitent: "De cæteris taceat, nisi interrogatus." *

Whilst our moralists, as well as the Church authorities, anxiously guard against indiscretion, which might impart dangerous knowledge prematurely, some modern votaries of science have absolutely thrown aside all regard to decorum. It was a singular coincidence, that at the very time when some vulgar itinerants were declaiming against the indelicacy of the confessional, lectures *on the origin of life* were publicly delivered to large audiences of females, who were invited to the close inspection of anatomical models. The curtain which hides the secrets of the marriage-bed was drawn aside, and the use of the power of reproduction pointed out, with the professed view of guarding against its abuses. The authority of the law was in vain invoked against this outrage on morals in the name of science. A well-known contributor to the periodical press published a long article over his proper signature, in which he maintained the propriety of the lectures, and the necessity of early and ample instruction being given to every individual on all that appertains to sexual intercourse. Not so our moralists, who, whilst pointing out with minute accuracy the laws of our being, have used a language intelligible only to the learned. The confessor, furnished with this necessary knowledge for the exercise of his ministry, sits as a faithful sentinel near the fount of human life, to guard the purity of its waters, and prevent their waste. In silence he watches as long as he perceives no wanton outrage; but to the heedless or the daring he proclaims, in tones not to be mistaken, that they must not violate the law of the Eternal, or attempt to frustrate his counsels. He enters not into every minute detail, nor does he deal in mere generalities; but according to the state of mind of the penitent, — his doubts or his remorses, — he instructs him, simply and sparingly, by declaring what is forbidden. NON LICET. Is there not something divine in the very idea of a self-denying ministry, that guards with such jealousy the law given by our Creator to the parents of our race, and the blessing which accompanies its observance?

The character of a tribunal which has lasted eighteen centuries may be fairly estimated by the general persuasion of those in the midst of whom it has subsisted. Without referring our

* Praxis Confessarii, c. ii. circa vi. præc.

readers to distant or past evidence, we at once appeal to the instinctive feeling of the Catholic community around us. The confessional is open to all, of every class and condition, — the corrupt and the virtuous, the illiterate and the learned, the vulgar and the refined, the lowly and the noble. Let any one consult the most depraved who have at any time resorted to confession, and he will find that it is regarded by them as an effectual remedy for sin, so that they flee from it when they are disposed to live licentiously, and have recourse to it when they propose to correct their evil ways. The pure and devoted, whose character is above suspicion, will bear testimony to its sanctifying influence, since they labor by confession to purify their souls from the slightest stains. Can it be imagined that all concur to testify in favor of an institution generally or frequently abused to perverse purposes? The virtuous mother is most solicitous to send her daughter to confession at an early age, to preserve her in innocence; and she grieves when she perceives that her son has ceased to approach it, since she fears that vice has found entrance into his heart. Whenever the zeal of the pious is excited for the reclaiming of the unfortunate, it is by inducing them to present themselves at the confessional that they hope to see it accomplished. Can it be, nevertheless, that its influence is adverse to virtue? We may be allowed to say, with Mr. Sampson, a Protestant lawyer, — "If it led to licentiousness or danger, that licentiousness or that danger would have come to light, and there would be tongues enough to tell it." *

It must not be forgotten that Protestants have frequent opportunities of knowing the influence of the confessional, and that those amongst them whose relations to Catholics are the most intimate show unbounded confidence in its purity. The Catholic wife approaches it with the full knowledge of her Protestant husband, and sends her daughters and sons to confession with his approbation. Would this be possible, if a shadow of suspicion rested on the mind of the natural protector of the innocence of his children, — the jealous guardian of the virtue of his consort?

It is needless to reply at greater length to the charges advanced against an institution which is essentially directed to wash away the defilements of sin, and which is in the Church like a majestic river whose waters absorb the impurities which

* Catholic Question, p. 89.

they meet with in their course. Confession, as Dr. Pusey remarks, was acknowledged to be a good thing by Latimer himself, who regretted that it had not been retained in England. In the reign of the fourteenth Louis, some Chinese, visiting the capital of France, and being informed of the use of the confessionals, which they saw in the churches, expressed a wish that such tribunals existed in their own country, in which self-accusation might anticipate the rigor of the law, and moral reform take the place of punishment. Rousseau, Voltaire, and a host of others, have acknowledged the powerful restraint which confession places on the passions of youth, and the fruits of restitution and good works which it produces.

The advantages to society arising from the confessional as a means of enforcing the reparation of wrongs can scarcely be estimated. It is properly the judgment-seat, where the culprit, acknowledging his guilt, escapes the penalties of the law, on conditions which combine mercy and justice. The promises of pardon held forth in the divine writings may easily be mistaken by our self-love for unreserved indulgence; but the example of Zaccheus should convince us that reparation of frauds is necessary. In vain do we profess sorrow for injustice, if we be unwilling to repair it. Few, nevertheless, offer at once, like the publican, to restore fourfold; whilst many are most unwilling to part with any portion of their unjust acquisitions. It was consonant with divine wisdom to refer us to the judgment of a disinterested person, instructed in the law of God, and uninfluenced by the false maxims which prevail among worldlings. The confessor is charged with the guardianship of the rights of all, and is bound to enjoin satisfaction for all wrongs which the penitent may have committed. His office empowers him to bind, as well as loose; and he must fearlessly declare to the penitent the necessity of restoring property and character, if either has suffered from his misdeeds. This surely is a most important portion of the sacerdotal duty, and well calculated to commend it to the admiration of all. Without any possible interest, the confessor acts as if he were the hired agent of the injured individual, who is generally unknown to him, and who may be an enemy of himself or his religion. Penitents left to their own judgment generally neglect the discharge of obligations of this kind. We see men notorious for injustice, who profess religion, without caring to atone for the many frauds by which they have amassed wealth; whilst very

rarely is an instance presented of restitution made by any one who has not approached the confessional.

The case reported in the *Catholic Question* regarded stolen property restored through the agency of Rev. Anthony Kohlmann, S. J., who was called on to declare the individual. Mr. Sampson, one of his counsel, eloquently portrayed on this occasion the advantages of confession, many of which are necessarily unknown. "Its utility," he said, "can never be proved by instances, because it cannot be shown how many have been saved by it; how many of the young of both sexes have been, in the most critical juncture of their lives, admonished from the commission of some fatal crime, that would have brought the parents' hoary hairs with sorrow to the grave. These are secrets that cannot be revealed. Since, however, the paths that lead to vice are many and alluring, is it not well that some one should be open to the repenting sinner, where the fear of punishment and of the world's scorn may not deter the yet wavering convert? If the road to destruction is easy and smooth, —*facilis descensus averni*, — may it not consist with wisdom and policy, that there be one silent, secret path, where the doubting penitent may be invited to turn aside, and escape the throng that hurries him along, — some retreat, where, as in the bosom of a holy hermit, within the shade of innocence and peace, the pilgrim of this checkered life may draw new inspirations of virtue and repose? If the thousand ways of error are tricked with flowers, is it so wrong that somewhere there should be a sure and gentle friend, who has no interest to betray, no care but that of ministering to the incipient cure? The siren songs and blandishments of pleasure may lead the young and tender heart astray, and the repulsive frown of stern authority forbid return. One step then gained or lost is victory or death. Let me, then, ask you that are parents," (the advocate addresses the jurors,) "which would you prefer, that the child of your hopes should pursue the course of ruin, and continue with the companions of debauch and crime, or turn to the confessional, where, if compunction could once bring him, one gentle word, one well-timed admonition, one friendly turn by the hand, might save your child from ruin, and your heart from unavailing sorrow? And if the hardened sinner, the murderer, the robber, or conspirator, can once be brought to bow his stubborn spirit, and kneel before his frail fellow-man, invite him to pronounce a penance suited to his crimes, and seek salvation

through a full repentance, there is more gained than by the bloodiest spectacle of terror; than though his mangled limbs were broken on the wheel, his body gibbeted, or given to the fowls of the air." *

As might have been anticipated from this eloquent appeal, but still more from the freedom of our institutions, the court held the priest exempt from answering the questions proposed to him. It was gratifying to Catholic feeling, that a guaranty was thus solemnly given to so sacred a trust. Had the decision been different, the venerable Jesuit father, rather than betray his ministry, would have doubtless gone to prison, like the Augustinian Gahan, who refused to manifest the nature of the communication which he had with Lord Dunboyne at his death, — nay, he would have sacrificed life itself, like St. John of Nepomuck, who was assassinated by order of Wenceslas, king of Bohemia, because he would not reveal the confession of the queen.

A word in regard to the nature of the secrecy of the confessional may be allowed us, before closing this article. It implies no more than the inviolability of the confidence reposed by the penitent in the confessor, who, under no circumstances, can reveal, to any one whatever, any sin disclosed to him in confession, or any circumstance manifested in connection with it, or make any use of the knowledge so obtained to the pain or prejudice of the penitent. There is no obligation on the penitent to declare his name, or the name of his accomplice, or to make any specifications, beyond the acknowledgment of his sins, so that he may preserve a perfect *incognito;* but if he be known to the confessor, he is nevertheless sure that his confidence will never be betrayed.

It has puzzled us sometimes to understand a charge of immorality advanced by some against confessors on the score of this inviolable secrecy. They appear horrified at the principle laid down by St. Thomas, that a confessor, if summoned as a witness, may deny on oath all knowledge of facts known to him only on the confession of the penitent. Yet who does not know that evidence is sought for in courts of justice only as procured by ordinary means? The priest can testify fully, to the extent of any other witness, as to what he has seen, or what he has heard, in any way in which information can be had by others. It must be presumed that he is called on only as

* Catholic Question, p. 89.

an individual deriving information through channels open to all; and were the design of the court manifestly directed to discover sacramental secrets, it is so unjust that a refusal to comply would be a vindication of natural right to be true to confidence reposed in the witness, and a denial of all knowledge of the fact would be necessarily understood in a qualified sense, of knowledge such as *a witness* could possess. The iniquity of the attempt would put the hearers on their guard against the danger of mistaking the reply as extending to sacramental knowledge. The culprit, pleading "Not guilty," is not thought to utter a falsehood, since his denial receives a modified interpretation from the circumstances; the lawyer, denying all knowledge of transactions which his client communicated in confidence, is understood of ordinary information, such as he might communicate without detriment to official relations; and the ambassador, who professes not to know the secrets of his royal master, is not branded as a liar by those who are acquainted with the language of diplomacy.

But it is time to relieve our readers from the consideration of a subject which, though of high importance, may not, as presented by us, have the attractions of many other topics of the day.

ART. III.—*An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.* By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN. New York: Appleton & Co. 1845. 8vo. pp. 206.

OUR readers do not need to be informed that the distinguished author of this work on the Development of Christian Doctrine, has, within the last year, been admitted to the communion of the Holy Catholic Church; for who has not heard of the event, and what Catholic heart has it not filled with devout joy and gratitude? Mr. Newman has stood for several years before the public as a man of rare gifts and acquirements; he was at the head of a very influential party in the Anglican communion, and appears to have enjoyed a personal esteem, and exerted a personal influence, which seldom fall to the lot of any but the master minds of their age or country. We may well, then, look upon his conversion with more than ordinary gratitude to the great Head of the Church, and as an event of more than ordinary significance.

Mr. Newman appears, from all we know of his history, to have commenced his career with sincere attachment to the schismatical communion in which he was born and reared, and to have felt that he owed it all his genius, talents, attainments, labors, and affections; but almost from the first it was seen by close observers that he cherished aspirations and tendencies which, if faithfully followed, must ultimately lead him out of that communion, or destroy the communion itself by absorbing it in the Catholic Church. Hence the great importance which has been attached to his movements, and the lively interest with which his various publications have been read. Some almost flattered themselves that he and his friends would so far *Catholicize* the Establishment as to render its restoration to Catholic unity feasible and certain; others, looking upon this as improbable, since it would find an insuperable obstacle in English politics, thought it more likely that his movement would end in his own individual conversion, and that of a considerable number of his friends and followers; others, again, among whom were we ourselves, thought it still more likely that he would stop short in his course, and make up his mind to live and die an Anglican. We felt, on reading the famous Tract 90, that the man who could write such a tract would never want ingenious reasons to justify to himself any course he might choose to adopt. But we did not take sufficiently into the account the difficulties of the position of one standing, like Mr. Newman, outside of the Church, nor make sufficient allowance for the dimness and indistinctness with which Catholic truth ordinarily at first dawns on the Protestant mind, and for the length of time it usually requires to ascertain how much of our past life we may retain, and how much we must give up, in order to place the several parts of our new belief in harmony with each other. We humbly and devoutly thank Almighty God that we were wrong; that we relied too little on the power of divine grace; and that, contrary to our expectations, Mr. Newman, and a large number of his friends, have already been permitted to enter that communion, out of which it is madness to suppose we can please God, or secure the salvation of our souls.

We have no disposition to speculate on the probable effect of the recent conversions in England. It may be that Almighty God is about to visit, in the riches of his mercy, the deeply sinning land of our forefathers, and, for his own greater glory, to restore her, contrary to her deserts, to the bosom of Catholic unity. Appearances everywhere indicate that our good God is at

present interposing in a special manner in behalf of his Church, and by a thousand ways preparing the return of the misguided children of the so-called Reformation to their allegiance, to the love and embrace of their Holy Mother, who has never ceased to weep over their folly and madness, and to beseech her heavenly Spouse to save them from themselves. But, whatever may be the ulterior purposes of Him who orders all things well, the conversion of even one soul is sufficient to warrant the fullest joy and gratitude the heart of man can entertain; and we have superabundant cause of devout thanksgiving in what he has already effected. It is enough for us to trust ourselves, and all, lovingly to him, and to pray unceasingly that his will may be done in all and in each.

The book before us appears to have been designed to indicate, to some extent, the process by which its gifted author passed in his own mind from Anglicanism to Catholicity, and to remove the principal objections to the Catholic Church, which he himself had raised in his previous publications. As the production of a strong, active, acute, and cultivated mind, enriched with various but not always well digested erudition, brought up in the bosom of heresy and schism, nurtured with false learning, false philosophy, vague and empty theories, gradually, under divine grace, working its way to the truth which gleams from afar, but which the intervening darkness renders fitful and uncertain; it is a work of more than ordinary interest, and one which the enlightened and philosophic few, fond of psychological researches, and of tracing the operations of sectarian or individual idiosyncrasies, may read perhaps with profit. A Protestant, ignorant, as Protestants usually are, of Catholicity, may even fancy the work substantially Catholic, and regard its theory as a convenient one for the Church, and one which she may, without prejudice to any of her claims, if not accept, at least tolerate. It is evident, from the first page of the work, that the author has made up his mind; that he is writing under the full conviction that he must seek admission into the Roman Catholic communion; and that, in his judgment, the theory he is putting forth in justification of the step he has resolved to take is, to say the least, perfectly compatible with Catholic authority and infallibility. He frankly accepts, and in some instances elaborately defends, the principal dogmas and usages of the Catholic Church, and especially those which are in general the most offensive to Protestants; and so little suspicion has he of the unsoundness of his work, so orthodox does he hold it,

that he does not scruple, even after his conversion, to publish it to the world. And yet we presume he himself is now prepared to concede, that, when he was writing this book, he was still in the bonds of Protestantism; that he had not as yet set his foot on Catholic ground; that he had not crossed the Jordan, had not even surveyed the promised land from the top of Mount Pisgah, and that he knew it only by vague rumor and uncertain report. All, to his vision, is dim and confused. He stumbles at every step, and stammers at every word. He puts forth a giant's strength, but only to wrestle with phantoms; and gives us learned and elaborate theories to explain facts which he himself shows are no facts, — ingenious and subtile speculations, where all that is needed, or is admissible, is a plain yes or no. From first to last, he labors with a genius, a talent, a learning, a sincerity, an earnestness, which no one can refuse to admire, to develope Protestantism into Catholicity. Vain effort! As well attempt to develope the poisonous sumach into the cedar of Lebanon.

Whatever may have been Mr. Newman's estimation of his work when writing or consenting to publish it, we cannot doubt that he now judges it as we do. He has now a practical and a filial acquaintance with the Church. He has been permitted to approach her Holy Sacraments; he has eaten "the food of angels"; his heart has been elevated and his vision purged. He is now not an alien, but a son, and a son who can have no will but that of his Holy Mother. No foolish pride of opinion, or mistaken notions of self-respect, can make him cling now to past utterances, because they were his, and labor to defend views which he could have entertained only while yet in ignorance, or, at best, seeing "men only as trees walking." His glory is in getting rid of the old Protestant leaven, and in receiving, on the authority of God in the Church, all the sacred truths which she believes and teaches, and as she believes and teaches them. He cannot feel that it derogates from true dignity and consistency of character to give up falsehood for truth, or to abandon a once cherished theory, when once seen to be both unnecessary and inadmissible. It implies no reproach to him that he was not able, at the time and under the circumstances, from the position in which his Protestantism had placed him, with the training he had received, and the little recourse he had had to the authorized living teacher, to produce a work less uncatholic, and less open to grave objections. The work is all that he could have reasonably expected it to be; and in

refusing to accept it as Catholic, we imply no distrust of the sincerity of his conversion, or of his present orthodoxy.

It is but simple justice to Mr. Newman to say, that it is not for his sake that we are about to point out some objections to his theory of developments. The circumstances under which he wrote, his acknowledged learning and ability, the presumption that he had thoroughly surveyed his ground, and the *apparent* favor with which his essay has been received by the Catholic press in England, are not unlikely to convey to Protestant, and perhaps to some partially instructed and speculative Catholic minds, the impression, that, if the theory set forth is not exactly Catholic, it at least contains nothing which a Catholic may not accept. The fact, that the author — whether legitimately or not — comes to Catholic conclusions, that he ends by entering the Catholic communion, that he puts forth his theory expressly for the purpose of removing the obstacles which others may find in following his example, and with this view publishes it to the world even after his converson, can hardly fail to produce in many minds the conviction that the theory and the conclusions are necessarily or at least legitimately connected. And several Protestant reviewers seem actually to entertain this conviction; and they, therefore, hold the theory up to condemnation as the "Romanist" theory; or, as they express themselves, "as the ground on which modern Rome seeks to defend her manifest corruptions of Christian doctrine." It is therefore due both to the Church and to Protestants to say, expressly, — and we do so with the highest respect for Mr. Newman, and with warm admiration for the truth, beauty, and force of many of the details of his work, — that his peculiar theory is essentially anticatholic and Protestant. It not only is not necessary to the defence of the Church, but is utterly repugnant to her claims to be the authoritative and infallible Church of God. A brief examination of some of the principal features of the theory will justify this strong and apparently severe assertion.

Mr. Newman so mixes up in the same category Christian doctrine, theology, and discipline, — matters in their nature distinct, and never confounded by Catholic doctors, — that it is difficult by express quotations to determine his exact meaning, and those of our readers who have not read his book must rely somewhat on our judgment and fidelity in representing it. But we are familiar with his subject; we have travelled, under circumstances similar to his own, over the greater part of the

ground he brings to view; we embraced, and for years publicly advocated, a theory substantially identical with his own; we have studied his book thoroughly and conscientiously; we have, and, as Catholics, can have, no motive for misrepresenting it; and we think the statements we are about to give are such as Mr. Newman himself will concede to be strictly just. As we understand Mr. Newman, the problem he has written his book to solve is, How to explain, in accordance with Christian truth, the variations or differences of doctrine and discipline which the Roman Catholic Church presents to-day, from the doctrine and discipline presented by the primitive Church. He does not anywhere draw up a list or give us a formal statement of these variations and differences; but important variations, not only in discipline, but also in doctrine, he takes it for granted, there have been. Some hypothesis for their explanation, he thinks, is necessary; and the hypothesis he suggests he calls "*the Theory of Developments.*" It is the purpose of his Essay, 1. To explain this theory; 2. To furnish the tests by which development may be distinguished from corruption; 3. To establish the probability, *a priori*, of developments in Christianity; and 4. By an elaborate historical application of the theory to the successive ages of the Church, to show that it meets and explains the principal facts in the case. Such is the general design of his work.

We waive, here, all considerations of this theory so far as it is intended to apply to Christian discipline and theology, and confine ourselves to it solely as applied to Christian doctrine. Under this last point of view, we object to the theory that it is a theory, and not a revealed fact. The truth of an hypothesis can never be inferred from the fact that it meets and explains the facts it is invented to meet and explain; and therefore the admission of any hypothesis into Christian doctrine would vitiate the doctrine itself. Mr. Newman begins his work by telling us that "Christianity has been long enough in the world to justify us in dealing with it as a fact in the world's history. *It may legitimately be made the subject-matter of theories:* what is its moral and political excellence, what its place in the range of ideas or of facts which we possess, *whether it be divine or human*, whether it be original or eclectic or both at once, how far favorable to civilization or to literature, whether a religion for all ages or for a particular state of society, — these are questions upon the fact or professed solutions of the fact, and *belong to the province of opinion.*" — p. 11. But in this

he must be mistaken. Whether Christianity be divine or human is not a question of opinion, but a question of fact, and so is it with all the questions he enumerates. Christianity is a fact in the world's history; this is a fact. But is Christianity what it professes to be? Is this a question of opinion, to be answered only by a theory? or is it a question of fact, to be taken up and settled, one way or the other, as a fact? If it is a matter of opinion, and if it is answerable only by a theory, what foundation is there or can there be for faith? Christianity is a fact, not only in the world's history, but in itself, or it is not. If it is, it cannot legitimately be made the subject-matter of theories, any more than may be the fact that it is a fact in the world's history. Christianity, if received at all, must be received, not as a theory, but as a revealed fact; and when we have established it as a revealed fact, no theory is needed or admissible, for we must then believe the fact precisely as it proposes itself.

But even if a theory might be introduced, Mr. Newman's would not satisfy us. We are not satisfied with his tests of a true development. He gives seven tests: — 1. Preservation of type or idea; 2. Continuity of principles; 3. Power of assimilation; 4. Early anticipation; 5. Logical sequence; 6. Preservative additions; 7. Chronic continuance. The sixth, second, and first are all resolvable into one, the simple preservation of the original type or idea. The third, which implies development by assimilation or accretion, is fatal to the sufficiency of the original revelation, by necessarily implying that the developed idea contains what was not in the idea as originally given. The fifth, Logical sequence, in itself is no proof of development. The fourth, Early anticipation, as far as it goes, is proof positive against development. And the seventh, Chronic continuance, is as applicable to corruptions as to true developments; for Mr. Newman fails entirely to show that corruptions are short-lived and transitory, as he alleges. Some writers date the origin of the Pelagian heresy, which is as rife as ever it was, as far back as the garden of Eden; and Mr. Newman himself admits that it remains to be seen "whether Mahometanism external to Christendom and the Greek Church within it" are not yet living, and capable of chronic continuance and activity (p. 48).

Furthermore, before we can proceed to apply tests to determine whether this or that is a development or a corruption of Christian doctrine, we must have a clear, distinct, and adequate

knowledge of Christian doctrine itself; for how can we say the original type or idea is preserved, if we do not know what it is? If we do know what it is, what is the use of the tests or their application? The whole process of the historical application of the tests is, then, at best, regarded as an argument, a mere paralogism. We need all the knowledge of Christian doctrine as the condition of concluding any thing from the application of the tests, which their successful application can give us; for there can be nothing in the conclusion not previously in the premises. Mr. Newman, like professors of natural science, has been misled by what in these times is called "Inductive Philosophy," — a philosophy which had never had "a local habitation or a name," more than other "airy nothings," if it had been borne in mind that we have no logic by which we can conclude the unknown from the known. When your conclusions go beyond what you have established in the premises, they may, indeed, sometimes be a guide to observation, but they have in themselves no scientific validity.

But, waiving these considerations, we object to Mr. Newman's theory, that it is an hypothesis brought forward to explain facts which are not facts. His problem is no problem; for it presupposes what no Catholic can concede, and what there is no warrant in the facts of the case for conceding. Mr. Newman proceeds on the assumption, that there have been real variations in Christian doctrine. "On various grounds, then, it is certain," he says, "that portions of the Church system were held back in primitive times; and of course this fact goes some way to account for that apparent variation and *growth* of doctrine, which embarrasses us when we would consult history for the true idea of Christianity; yet it is not the key to the whole difficulty, for the obvious reason, that the variations continue beyond the time when it is conceivable the discipline (*disciplina arcani*) was in force." And the view on which his book is written, he adds, is, —

"That the *increase* and expansion of the Christian *Creed* and Ritual, and the *variations* which have attended the process in the case of individuals and churches, are *necessary* attendants on any philosophy or polity which takes possession of the intellect and heart, and has had any wide or extended dominion; that, from the nature of the human mind, *time* is necessary for the full comprehension and *perfection* of great ideas; and that the highest and most wonderful truths, though communicated once for all to the world by inspired teachers, could not be comprehended all at once

by the recipients, but, as received by minds not inspired, and through *media* which were human, have required only the longer time and the deeper thought for their full elucidation. This may be called the *Theory of Developments*." — p. 19. "We shall find ourselves unable," he says again, "to fix an historical point at which the *growth of doctrine* ceased. Not on the day of Pentecost, for St. Peter had still to learn at Joppa about the baptism of Cornelius; not at Joppa and Cæsarea, for St. Paul had to write his Epistles; not on the death of the last Apostle, for St. Ignatius *had to establish the doctrine of Episcopacy;* not then, nor for many years after, for the canon of the New Testament was still undetermined; *not in the Creed*, which is no collection of definitions, but a summary of certain *credenda*, an incomplete summary, and, like the Lord's Prayer or the Decalogue, *a mere sample* of divine truths, especially of the more elementary. No one doctrine can be named which starts *omnibus numeris*, at first, and gains nothing from the investigations of faith and the attacks of heresy. The Church went forth from the world *in haste*, as the Israelites from Egypt, 'with their dough before it was leavened, their kneading-troughs being bound up in their clothes upon their shoulders.'" — p. 55. "Butler of course was not contemplating the case of *new articles of faith*, or developments imperative on our acceptance, but he surely bears witness to the probability of developments in Christian doctrine considered in themselves, which is at present the point in question." — p. 57. "Thus we see how, as time went on, the doctrine of Purgatory *was opened upon the apprehension of the Church*, as a portion or form of penance due for sins committed after baptism; and thus the *belief* in this doctrine and the *practice* of infant baptism would *grow* into general reception together." — p. 192.

These passages do not appear in their full strength, detached, as they are, from the context; but we think there is no mistaking the doctrine they inculcate. They prove clearly that Mr. Newman does not mean simply that there has been a growth in theological *science*, a variation or expansion of outward discipline, but that there have been in the teachings of the Church herself real variations of *doctrine*, an increase and expansion of the Christian creed, — a real progress of the Church in her own apprehension and understanding of the sacred deposit of faith committed to her charge, and which she received the command to teach all nations even unto the consummation of the world. She went forth in haste, her "dough unleavened," her creed incomplete, her understanding of her faith imperfect, ignorant, in part at least, in regard to every article of faith, of the precise truth she was authorized to teach.

New definitions are new developments, and indicate that more of Christian truth is opened upon the apprehension of the Church. Before she defines the article, she herself does not clearly and distinctly apprehend what, on the point defined, is the revelation she originally received. As if she had only a confused notion, an intense feeling, and no distinct apprehension of the consubstantiality of the Son to the Father when she drew up the Symbol, and not till she defined it against Arius at Nice; and when she defined the "two natures in one person" against Nestorius, she had not yet fully learned the "one person in two distinct natures," which she asserted shortly after against Eutyches. All may have been implied in the original revelation, but she knew it not; and it is only as time goes on, as mind acts on mind, as controversies arise, as urgent necessities press, that she gradually developes it, and fixes it in her definitions. Thus in her understanding there is a perpetual growth, or a continued increase and expansion of Christian doctrine. The decision of the rule of faith, he tells us, "has been left to time, to the influence of mind upon mind, the issues of controversy and the growth of opinion," (p. 51,) and remains, he supposes, even to this day, "more or less undeveloped, or at least undefined by the Church." (p. 173.) Infant baptism was "unprovided for by the revelation, as originally given." (p. 51.) It is left undecided, "unless by development or growth" of revelation, what is the resource of those who sin after baptism, (ib.,) and the doctrine of Purgatory appears to have been a late development. (p. 192.) *

* We cannot resist, here, the temptation to quote a passage from a recent Protestant work published in this country, — *The Principle of Protestantism in its Relation to the Present State of the Church*, by Professor Schaf, of the German Reformed Theological Seminary, Mercersburg, Pa., — a German, lately from Berlin, and in part attached, we believe, to the school of Neander. He is a young man of very superior abilities. His work has many remarkable affinities with Mr. Newman's. Both works adopt very nearly the same fundamental principles; but one concludes in favor of Protestantism, the other of Catholicity. The passage we quote seems to us a clear and distinct statement of Mr. Newman's leading doctrine, and a much better statement than Mr. Newman himself has anywhere formally given.

"It must be remarked, that, when we speak of advance or progress, we do so with reference only to the *previous apprehension* of Christianity in the *Church*, and not to *Christianity* itself, as exhibited in its original, and for all times absolutely normal character, in the writings of the New Testament. . . . . In its own nature, as a new order of life, Christianity has been complete from the beginning; and there is no room to

Now, in regard to all this, we simply ask, Does the Church herself take this view? Does she teach that she at first received no formal revelation, — that the revelation was given as "unleavened dough," to be leavened, kneaded, made up into loaves of convenient size, baked and prepared for use by her, after her mission began, and she had commenced the work of evangelizing the nations? Does she admit her original creed was incomplete, that it has increased and expanded, that there have been variation and progress in her understanding of the revelation she originally received, and that she now understands it better, and can more readily define what it is than she could at first? Most assuredly not. She asserts that there has been no progress, no increase, no variation of faith; that what she believes and teaches now is precisely what she has always and everywhere believed and taught from the first. She denies that she has ever added a new article to the primitive creed; and affirms, as Mr. Newman himself proves in his account of the Council of Chalcedon, (p. 145,) that the new definition is not a new development, a better understanding of the faith, but simply a new definition, against the "novel expressions" invented by the enemies of religion, of what, on the point defined, had always and everywhere been her precise faith. In this she is right, or she is wrong. If right, you must abandon your theory of developments; if wrong, she is a false witness for God, and your theory of developments cannot make her worthy of con-

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conceive that any more perfect order can take its place, or that it may be so improved as, in the end, to outgrow entirely its own original sphere. But notwithstanding this, we are authorized to speak of advance or progress in the case of the Church itself, and on the part of the Christianized world; and of this not merely as extensive, in the spread of the Gospel among Pagans, Mohammedans, and Jews, but as intensive, also, *in the continually growing cultivation and improvement* of those four great interests of the Church, doctrine, life, constitution, and worship. The Church, not less than every one of its members, has its periods of infancy, youth, manhood, and old age. This involves no contradiction to the absolute character of Christianity; for the progress of the Church, outward or inward, is never in the strict sense creative, but in the way only of reception, organic assimilation, and expansion. In other words, all historical development in the Church, theoretical and practical, consists in an *apprehension, always more and more profound, of the life and doctrine of Christ and his Apostles; an appropriation, more full and transforming always, of their distinctive spirit, both as to its contents and its form.* Only so far as a doctrine or ordinance of the Church bears this character may it be allowed to have normative and enduring force." — pp. 50, 51.

This is bold, manly, and consistent in a Protestant; it is something else in a Catholic.

fidence. If you believe her, you cannot assert developments in your sense of the term; if you do not believe her, you are no Catholic. This is sufficient to show that Mr. Newman cannot urge his theory as a Catholic, whatever he might do as a Protestant.

Mr. Newman proceeds on the assumption, that the revelation committed to the charge of the Church was not a distinct, formal revelation, but a vague, loose, obscure revelation, which she at first only imperfectly apprehended. This is evident from the extracts we have made, and also from what he says when pointing out an error in a passage which he quotes from one of his previous publications. "The writer considers the growth of the doctrine [of Purgatory] an instance of the action of private judgment; whereas I should now call it an instance of *the mind of the Church working out dogmatic truth from implicit feelings*, under secret supernatural guidance."—p. 192. This is a pregnant passage, and may be regarded as a key to Mr. Newman's doctrine of development, and also to his view of the teaching authority of the Church. The development, as is evident from the context, is not the formal definition of the faith against a novel error, but is a slow, painful, and laborious working out, by the Church herself, of dogmatic truth from implicit feelings,—though what kind of feeling an *implicit* feeling is, we are unable to say. "Thus St. Justin or St. Irenæus might be without any digested ideas of Purgatory, or Original Sin, yet have an *intense feeling*, which they had not defined or located, both of the fault of our first nature and of the liabilities of our nature regenerate."—p. 44. It is obvious from the whole course of Mr. Newman's reasoning, that he would predicate of the Church, in their time, what he here predicates of St. Justin and St. Irenæus. The Church had a vague yet intense feeling of the truth, but had not digested it into formal propositions or definite articles. She had a blind instinct, which, under secret supernatural guidance, enabled her to avoid error and to pursue the regular course of development. She had a secret feeling of the truth, as one may say, a natural taste for it, and a distaste for error; yet not that clear and distinct understanding which would have enabled her at any moment, on any given point, to define her faith. She only knew enough of truth to preserve the original idea, and to elaborate from her intense feelings, slowly and painfully, as time went on, now one dogma, and now another. What in one age is feeling in a succeeding age becomes opinion, and an article of faith in

a still later age. This new article gives rise to a new intense feeling, which, in its turn, in a subsequent age becomes opinion, to be finally, in a later age yet, imposed as dogmatic truth. This is, so far as we can understand it, Mr. Newman's doctrine of development, and what he means by "working out dogmatic truth from implicit feelings."

By the "mind" of the Church which works out this dogmatic truth, Mr. Newman does not mean, strictly speaking, the constituted authority of the Church, but the internal sense, very nearly what Moehler calls the "internal tradition," of the collective body of the faithful. When he speaks of the recipients of the revelation, he seems always to have in his mind the *Ecclesia credens*, and to forget the *Ecclesia docens*. He does not appear to have ever heard that Almighty God gave his revelation to pastors and teachers qualified from the first to teach it in its purity and integrity, clearly and distinctly, but that he threw it upon the great concourse of believers for them to receive and make the most of. "The time at length came when these recipients ceased to be inspired; and on these recipients the revealed truths would fall at first vaguely and generally, and would afterwards be completed by developments."— p. 49. This view, if followed out, would suppress entirely the proper teaching authority of the Church, competent at any moment to declare infallibly what is the precise truth revealed; or, at least, would raise the *Ecclesia credens* above the *Ecclesia docens*, and reduce the office of the Church teaching to that of defining, from time to time, the dogmatic truth which the Church believing has gradually and slowly worked out from her implicit feelings. The secret supernatural assistance would then attach to the Church believing, and superintend the elaboration, rather than to the Church teaching; and if to the Church teaching at all, only so far as to enable it faithfully to collect and truly define what the Church believing elaborates; the very doctrine we ourselves set forth in the first number of this Journal, and insisted on, not as a reason for going into the Roman Catholic Church, but as a reason for *not* going into it, and for staying where we were.

Mr. Newman evidently proceeds on the assumption, that Christianity can be abstracted from the Church, and considered apart from the institution which concretes it, as if the Church were accidental and not essential in our holy religion. "Christianity," he says, "though spoken of in prophecy as a kingdom, came into the world as an *idea* rather than an institution, and

has had to wrap itself in clothing, and fit itself with armor of its own providing, and form the instruments and methods of its own prosperity and warfare." — p. 59. If he does not so consider it, all he says on the development of ideas in general has and can have no relation to his subject. "The more claim," he says, "an idea has to be considered living, the more various will be its aspects; and the more social and political is its nature, the more complicated and subtile will be its developments, and the larger and the more eventful will be its course. *Such is Christianity;* and whatever has been said about the development of ideas generally becomes, of course, an antecedent argument for its progressive development." — p. 49. Its divine Author then sent Christianity into the world a naked and unarmed idea. By its action on us, and ours on it, it gradually developes itself into an institution, which, feeble at first, as time and events roll on, strengthens and fortifies itself, now on this side and now on that, pushes deep its roots into the heart of humanity, sends out its branches, now in one direction and now in another, till at length it grows up and expands into that all-embracing authority, those profound and comprehensive dogmas, those pure and sublime precepts, and that rich and touching ritual, which together make up what we to-day call the Roman Catholic and Apostolical Church. Hence the significance of what the author told us in his Introduction (p. 11): "Christianity has, from the first, ... thrown itself upon the great concourse of men. Its home is in the world; and to know what it is we must seek it in the world, and hear the world's witness of it." *

We meet here an old, familiar acquaintance, — a doctrine which we embraced for years before we became a Catholic, and which for years kept us out of the Catholic Church, as it now keeps out the greater part of our former friends and associates. Assuming that Christianity came into the world originally as an idea, and not as an institution, that it was thrown upon the great concourse of men, to be developed and embodied by the action of their minds, stimulated and directed by it, we held, that, by seizing it anew, abstracting it from the institutions with which it has thus far clothed itself, and proclaiming it as eighteen hundred years of intense moral and intellectual activity have developed it, we might organize through it a new

* "He [*Ego sum vobiscum*] was in the world, and the world knew him not." — St. John i. 10.

institution, a new church, in advance of the old by all the developments which these eighteen hundred years have effected; and we see not, even now, wherein we were wrong, if it be assumed that Christianity was originally given us as a naked and unarmed idea.

This doctrine rests on the assumption, that ideas, in themselves considered, are active and potent, and that they may, as our old friend, the author of *Orphic Sayings*, would express himself, "take unto themselves hands, build the temple, erect the altar, and instaurate the worship of God." This is not only bad theology, but false philosophy, as we attempted to show in an article entitled *No Church, No Reform*, published in this Journal for April, 1844. Ideas, not concreted, not instituted, are not potencies, are not active, but are really to us as if they were not. The ideal must become actual, before it can be operative. If Christianity had come into the world as an idea, it would have left the world as it found it. Moreover, if you assume it to have come as an idea, and to have been developed only by the action of the human mind on it, the institutions with which it is subsequently clothed, the authorities established in its name, the dogmas imposed, the precepts enjoined, and the rites prescribed are all really the products of the human mind; and, instead of governing the mind, may be governed, modified, enlarged, or contracted by it at its pleasure. The Church would be divine only in the sense philosophy or civil government is divine. If Mr. Newman had not been so preoccupied with the solution of the problem which his Anglicanism proposed, it seems to us he must have seen this, and shrunk from advancing his theory of developments.*

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* Yet Mr. Newman seems to have had some suspicion of this conclusion. "Nor can it fairly be made a difficulty, that thus to treat Christianity is to level it in some sort to sects and doctrines of the world, and to impute to it the imperfections which characterize the productions of man. Certainly it is a degradation of a divine work to consider it under an earthly form; but it is no irreverence, since the Lord himself, its author and owner, bore one also. Christianity differs from other religions and philosophies in what it has in addition to them; not in kind, but in origin; not in its nature, but in its personal characteristics; being informed and quickened by what is more than intellect, by a Divine Spirit. It is externally what the Apostle calls an 'earthly vessel,' *being the religion of men*. And, considered as such, it grows 'in wisdom and stature'; but the powers which it wields, and the words which proceed out of its mouth, attest its miraculous nativity." — pp. 49, 50.

Mr. Newman mistakes the analogy on which he relies. Undoubtedly the Church has its human side as well as its divine side; but it is not a

A little reflection on a somewhat popular German theory, of which Neander is perhaps the best living exponent, might have led Mr. Newman to suspect the soundness of his own, which is very nearly identical with it. Neander assumes that Christianity came into the world as a life, or the principle of a new and higher life; which, it strikes us, is only another form of words for saying it came as an idea. The German, assuming it to be life, or the principle of life, or a living "idea," placed by its Author in the world uninstituted, concludes that Christianity needs no formal institution, was never intended to be clothed with a formal institution, and that it can subsist, diffuse, and propagate itself, and fulfil its mission, without any other association or organization than that of general society. This also was Schleiermacher's view, as set forth in his *Ueber die Religion: Reden an Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern.* The Englishman, from virtually the same premises, argues, it is true, to a better conclusion, but not, it seems to us, with a better nor even with so good a logic. Certain it is, we ourselves could never obtain his Catholic conclusions from his premises; and it was not till we had been forced to abandon them, that we presented ourselves at the door of the Church, and begged permission to enter.

Our difficulties do not diminish when we take up Mr. Newman's definition of *idea.* An idea, according to him, is the habitual judgment which the mind forms of that which comes before it; and in this sense, he tells us, the term is used in his *Essay*, p. 20. Christianity came into the world as an idea, therefore as an habitual judgment formed by the mind. This, if construed strictly, makes Christianity purely human; for, if it be an habitual judgment formed by the human mind, it has no existence out of the mind, and could have had none before being formed in it. This is a conclusion from which every believer must recoil with horror. But, at any rate, we must

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correct view of Christianity to assume that its whole body, including its doctrines and institutions, is human, is a production of man, simply quickened and informed by the Divine Spirit. In Christianity, doctrine represents the divine, not the human, — is not the "earthly vessel," but that which was deposited in the vessel; for nothing can be regarded as Christian doctrine but what was originally revealed. Christian doctrine is the revelation itself, not the view which men take of that revelation. Hence the necessity of the infallible *Ecclesia docens* to keep and propound it. And here is the grand error Mr. Newman commits. He is still, while writing, a decided Protestant, mistaking our notions of Christianity for Christianity itself.

say, according to the author, that Christianity came into the world as an habitual judgment, for it came as an idea. Then it is nothing but an habitual judgment which the world forms. This must be admitted, because he says expressly, "To know what it is, we must seek it in the world, and hear the world's witness of it."— p. 11. But it is an habitual judgment which the world forms of — what? Of Christian doctrine, of the revelation supernaturally made and committed to the Church? Mr. Newman cannot say this, because this would make Christianity the *object* of the judgment, whereas he tells us that it is the judgment itself. Of what, then, is Christianity the habitual judgment which the world forms? We can conceive no answer Mr. Newman can give which will not involve naked Deism, or, at best, mere Quakerism.

Mr. Newman tells us again, p. 20, that ideas sometimes represent facts, and sometimes do not. Does Christianity represent a fact, or does it not? He doubtless intends to teach that it does. But what is the evidence? What is the criterion by which to distinguish an idea which represents a fact from one which does not? He answers: —

"When one and the same idea is held by persons who are independent of each other, and variously circumstanced, and have possessed themselves of it by different ways under very different aspects, without losing its substantial unity and its identity, and when it is thus variously presented, and yet recommended to persons similarly circumstanced; and when it is presented to persons variously circumstanced, under aspects discordant at first sight, but reconcilable after such explanations as their respective states of mind require; then it seems to have a claim to be considered the representative of objective truth."— pp. 20, 21.

This is pure *Lamenaism* which makes the *consensus hominum* the criterion of truth. It would also authorize us to infer, that, if Christianity, as at its first promulgation, be embraced only by a few, and these mutually connected and similarly circumstanced, and if, at the same time, these all receive it by the same way and under the same aspect, or agree among themselves in their views of it, it would have no "claim to be considered the representative of objective truth." The faith of the Blessed Virgin, the Twelve Apostles, and the Seventy Disciples, must, then, have labored under very serious disadvantages. Moreover, if all the world should be converted, all gathered into the same communion, become of "one mind," as well as of "one heart," there would be room to question

whether Christianity represents a fact or a no-fact. Is this Catholic teaching?

Nor are we better satisfied with what Mr. Newman says of the process of development. Christianity came into the world as an idea, an habitual judgment; and we may say of it in particular all he says of development in ideas in general. Ideas, we are told, "are not ordinarily brought home to the mind, except through the medium of a variety of aspects; like bodily substances, which are not seen except under the clothing of their properties and influences, and can be walked round and surveyed on opposite sides, and in different perspectives, and in contrary lights."— p. 21. Let an idea get possession of the popular mind, or the mind of any particular set of persons, and it is not difficult to understand the effects which will ensue.

"There will be a general agitation of thought, and an action of mind, both upon itself and upon other minds. New lights will be brought to bear upon the original idea, aspects will multiply, and judgments will accumulate. There will be a time of confusion, when conceptions and misconceptions are in conflict; and it is uncertain whether any thing is to come of the idea at all, or which view of it is to get the start of the others. After a while, some definite form of doctrine emerges; and, as time proceeds, one view of it will be modified or expanded by another, and then combined with a third, till the idea in which they centre will be to each mind separately what at first it was only to all together. It will be surveyed, too, in its relation to other doctrines or facts, to other natural laws or established rules, to the varying circumstances of times and places, to other religions, polities, philosophies, as the case may be. How it stands affected towards other systems, how it affects them, how far it coalesces with them, how far it tolerates when it interferes with them, will be gradually wrought out. It will be questioned and criticized by enemies, and explained by well-wishers. The multitude of opinions formed concerning it, in these respects and many others, will be collected, compared, sorted, sifted, selected, or rejected, and gradually attached to it or separated from it, in the minds of individuals and of the community. . . . . Thus, in time, it has grown into an ethical code, or into a system of government, or into a theology, or into a ritual, according to its capabilities; and this system or body of thought, theoretical and practical, thus laboriously gained, will, after all, be only the adequate representation of the original idea, being nothing else than what the very idea *meant* from the first, — its exact image as seen in a combination of the most diversified aspects; with the suggestions and corrections of many minds, and the illustrations of many trials. This process of thought is called the development of an idea." — pp. 22, 23.

That this is intended to be a description of the process of development, which takes place in Christian *doctrine*, is evident from the title of the book, *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, and from what he says expressly.

"If Christianity be a fact, and can be made the subject-matter of exercises of the reason, and impress an idea of itself on our minds, that idea will, in the course of time, develope in a series of ideas. . . . . It is the pecularity of the human mind that it cannot take an object in, which is presented to it, simply and integrally. It conceives by means of definition or description; whole objects do not create in the intellect whole ideas, but are, to use a mathematical phrase, thrown into series, into a number of statements, strengthening, interpreting, correcting each other, and, with more or less exactness, approximating, as they accumulate, to a perfect image. There is no other way of learning or of teaching. *We cannot teach, except by aspects or views which are not identical with the thing itself we are teaching.* . . . . . And the more claim an idea has to be considered as living, the more various will be its aspects; and the more social and political its nature, the more complicated and subtile will be its developments, and the longer and more eventful will be its course. Such is Christianity; and whatever has been said . . . . . about the development of ideas generally becomes, of course, an antecedent argument for its progressive development. . . . . Nor is the case altered by supposing that inspiration did for the first recipients of the revelation what the Divine Fiat did for herbs and plants in the beginning, which were created in maturity. Still, the time at length came when its recipients ceased to be inspired; and on these recipients the revealed truths would fall, as in other cases, at first *vaguely* and *generally*, and would afterwards be completed by developments." — p. 49.

It is plain from this, that Mr. Newman means to teach that the Church, in order to attain to an adequate expression of the Christian idea or of Christian doctrine, must institute and carry on the precise process of development which he has predicated of ideas generally; for he contends, and he told us as much in the beginning, that she is forced to do so by the nature of the human mind itself. The revelation is not and cannot be taken in all at once. The Church can neither learn nor teach it, except under particular aspects, none of which, he says, can go the depth of the idea, — that is, we presume, of the fact or no-fact which the idea represents; for it is hardly to be supposed that a judgment cannot go the depth of itself; and it is only by collecting and adjusting these particular aspects, that she can attain to an adequate expression of Christian doctrine.

This is naked eclecticism, not in philosophy only, but even in faith.

But this development is effected only gradually, and "after a sufficient time." Some centuries elapse, and the doctrine of Purgatory is "opened upon the apprehension of the Church." —p. 192. She at first cannot take in all revealed truth. She has it all stowed away somewhere, but she only partially apprehends it. As time goes on, as individuals differently circumstanced view it under different particular aspects and from opposite poles, as new controversies arise, bold and obstinate heretics start up, some clamorous for one particular aspect, and some for another, she is able to enlarge her view, to augment the number of her dogmas, and tell us more truly what is the revelation she has received. And this we are to say of a Church we are defending as authoritative and infallible, and which we hold has received the formal commission to teach all nations all things whatsoever our Lord commanded his Apostles! In plain words, was the Church able to teach truly and infallibly in the age of Saints Clement and Polycarp, or of Saints Justin and Irenæus, the whole Catholic faith, and the precise Catholic faith, on any and every point which could be made, —or was she not? If she was, there can have been no development of doctrine; if she was not, she was not then competent to discharge the commission she received? Was what she then taught the faithful sufficient for salvation? Is not what was then sufficient all that is really necessary now? If so, and if she teaches doctrines now which she did not then, or insists on our believing now what she did not then, how will you exonerate her from the charge brought by Protestants, that she has added to the primitive faith, and teaches as of necessity to salvation what is not necessary, and therefore imposes a burden on men's shoulders they ought not to be required to bear? Moreover, where are these developments to stop? Have we reached the end? Has the Church finally wrought out the whole body of dogmatic truth, or are we, like the Puritan Robinson, "to look for new light" to break in upon her vision? Mr. Newman seems to think new developments are needed; for he mentions, p. 173, several fundamental matters, which he says he supposes "remain more or less undeveloped, or at least undefined, by the Church."

Mr. Newman, after Leibnitz, represents heresy as consisting in taking and following out a partial view of Christian truth. Will he permit us to ask him to tell us how, at that period,

when the Church apprehended the truth only under particular aspects, heresy was distinguishable from orthodoxy? Moreover, if there ever was a time when the Church did not teach the whole faith, how he can maintain her catholicity; since to her catholicity, as we learn from the catechism, it is not only essential that she subsist through all ages, and teach all nations, but that she teach all truth?

Whoever glances at Mr. Newman's application of his "tests" cannot fail to perceive that he regards heresies as having been of essential service to the Church in enabling her to develope and fully understand the sacred deposit of faith; and that he sees no peculiar sin in them, but in their anticipating the Church, and bringing out and insisting upon a particular aspect of truth, before her hour has come, before she has reached it in the regular course of development. They are too impatient; they cannot wait the slow course of time, but would precipitate the growth of the Church. "Montanism is a remarkable anticipation or presage of developments which soon began to show themselves in the Church, though they were not perfected for centuries after." "The doctrinal determinations and ecclesiastical usages of the Middle Ages are only the true fulfilment of its self-willed and abortive attempts at precipitating the growth of the Church." "While the prophets of the Montanists prefigure the Church's doctors, and their inspiration her infallibility, and their revelations her developments, and the heresiarch himself is the unsightly anticipation of St. Francis, in Novatian again we see the aspiration of nature after such creations of grace as St. Benedict or St. Bruno."—pp. 165, 166. This requires no comment. But, if heretics go before the Church, and develope truth before she is ready for it, and yet a truth she subsequently accepts, we think she should treat them with a little more indulgence, and that we should rather lament her tardiness than censure their precipitancy. Mr. Newman, strange as it may seem, regards the heretic as generally in advance of the orthodox doctor, and appears to maintain that orthodoxy is formed out of the "raw material" supplied by heretics. "The theology of the Church," he says, "is the diligent, patient working out of one doctrine from many materials. The conduct of popes, councils, fathers, betokens the slow, painful, *anxious* taking up of *new elements* into an existing body of *belief*."—p. 166. It is singular that it never occurred to Mr. Newman, that possibly the heretical views which he seems to admire so much were simply corrup-

tions of doctrines which the Church had taught before them, and that heresy is the corruption of orthodoxy, and not its raw material. As a matter of fact, we suspect, in all cases of coincidence, the orthodox doctor is older than the heretical teacher, as the Church is older than any of the sects.

After all, it is clear that Mr. Newman's *πρῶτον ψεῦδον*, his mother error, is in assuming that the Christian doctrine was given originally and exclusively through the medium of the written word. How far he assumes this absolutely for himself, or how far his assumption is intended to be a concession to his Anglican friends, it is impossible for us to say; and we confess, that, on reading and rereading the book, we are at a loss to determine whether he is really putting forth a theory which he holds to be true, or only a theory which he thinks may remove, on Anglican premises, the difficulties which the Anglican finds in the way of Catholicity. But this much is certain, — his theory is framed on the supposition, that the revelation was first given in the written word exclusively, and that the Church has herself had to learn it from written documents. Hence, as the doctrine in these is evidently not drawn out and stated in formal propositions or digested articles of faith, but is given only generally, vaguely, obscurely, in detached portions and loose hints, developments have been absolutely indispensable, and must have been foreseen and intended by the Author of our religion. This is what he labors to prove in the chapter entitled, *On the Development of Christian Ideas antecedently considered*, pp. 49–65. But this is sheer Protestantism, not Catholicity, and is never to be assumed or conceded by a Catholic, in an argument for the Church. Catholicity teaches that the whole revelation was made to the Church, irrespective of written documents, and there never was a time when Christianity was confined to "the letter of documents and the reasonings of individual minds," as Mr. Newman presupposes, p. 11. The depository of the revelation is not the Holy Scriptures, *plus* tradition. The divine traditions cover the *whole* revelation, and not merely that portion of it not found in the Holy Scriptures; and it is because the Church has the whole faith in these divine traditions, which, by supernatural assistance, she faithfully keeps and transmits, and infallibly interprets, that she can establish the rule of Scriptural interpretation, and say what doctrines may and what may not be drawn from the written word. The greater part of her teachings are found in the Holy Scriptures, and she for the most part teaches through them, but was never under the necessity of learning her faith

from them, as any one might infer from the very face of the Sacred Books themselves, which were all addressed to *believers*, and therefore necessarily imply that the faith had been revealed, propounded, and embraced before they were written. The Church must precede the Scriptures; for it is only on her authority that their inspiration can be affirmed. They are a part of her divine teaching, not the sources whence she learns what she is commanded to teach. If Mr. Newman had borne this in mind, he would hardly have insisted so strongly on his theory of developments, and would have spared himself the rather serious error of maintaining that the Church appeals to the mystical sense of Scripture in *proof* of her doctrines. The source of heresy is not in the literal interpretation of Scripture, as he imagines, but in attempting to deduce the faith from Scripture by private judgment, independently of the Church. The doctors of the Church are accustomed to adduce the mystical sense of Scripture in *illustration* of Christian doctrine, but never in *proof*, except where the mystical sense is affirmed and defined by positive revelation.

We have been forcibly struck, in reading this Essay, with the wisdom of the plan of instructing by the living teacher, which our Lord has adopted. If any man could have learned Catholicity from books or documentary teaching, we should have said that man was John Henry Newman. He had every qualification for the task which could be demanded, — genius, talent, learning, acuteness, patience of research, and all the books necessary at his hand; and yet, with the best intentions, in a work designed expressly to justify his change of religion to the world, and to open an easy passage-way for others to follow him, he has mistaken Catholicity in its most essential points, and, in fact, written a book which will prove one of the hardest books *for him*, as a Catholic, to answer, he will be likely to find. If, instead of ransacking the libraries of all ages and nations, and amassing an erudition which he was not in the condition to digest, and for the interpretation of which he had no certain guide, he had gone to the first Catholic priest within his reach, and asked him to teach him the catechism, and to explain to him the creed of Pius the Fifth, he would in one week have learned more of genuine Catholicity than he learned in the years he spent in the preparation of this work. No man should ever persuade himself that he knows any thing really and truly of Catholicity, till he has listened patiently and reverently to the living teacher authorized by Almighty God to teach him. The faith is learned by *hearing*, not by *reading*.

Mr. Newman says his theory "has been recently illustrated by several distinguished writers on the continent, such as De Maistre and Moehler." — p. 19. We are not aware of any *Catholic* writer on the continent, or elsewhere, who has broached a theory bearing any resemblance to Mr. Newman's; and, so far as our own judgment goes, backed by high authority, he totally misapprehends both De Maistre and Moehler, if he supposes they in the least countenance his theory of development. Moehler's method, and some of his forms of expression, may lead, as at one moment they led us, to suppose he did, in some respects, favor a theory of development; but it was as we read him in the pages of his Protestant reviewers, rather than in his own pages, that we were led to do him so great injustice. A closer inspection of his work has satisfied us that it is not so. What Moehler really means is not historical developments, but logical sequence and coherence. His design was, in part, to show Protestants that they are illogical, and, under the relation of logical sequence and coherence, to contrast their teachings with those of the Church. In Protestantism we find a given doctrine which logically implies another as its complement, but this other doctrine is wanting. In Catholicity, whenever we find a doctrine which logically implies another, we are sure to find the latter as an article of faith. All this is very true, and may well be said, without saying one word in favor of developments. De Maistre, so far as we understand him, allows development only in the exercise or application of the divine powers of the Church. If in the early ages less power was actually exercised by the sovereign pontiffs than in some subsequent ages, it was not because their authority was less, their rights less positive and divine, or because their authority was less clearly recognized as a substantive power in the Church, but because there was less occasion for its exercise; the external discipline of the Church, which may vary from age to age, and from place to place, bringing fewer cases immediately before them. The growth or expansion is never of the authority, but simply of its exercise. It is so we understand De Maistre, and Catholic writers generally. Mr. Newman will hardly find a Catholic writer of any note who will sustain his position, that the Church developed itself first as Catholic, and then as Papal. This is doctrine for Oxford, not for Rome.

But enough. It is plain to the Catholic reader, that Mr. Newman errs in consequence of his neglect to distinguish in his own mind, — or, if not in his own mind, in his book, — on the one

hand, between Christian doctrine, that is, divine revelation, and Christian theology and discipline; and, on the other, between what the Church teaches as of divine revelation, and the speculations of individual fathers and doctors. Take the whole history of the Christian world, so called, from the time of our blessed Lord down to the present moment, including the sects as well as the Church, and considering all that has been going on with all who have borne the Christian name, and in every department of life, there is no doubt but such developments and processes as Mr. Newman describes have to some extent taken place. But he seems to have studied his theory chiefly in the history of the sects, where it is unquestionably applicable, and to have concluded that the Church in its life in the world must be governed by a law analogous to the one by which they are governed, and that his theory may apply to her as well as to them. He forgets that she sprung into existence full grown, and armed at all points, as Minerva from the brain of Jupiter; and that she is withdrawn from the ordinary law of human systems and institutions by her supernatural origin, nature, character, and protection. If he had left out the Church, and entitled his book, *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, when withdrawn from the Authority and Supervision of the Church*, he would have written, with slight modifications, a great and valuable book. It would then have been a sort of natural history of sectarism, and been substantially true. But applying his theory to the Church, and thus subjecting her to the law which presides over all human systems and institutions, he has, unintentionally, struck at her divine and supernatural character. The Church has no natural history, for she is not in the order of nature, but of grace. Or, if he had simply distinguished between Christian doctrine, in which there is no development, which is always and everywhere the same, and in which not the least shadow of a variation can be admitted, and confined his remarks to theology as a human science deduced from supernatural principles, to the variations of external discipline and worship, and to the greater or less predominance of this or that Christian principle in the practice of individual Christians in different ages of the Church, much that he has said might be accepted, and no very grave error would be taught.

From what we have said it is easy to infer that we do not think Mr. Newman judged wisely in sending this book forth to the public. He did well, on his conversion, to offer it to the

proper authorities for revision; but he must pardon us for saying that we think he would also have done well, if, when they declined to revise, he had declined to publish. Until we know enough of Catholicity to know when and where to doubt the accuracy of our knowledge, it is a great hardship to be obliged to go to press on our own responsibility. For our own sakes, as well as for the sake of others, we should take every precaution in our power against error. There is error enough in the world, without our being in haste to augment the quantity.

The Church is not of yesterday, nor are we who live now the first enlightened defenders she has had. The best method of defence has hardly been reserved for us to discover; and perhaps it is a sufficient reason for distrusting any method, that it is new, that it is a discovery of our own. The Church is not here to follow the spirit of the age, but to control and direct it, often to struggle against it. They do her the greatest disservice who seek to disown her glorious past, and to modify her as far as possible, so as to adapt her to prevailing modes of thought and feeling. It is her zealous but mistaken friends, who, guided by a shortsighted policy, and taking counsel of the world around them, seek, as they express it, to *liberalize* her, to bring her more into harmony with the spirit of the age, from whom we, as good Catholics, should always pray, *Libera nos, Domine!* The best service we can render the Church, in our age and country, is to surrender ourselves to her, all that we have and are, and pray Almighty God that we may always have the grace to do her bidding. She is the representative of God on earth; and we can never do wrong, if we do what, and only what, she bids us. O, it is blessed to feel that we have not to take care of the Church, but that she is able and willing to take care of us!

Most of us who have been brought up Protestants, and have had some literary reputation, when we become converts, in the fervor of the moment, have an almost irresistible impulse to relate our *experience*, and detail the process by which we have been translated from death unto life. Nothing seems easier to us than to bridge over the gulf which divides the Protestant world from the Catholic, and open an easy passage-way for those whom we have reluctantly left behind. But, alas! few of us can detail the process of our conversion, if we try. We are led by a way we know not, by a hand we see not. "*Spiritus ubi vult spirat; et vocem ejus audis, sed nescis unde veniat, aut quo vadat: sic est omnis, qui natus est ex Spiritu.*"

St. John iii. 8. The most we can say is, "This one thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, I now see." We believe before we reason, and are often carried onward not only without reasoning, but even in spite of it. The reasoning we should subsequently give would be as likely to mislead others as to aid them. The grounds of our faith are catholic, not individual; and the less use we make of what is individual or peculiar to ourselves in defending it, the better. We did not convert ourselves; God did it, and his be the praise and the glory.

But we say not this for Mr. Newman's sake. He is no longer outside of the Church, seeking to find reasons to justify him in asking admission into her communion. His doubts and misgivings, his advances and his retreats, have given way to firm faith and filial confidence. He does not now, as in his book, believe the Church because by private reason he has convinced himself of the truth of her teachings; but he believes what she teaches because he believes *her*, and he believes her because she has received the formal commission from Almighty God to teach all nations to observe whatsoever Christ commanded his Apostles, and because he has received, through divine grace, the virtue of faith. He has broken with the past, and sees that his present is not a continuation of his former life; for he now understands that Catholicity is not Protestantism developed. His present and his past are separated by a gulf which grace alone can bridge over; and he needs not that we tell him he can more effectually serve those he has left behind by his prayers than by his hypotheses, however ingenious or elaborate. We take our leave of him with the assurance, that, if we have criticized his book somewhat severely, it has been with no improper feeling towards him; and that, when he shall be disposed to address the public again, and from his new position, he will find us among the most willing, the most eager, and the most respectful of his listeners. This elaborate Essay belongs to his past life; let it go with all that Protestantism he abjured before he was permitted to put on the livery of Christ. It belongs not to his Catholic life, and is only accidentally connected with it, either in his own mind, or in that of others. The Essay he will write hereafter, out of the fulness of his Catholic heart, will breathe a different tone, and fetch another echo. It will refresh the Catholic soul, strengthen his faith, confirm his hope, and warm his charity. A noble career opens before him. May God give him grace to run it with success!

ART. IV. — *Margaret, a Tale of the Real and Ideal, Blight and Bloom, including Sketches of a Place not before described, called Mons Christi.* Boston: Jordan & Wiley. 1845. 12mo. pp. 460.

WE have no intention of reviewing at length the book the title of which we have just quoted. Indeed, we have read it only by proxy. We have heard it spoken of in certain literary circles as a remarkable production, almost as one of the wonders of the age. The Protestant lady who read it for us tells us that it is a weak and silly book, unnatural in its scenes and characters, coarse and vulgar in its language and details, wild and visionary in its speculations; and, judging from the portions here and there which we actually have read, and from the source whence it emanates, we can hardly run any risk in indorsing our Protestant friend's criticism. The author is a man not deficient in natural gifts; he has respectable attainments; and makes, we believe, a tolerably successful minister of the latest form of Protestantism with which we chance to be acquainted; though, since we have not been introduced to any new form for several months, it must not be inferred from the fact that we are acquainted with no later form, that none later exists.

So far as we have ascertained the character of this book, it is intended to be the vehicle of certain crude speculations on religion, theology, philosophy, morals, society, education, and matters and things in general. The *Mons Christi* stands for the human heart, and Christ himself is our higher or instinctive nature, and if we but listen to our own natures, we shall at once learn, love, and obey all that our Blessed Redeemer teaches. Hence, Margaret, a poor, neglected child, who has received no instruction, who knows not even the name of her Maker, nor that of her Saviour, who, in fact, has grown up in the most brutish ignorance, is represented as possessing in herself all the elements of the most perfect Christian character, and as knowing by heart all the essential principles of Christian faith and morals. The author seems also to have written his work, in part at least, for the purpose of instructing our instructers as to the true method of education. He appears to adopt a very simple and a very pleasant theory on the subject, — one which cannot fail to commend itself to our young folks. Love is the great teacher; and the true method of education is for the pupil

to fall in love with the tutor, or the tutor with the pupil, and it is perfected when the falling in love is mutual. Whence it follows, that it is a great mistake to suppose it desirable or even proper that tutor and pupil should both be of the same sex. This would be to reverse the natural order, since the sexes were evidently intended for each other. This method, we suppose, should be called "LEARNING MADE EASY, OR NATURE DISPLAYED," since it would enable us to dispense with school-rooms, prefects, text-books, study, and the birch, and to fall back on our natural instincts. These two points of doctrine indicate the genus, if not the species, of the book, and show that it must be classed under the general head of Transcendentalism. If we could allow ourselves to go deeper into the work and to dwell longer on its licentiousness and blasphemy, we probably might determine its species as well as its genus. But this must suffice; and when we add that the author seems to comprise in himself several species at once, besides the whole genus humbuggery, we may dismiss the book, with sincere pity for him who wrote it, and a real prayer for his speedy restoration to the simple genus humanity, and for his conversion, through grace, to that Christianity which was given to man from above, and not, spider-like, spun out of his own bowels.

Yet, bad and disgusting, false and blasphemous, as this book really is, bating a few of its details, it is a book which no Protestant, as a Protestant, has a right to censure. Many Protestants affect great contempt of Transcendentalism, and horror at its extravagance and blasphemy; but they have no right to do so. Transcendentalism is a much more serious affair than they would have us believe. It is not a simple "Yankee notion," confined to a few isolated individuals in a little corner of New England, as some of our Southern friends imagine, but is in fact the dominant error of our times, is as rife in one section of our common country as in another; and, in principle, at least, is to be met with in every popular Anti-Catholic writer of the day, whether German, French, English, or American. It is, and has been from the first, the fundamental heresy of the whole Protestant world; for, at bottom, it is nothing but the fundamental principle of the Protestant Reformation itself, and without assuming it, there is no conceivable principle on which it is possible to justify the Reformers in their separation from the Catholic Church. The Protestant who refuses to accept it, with all its legitimate consequences, however frightful or absurd they may be, condemns himself and his whole party.

We are far from denying that many Protestants, and, indeed, the larger part of them, as a matter of fact, profess to hold many doctrines which are incompatible with Transcendentalism; but this avails them nothing, for they hold them, not as Protestants, but in despite of their Protestantism, and therefore have no right to hold them at all. In taking an account of Protestantism, we have the right, and, indeed, are bound, to exclude them from its definition. Every man is bound, as the condition of being ranked among rational beings, to be logically consistent with himself; and no one can claim as his own any doctrine which does not flow from, or which is not logically consistent with, his own first principles. This follows necessarily from the principle, that of contraries one must be false, since one necessarily excludes the other. If, then, the doctrines incompatible with Transcendentalism, which Protestants profess to hold, do not flow from their own first principles, or if they are not logically compatible with them, they cannot claim them as Protestants, and we have the right, and are bound, to exclude them from the definition of Protestantism. The man cannot be scientifically included in the definition of the horse, because both chance to be lodged in the same stable, or to be otherwise found in juxtaposition.

The essential mark or characteristic of Protestantism is, unquestionably, *dissent* from the authority of the Catholic Church, in subjection to which the first Protestants were spiritually born and reared. This is evident from the whole history of its origin, and from the well known fact, that opposition to Catholicity is the only point on which all who are called Protestants can agree among themselves. On every other question which comes up, they differ widely one from another, and not unfrequently some take views directly opposed to those taken by others; but when it concerns opposing the Church, however dissimilar their doctrines and tempers, they all unite, and are ready to march as one man to the attack. As dissent, Protestantism is negative, denies the authority of the Catholic Church, and can include within its definition nothing which, even in the remotest sense, concedes or implies that authority. But no man, sect, or party can rest on a mere negation, for no mere negation is or can be an ultimate principle. Every negation implies an affirmation, and therefore an affirmative principle which authorizes it. He who dissents does so in obedience to some authority or principle which commands or requires him to dissent, and this principle, not the negation, is his fundamental principle.

The essential or fundamental principle of Protestantism is, then, not dissent from the authority of the Catholic Church, but the affirmative principle on which it relies for the justification of its dissent.

What, then, is this affirmative principle? Whatever it be, it must be either out of the individual dissenting, or in him; that is, some external authority, or some internal authority. The first supposition is not admissible; for Protestants really allege no authority for dissent, external to the individual dissenting, — have never defined any such authority, never hinted that such authority exists or is needed; and there obviously is no such authority which can be adduced. In point of fact, so far from dissenting from the Church on the ground that they are commanded to do so by an external authority paramount to the Church, they deny the existence of all external authority in matters of faith, and defend their dissent on the ground that there is no such authority, never was, and never can be.

But some may contend, judging from the practice of Protestants, and what we know of the actual facts of the original establishment of Protestantism in all those countries in which it has become predominant, that it does recognize an external authority, which it holds paramount to the Church, and on which it relies for its justification. Protestantism, as a matter of fact, owes its establishment to the authority of the lay lords and temporal princes, or, in a general sense, to the civil authority. It was, originally, much more of a political revolt than of a strictly religious dissent, and its causes must be sought in the ambition of princes, dating back from Louis of Bavaria, and including Louis the Twelfth of France, rather than in any real change of faith operated in the masses; and its way was prepared by the temper of mind which the temporal princes created in their subjects by the wars they undertook and carried on ostensibly against the popes as political sovereigns, but really for the purpose of possessing the patrimony of the Church, and of subjecting the Church, in their respective dominions, to the control of the secular power. The Reformers would have accomplished little or nothing, if politics had not come to their aid. Luther would have bellowed in vain, had he not been backed by the powerful Elector of Saxony, and immediately aided by the Landgrave Philip; Zwingle, and Œcolampadius, and Calvin would have accomplished nothing in Switzerland, if they had not secured the aid of the secular arm, and followed its wishes; the powerful Huguenot party in France

was more of a political than of a religious party, and it dwindled into insignificance as soon as it lost the support of the great lords, distinguished statesmen and lawyers, and the provincial parliaments. In Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, the Reform was purely the act of the civil power; in the United Provinces, it was embraced as the principle of revolt, or of national independence; in England, it was the work, confessedly, of the secular government, and was carried by court and parliament against the wishes of the immense majority of the nation; in Scotland, it was effected by the great lords, who wished to usurp to themselves the authority of the crown; in this country, it came with the civil government, and was maintained by civil enactments, pains, and penalties. We might, therefore, be led, at first sight, to assert the fundamental principle of Protestantism to be the supremacy in spirituals of the civil power. But this would be a mistake, because it did not recognize this supremacy unless the civil power was Anti-Catholic, and because the assertion of this supremacy of the civil power in spirituals was itself a denial of the authority of the Church, and therefore could not be made without making the act of dissent. There is no question but the Protestants did, whenever it suited their purpose, assert the supremacy of the state in spiritual matters; and it must be conceded that it is very agreeable to its nature to do so, as is evident from the fact, that even now, and in this country, it opposes the Catholic Church chiefly, and with the most success, on the ground that Catholicity asserts the freedom of religion, or, what is the same thing, the independence of the spiritual authority. Still this cannot be its ultimate principle. The Church taught and teaches, that, though the independence of the civil power in matters purely temporal is asserted, its authority in spirituals is null. To deny this is to deny the Church, and as much to dissent from her authority as to deny her infallibility, her divine origin, or any article of the creed she teaches; and this must be denied before the supremacy of the civil power in spirituals can be asserted. Therefore, if Protestantism did openly, avowedly, assert the Erastian heresy of the supremacy of the civil power in spirituals, it would not justify her dissent by an external authority, unless she could make this assertion itself on some external authority acknowledged to be paramount to the Church. But for this she has no external authority, since the Church denies it, and the authority of the state is the matter in question. She can, then, assert the supremacy of the state only on the authority of some

principle in the individual dissenting, and therefore only on some internal authority. Whatever authority, then, Protestantism may ascribe to the civil power, it is not an external authority, because the authority asserted is, as we have seen in a previous article, always of the same order as that on which it is asserted, and can never transcend it

Others, again, may think, since Protestants, and especially those among them denominated Anglicans and Episcopalians, occasionally appeal to Christian antiquity, and talk of the Fathers, and sometimes even profess to quote them, that they have, or think they have, in Christian antiquity an authority for dissent, virtually, at least, external to the individual dissenting. But Christian antiquity, unless read with a presumption in favor of the Church, save on a few general and public facts manifestly against Protestants, decides nothing. Understood as the Church understands it, and it evidently *may*, without violence to its letter or spirit, be so understood, it condemns Protestantism without mercy. To make it favor Protestantism even negatively, it is necessary to resort to a principle of interpretation which the Church does not concede, and the adoption of which would, therefore, involve the dissent in question. If we take with us the canon, that all in the Christian Fathers is to be understood in accordance with the Church when not manifestly against her, Christian antiquity will be all on the side of the Roman Catholic Church; if we take the canon, that all in the Christian Fathers is to be understood in a sense against the Church, when not manifestly in her favor, Christian antiquity may, on many important dogmas, leave the question doubtful; though even then it would, in fact, be decisive for the *authority* of the Church, and therefore implicitly for all special dogmas. But, be this as it may, it is undeniable that it is only by adopting this latter canon that Protestantism can derive any countenance from Christian antiquity. But on what authority do they, or can they, adopt such a canon? Protestants call themselves reformers; they are accusers, dissenters, and therefore all the presumptions in the case are manifestly against them, as they are against all who accuse, bring an action or a charge against others; and they must make out a strong *primâ facie* case, before they can turn the presumptions in their favor. This is law, and it is justice. Till they do this, the presumption is in favor of the Church; and then it is enough for her to show that the testimony of antiquity *may*, without violence, be so understood as not to impeach her

claims. Till then, nothing will make for Protestants which is not manifestly against her, so clear and express as by no allowable latitude of interpretation to be reconcilable with her pretensions. That is to say, the Protestant must impeach the Church on *primâ facie* evidence, before he can have the right to adopt that canon of interpretation without which it is manifestly suicidal for him to appeal to Christian antiquity. Take, as an illustration of what we mean, the testimony of St. Justin Martyr to the Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence. It is clear to any one who reads the passage, that the words in a plain and easy sense confirm the Catholic doctrine ; and yet, if there were an urgent necessity for interpreting them otherwise, we are not certain but, without greater deviation from the literal sense than is sometimes allowed, they *might* be so understood as not to be inconsistent with the views of the Blessed Eucharist which some Protestant sects profess to entertain. But by what authority, because they *may* be so interpreted, are we to say they *must* be ? In truth, it is nothing to the Protestant's purpose to say they *may* be, till he establishes by positive authority they *must* be, for it is obvious they also *may* not be. Now, what and where is this positive authority ? Manifestly not in Christian antiquity itself ; and yet it must be had, before Christian antiquity can be adduced as authorizing dissent from the Catholic Church. This authority, as we said before, must be either external to the dissenter or internal in the dissenter himself. It cannot be external ; for, after the Church, there is no conceivable external authority applicable in the case. It must, then, be internal. Then the authority of Christian antiquity, as alleged against the Church, is only the authority there is in the dissenter himself, according to the principle already established, that the authority asserted is necessarily of the same order as that on which it is asserted.

Finally, it will, perhaps, be alleged, inasmuch as all Protestants did at first, and some of them do now, appeal to the written word, or the Holy Scriptures, in justification of their dissent, that they have in these a real or a pretended authority, external to and independent of the dissenter, distinct from and paramount to that of the Church. But a moment's reflection will show, even if the Scriptures were not in favor of the Church, that this is a mistake. The Holy Scriptures proposed, and their sense declared, by the Church, we hold with a firm faith to be the word of God, and therefore of the highest authority ; but, if not so proposed and

interpreted, though in many respects important and authentic historical documents, and valuable for their excellent didactic teachings, they would not and could not be for us the inspired, and, in a supernatural sense, the authoritative, word of God. To the Protestant they are not and cannot be an authority external to the dissenter; because, denying the unwritten word, the Church, and all authoritative tradition, he has no external authority to vouch for the fact that they are the inspired word of God, or to declare their genuine sense. If there be no external authority to decide that the Bible is the word of God, and to declare its true sense, the authority ascribed to it in the last analysis, according to the principle we have established, is only the authority of some internal principle in the individual dissenting; for, in that case, the individual, by virtue of this internal principle, decides, with the Bible as without it, what is and what is not God's word, what God has and has not revealed; and therefore what he is and what he is not bound to believe, what he is and what he is not bound to do.

It is, moreover, notorious that Protestants do really deny all external authority in matters of faith, and hold that any external authority to determine for the individual what he must believe would be manifest usurpation, intolerable tyranny, to be resisted by every one who has any sense of Christian freedom, or of his rights and dignity as a man. Even the Anglican Church, which claims to herself authority in controversies of faith, acknowledges that she has no right to ordain any thing as of necessity to salvation, which may not be proved from God's word written; and by implication at least, if she means any thing, leaves it to the individual to determine for himself whether what she ordains is provable from the written word or not; and, therefore, abandons her own authority, by making the individual the judge of its legality. No one will, furthermore, pretend that Protestants even affect to have dissented from the Catholic Church, in which they were spiritually born and reared, in obedience to an external authority; that is to say, another Church, which they held to be paramount to the Roman Catholic Church. If they had admitted that there was anywhere an authoritative Church, they would have agreed that it was this Church, and could have been no other. In denying the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, they denied, and intended to deny, in principle, all external authority in matters of faith; and the chief count in the indictment of the Church, which they have drawn up, and on which they have

been for these three hundred years demanding conviction, is, that she claims to be such authority, when no such authority was instituted, or intended to be instituted. We may, then, safely conclude that the affirmative principle on which Protestantism relies for the justification of its denial of Catholic authority is not some authority external to the individual dissenting, and held to be paramount to that from which he dissents.

Then the principle must be internal in the individual himself, and this is precisely what Protestantism teaches; for by her own confession, nay, by her own boast, her fundamental principle is PRIVATE JUDGMENT. This was the only principle which, in the nature of the case, she could set up as the antagonist of Catholic authority; and it is notorious the world over, that it is in the name of this principle that she arraigns the Church, and commands her to give an account of herself. We see, even to-day, emblazoned on the banners borne by the motley hosts of the so-called "Christian Alliance," this glorious device, — THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. This is their battle-cry, as *Deus Vult* was that of the Crusaders. It is their *In hoc signo vince*. "We want no infallible pope, bishops, or church, to propound and explain to us God's word, to lord it over God's heritage, and make slaves of our very consciences. No! we are freemen, and we strike for freedom, the glorious birthright of every Christian to judge for himself what is or what is not the word of God; that is, what he is or is not to believe." There is no mistake in this. If there is any thing essential, any thing fundamental, in Protestantism, any thing which makes it the subject of a predicate at all, it is this far-famed and loud-boasted principle of PRIVATE JUDGMENT.

In saying this, we of course are not to be understood as asserting that Protestants always, or even commonly, respect, in their practice, this right of private judgment. Practically, every Protestant says, "*I* have the right to think as I please, and *you* have the right to think as I do; and if you do not, I will, if I have the power, compel you to do so, or confiscate your goods, deprive you of citizenship, outlaw you, behead, hang, or burn you; at least, imprison you, flog you, or bore your ears and tongue." In point of fact, Protestants, we grant, have very generally violated the principle of private judgment, and have practised, in the name of religious liberty, the most unjust, tyranny over conscience, — unjust, because, on their own principles, they have received from Almighty God no authority

to dictate to conscience, and because they also concede, what is unquestionably true, that conscience is accountable to God alone. Every attempt of any man, set, or class of men, not expressly commissioned by Almighty God, — so expressly that the authority exercised shall be really and truly his, — to exert the least control over conscience is a manifest usurpation, an outrageous tyranny, which every man, having a just reverence for his Maker, will resist even unto death. The Catholic Church, indeed, claims plenary authority over conscience ; but only on the ground, that she is divinely commissioned, and that the authority which speaks in her is literally and as truly the authority of God, as that of the representative is that of his sovereign. If, *per impossibili*, she could suppose herself not to be so commissioned, and therefore not having the pledge of the divine supervision, protection, and aid which such commission necessarily implies, she would concede that she has no authority, and should attempt to exercise none. We cheerfully obey her, because in obeying her we are obeying not a human authority, but God himself. In submitting to her we are free, because we are submitting to God, who is our rightful sovereign, to whom we belong, all that we have, and all that we are. Freedom is not in being held to no obedience, but in being held to obey only the legal sovereign ; and the more unqualified this obedience, the freer we are. Perfect freedom is in having no will of our own, in willing only what our sovereign wills, and because he wills it. If the Church, as we cannot doubt, be really commissioned by God, the more absolute her authority, the more unqualified our submission, the more perfect is our liberty, as every man knows, who knows any thing at all of that freedom wherewith the Son makes us free. But in yielding obedience to a Protestant sect, it is not the same. When any one of our sects undertakes to dictate to conscience, it is tyranny ; because, by its own confession, it has received no authority from God. It is tyranny, even though what it attempts to enforce be really God's word ; for it attempts to enforce it by a *human*, and not by a *divine* authority. It would still tyrannize, because it has no right to enforce any thing at all. It may say, as our sects do say, it has the Bible, that the Bible is God's word, and that it only exacts the obedience to God's commands which no man has the right to withhold. Be it so. But who has made it the keeper and executor of God's laws ? Where is its commission under the hand and seal of the Almighty ? It is, doubtless, right that the civil laws should be

executed, — that the murderer, for instance, should be punished; but it does not *therefore* follow that I, as a simple citizen, have the right to execute them, and to inflict the punishment. That may be done only by the constituted authorities, and is not my business; and it is a sound as well as a homely adage, Let every one mind his own business. Protestants, on this point, fall into grievous errors. The simple possession of the Holy Scriptures does not constitute them *keepers* of the word, — even supposing the Scriptures to contain the *whole* word, — and give them the right to dictate to conscience, as they imagine, any more than the fact of my having in my possession the statute-book constitutes me the guardian and administrator of the laws of the commonwealth. Protestants, whenever they interfere with the right of private judgment, convict themselves, on their own principles, of practising on what, in these days, is called "Lynch law"; and Lynch law is to the state precisely what Protestantism, in practice, is to the Church. This is a fact which deserves the grave consideration of those sects which contend for creeds and confessions, and claim the right to try and punish as heretics such as in their judgment do not conform to them. Even Dr. Beecher himself came very near, a few years since, being *lynched* by his Presbyterian associates; and if it had not been for an extraordinary suppleness and marvellous skill in parrying blows, hardly to have been expected in one of his age, it might have been all up with him. Our Presbyterian, Dutch Reformed, Puritan, and Anglican friends should lay this to heart, and never suffer themselves to complain of the practice of "Lynch-law," or to find the least fault with the commission of Judge Lynch himself, — for it emanates from the same authority as their own, and is as regularly made out and authenticated. But this is foreign from our present purpose. It is enough for our present purpose, that Protestants assert, in theory, as they unquestionably do, the right of private judgment, and make it the principle of their dissent from the authority of the Catholic Church.

But all men, at least as to their inherent rights, are equal. The right of private judgment, then, cannot be asserted for one man, without being at the same time, and by the same authority, asserted for all men. Then Protestants cannot assert private judgment as their authority for dissenting from the Catholic Church, without erecting it into a universal principle. We may assume, then, that Protestantism begins by laying down as its principle the right of *all men* to private judgment.

But the right of all men to private judgment is in effect the *unrestricted* or universal right to private judgment. This may not have been clearly seen in the beginning, and there is no question but Protestants intended in the commencement to restrict the right of private judgment to the simple interpretation of the written word. But every one, whatever may be his intentions, must be held answerable for the strict logical consequences of the principles he deliberately adopts; for if he does not foresee these consequences, he ought not to take upon himself the responsibility of adopting the principles. The right of private judgment, once admitted, can no longer be restricted. If restricted at all, it must be by some authority, and this authority must be either external or internal. If internal, it is private judgment itself, and then it cannot restrict, for it would be absurd to say that private judgment can restrict private judgment. But there can be no external authority, because Protestants admit no external authority, and because we cannot assert an external authority to restrict private judgment, without denying private judgment itself. Either the authority must prescribe the limits of private judgment, or private judgment must prescribe the limits of the restriction; if the first, it is tantamount to the denial of private judgment itself, for private judgment would then subsist only at the mercy of authority, by sufferance, and not by right; if the latter, the *authority* is null; for private judgment may enlarge or contract the restriction as it pleases, and that is evidently no restriction which is only what that which is restricted chooses to make it. It is impossible, then, to erect private judgment into a principle for all men, and afterwards to restrict it to the simple interpretation of the Holy Scriptures.

If we assert the right of private judgment to interpret the Holy Scriptures, we must assert its right in all cases whatsoever; for the principle on which private judgment can be defended in one case is equally applicable in every case. Will it be said that private judgment must yield to God's word? Granted. But what is God's word? The Bible. How know you that? Do you determine that the Bible is the word of God by some external authority, or by private judgment? Not by some external authority, because you have none, and admit none. By private judgment? Then the authority of the Bible is *for you* only private judgment. The Bible does not propose itself, and therefore can have no authority higher than the authority which proposes it. Here is a serious difficulty for

those Protestants who set up such a clamor about the Bible, and which shows them, or ought to show them, that, whatever the Bible may be for a Catholic, for them it can, in no conceivable contingency, be any thing but a human authority. *The authority of that which is proposed is of the same order as that which proposes, and cannot transcend it.* This is a Protestant argument, and is substantially the great argument of Chillingworth against Catholicity, and the one under a slightly different form which we have answered in a preceding article. Nothing proposes the Bible to Protestants but private judgment, as is evident from their denial of all other authority ; and therefore in the Bible they — not we, thank God ! — have only the authority of private judgment, and therefore only the word of man, and not the word of God. If the authority on which Protestants receive the word of God is only that of private judgment, then there is for them in the Bible only private judgment ; and then nothing to restrict private judgment, for private judgment can itself be no restriction on private judgment.

Moreover, if we take the Bible to be the word of God on the authority of private judgment, and its sense on the same authority, as Protestants do and must, then we assume private judgment to be competent to decide of itself what is and what is not the word of God, what God has revealed and what he has not revealed, has commanded and has not commanded, — and therefore competent to decide what we are to believe and what we are not to believe, and what we are to do and what we are not to do. But this is to assume the whole for private judgment, and therefore to assume its unrestricted right. We may, then, assume, in the second place, that Protestantism not only lays down the principle of the right of all men to private judgment, but the right of all men to the universal or unrestricted right of private judgment.

But private judgment itself is not, strictly speaking, ultimate, and therefore, though it be the principle of Protestantism, is not its ultimate principle. The ultimate principle of Protestantism lies a little farther back. Rights are never in themselves ultimate, but must always, to be rights, rest on some foundation or authority. The right of private judgment necessarily implies some principle on which it is founded. Every judgment is by some standard or measure ; for when we judge it is always *by* something, and this, whatever it is, is the principle, law, rule, criterion, standard, or measure of the judgment.

In every act of private judgment this standard or measure is the individual judging. The individual judges by himself, and to judge by one's self is precisely what is meant by private judgment. In it the individual is both measurer and measure, — in a word, his own yard-stick of truth and goodness. But rights, to be rights, must not only be founded on some principle, but on a *true* principle ; for to say they are founded on a false principle is only saying, in other words, that they have no foundation at all. The right of all men to unrestricted private judgment, then, necessarily implies that each and every man is in himself the exact measure of truth and goodness. In laying down the principle of private judgment as the principle of its dissent from the Catholic Church, Protestantism, then, necessarily lays down the principle, that each and every man is in himself the exact measure of truth and goodness, — the very fundamental proposition of Transcendentalism, as we established in our Review, one year ago, and from which the other two propositions to which, in our analysis, we reduced its teachings are easily obtained. The identity in principle is, then, perfect ; and no Protestant, as we began by saying, can refuse to accept Transcendentalism, with all its legitimate consequences, without condemning himself and his whole party.

This conclusion is undeniable, for the acutest dialectician will find no break or flaw in the chain of reasoning by which it is obtained. We, then, may assume this very important position, that Transcendentalism is the strict logical termination of Protestantism ; and if some Protestants, as is the case, refuse to admit it, it is at the expense of their dialectics ; because they cannot, or dare not, say, Two and two make four, but judge it more prudent to say, Two and two make five, or to compromise the matter and say, Two and two make three. There are few things which are more disgusting than the cowardice which shrinks from avowing the legitimate consequences of one's own principles. The sin of inconsequence is, as the celebrated Dr. Evariste de Gypendole justly remarks, a mortal sin, — at least, in the eyes of humanity ; for it is high treason against the rational nature itself ; and he who deliberately commits it voluntarily abdicates reason, and takes his place among inferior and irrational natures. If your principles are sound, you cannot push them to a dangerous extreme ; and if they will not bear pushing to their extreme consequences, you should know that they are unsound, and not fit to be entertained ; for

it is always lawful to conclude the unsoundness of the principle from the unsoundness of the consequences.

Taking this view of the case, we confess the Transcendentalists appear to us the more respectable, and indeed the only respectable, because the only consistent, class of Protestants. Consistent as Protestants, we mean, not as men; for Transcendentalism is the *ne plus ultra* of inconsistency and absurdity; but as Protestants they are consistent in so far as they carry out with an iron logic the Protestant principle to its legitimate results; and in doing this, in the providence of God, they are rendering no mean service to the cause of truth. They are a living and practical *reductio ad absurdum* of Protestantism. They strip it of its disguises, expose it in its nakedness, and subserve the cause of truth as the drunken Helotæ subserved the cause of temperance in the Spartan youth by exposing to them the disgusting effects of drunkenness.

It is of great practical importance that Protestantism should be exhibited by its followers in its true light, as it really is in itself. Thus far Protestants have owed their success and influence, in the main, to the fact that the mass of them have never seen and comprehended Protestantism in its simple, unadulterated elements. It has always been presented to them in a livery stolen from Catholicity. The great mass of the Protestant people, seeing it only in this livery, have supposed that it appertained to the household of faith, and that they had in it all that is essential to the Christian religion. Unable to penetrate its disguises, unable to distinguish between what was genuinely Protestant and what was surreptitiously taken from the Church, they could not understand the force or truth of the Catholic accusations against them. It seemed to them utterly false to say that they had no faith, no church, no religion, and that their Protestantism necessarily involved the denial of the whole scheme of revealed religion, and left them in reality nothing but mere Naturalism. Had they not something they called a church? Had they not places of worship modelled after Christian temples? Had they not the Holy Scriptures, pastors and teachers, hymns, prayers, — all the exterior forms of worship? Did they not profess to believe in God, the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, the necessity of Grace, the endless punishment of the wicked, and the eternal beatitude of the just, — all that even Catholic doctors have ever taught that it is necessary as *ex necessitate medii ad salutem* to be ex-

plicitly believed? Did they not try to lead holy and devout lives, spend much time in prayer and praise, seek earnestly to know and do the will of God, and actually, in many instances, attain to a moral elevation which would more than compare favorably with that of many Catholics? How say, then, that we have no religion, that our principles are at war with Christianity, and lead necessarily to the destruction of all faith, of all Christian morality? Have we not in our Protestantism, as we hold it, a living lie to your unjust charge, your foul aspersion? It must be confessed, that appearances, to the Protestant, were much against the Catholic, and it required considerable insight and firmness of logic to establish the charges which the Catholic, from the principles of an infallible faith, was fully warranted in preferring. But time and events have now made clear and certain to all who can see and reason, what then seemed so doubtful, not to say, so unfounded. In Transcendentalism, which is both the logical and historical development of Protestantism, it may now be seen that the Protestant, not the Catholic, was deceived; that not the Catholic was unjust in his charges, but the Protestant was carried away by his delusions. This is an immense gain, and by showing this, by stripping Protestantism of its disguises, by compelling it to abandon what it had attempted to retain of Catholicity, and to restrict it to its own principles, Transcendentalism is subserving in no ordinary degree the cause of religion and morality. Three hundred years of controversy have resulted in simplifying the question, and in making up the true and proper issue. If the true and proper issue could have been made in the beginning, Protestantism would have died in its birth. The mass of those who have followed the Protestant standard have done so because they supposed *they* had in the Holy Scriptures a divine authority for their belief. Here was their mother delusion. Catholics have really in the Holy Scriptures a divine authority, because they receive them on the proposition of the Church expressly commissioned by Almighty God to propose the truth revealed; but Protestants, as we have seen, since they take the Holy Scriptures only on the authority of private reason, have in them only the authority of private reason, — a merely human authority. It is now seen and understood that the Scriptures, if taken on human authority, have only a human authority; and therefore, as Catholics always alleged, Protestants, with all their pretensions, have only a human authority for the dogmas they profess to derive from them, and therefore are not, and never have been, able

to make that act of divine faith without which, if they have come to years of discretion, they possess no *Christian* virtue, and do nothing meritorious for eternal life. If Christianity be a supernatural life, the life which begins in supernatural faith and contemplates a supernatural destiny, it is now clear that Protestants cannot and never could claim to be truly within the pale of the Christian family, but do reject and always have virtually rejected the Christian religion itself.

This being so, it becomes necessary now either to deny the supernatural character of the Christian life, and therefore the necessity of divine or supernatural faith, or to give up Protestantism as having no claim to be called Christian. This is becoming a general conviction among Protestants themselves, and therefore the tendency to reject Christianity, as a supernatural religion, is manifesting itself all over the Protestant world. Even Bishop Butler, the great Anglican light of the last century, declares the Gospel to be only "a republication of the law of nature"; and we have rarely met with a Protestant, whatever might be his unintelligible jargon about the New Birth, that did not hold, substantially, that the Christian life is merely the continuation and development of our natural life. The old modes of speech, adopted when Christianity was held to be a supernatural religion, are, we admit, in some instances, retained and insisted upon; but they have lost their former significance. *Supernatural* is defined to be *supersensuous*, as if spiritual existences could not be natural as well as material existences. It is thus Coleridge defines supernatural; it is thus, also, the *Supernaturalists* of Germany, of the school of Schleiermacher and De Wette, understand it, while the Rationalists deny it in name as well as in reality. In no higher sense do we find the word recognized by the mass of Swiss and French Protestants. "What did Almighty God make us for?" said we, the other day, to a worthy Protestant preacher, not without note in this community and the councils of his country. "To develope and perfect our spiritual natures," was the ready reply; that is, to finish the work which Almighty God began, but left incomplete; and this is the reply which, in substance, is almost universally given by those Protestants who plume themselves on having pure and ennobling spiritual views of religion. Thus it is, men everywhere lose sight of their supernatural destiny, and then deny the necessity of a supernatural life, and then the necessity of grace. Thus, in substance, if not in name, they reject the doctrines of the Trinity,

the Incarnation, the Miraculous Conception and Birth of our Saviour, Original Sin, the Atonement, Remission of Sins, the Plenary Inspiration of the Scriptures, and, finally, all that is incompatible with the principle of man's sufficiency for himself, as so many reminiscences of Popery, or traditions of the Dark Ages, and as interposing between the human soul and its Creator, and hindering its freedom and growth. It is idle to deny, that, all over the Protestant world, the tendency to this result is strong and irresistible, and that it is already, as we have said on a former occasion, reached by the more thinking and enlightened portion of Protestants. The true and proper issue, then, cannot be really any longer evaded. Protestants must meet the simple questions of Naturalism or Supernaturalism, of Transcendentalism or Catholicity, of man or God.

No doubt, a certain class of Protestant doctors do, and will, for some little time to come, struggle to stave off this issue, but in vain. Matters have proceeded too far. It is too late. The internal developments of Protestantism are too far completed, the spirit at work in the Protestant ranks is too powerful, to prevent the direct issue from being made. Transcendentalism, under one form or another, has struck its roots so deep, has spread out its branches so far, and finds so rich a soil, that it must ere long cause all the other forms of Protestantism, as the underbrush in a thick forest, to die out and disappear. The spirit of inquiry which Protestantism boasts of having quickened, the disposition to bring every question, the most intricate and the most sacred, to the test of private judgment, which she fosters, and which it would be suicidal in her to discountenance, will compel these doctors themselves either to give up their vocations, or to fall into the current and suffer themselves to be borne on to its termination. Resistance is madness. The movement party advances with a steady step, and will drive all before it. Whatever Evangelical doctor throws himself in its path to stay its onward march is a dead man and ground to powder. There is no alternative; you must follow Schlegel, Hurter, Newman, back into the bosom of Catholic unity, or go on with Emerson, Parker, and Carlyle. Not to-day only have we seen this. Think you that we, who, according to your own story, have tried every form of Protestantism, and disputed every inch of Protestant ground, would ever have left the ranks of Protestantism in which we were born, and under whose banner we had fought so long and suffered so much, if there had been any other alternative for us?

The "No Popery" cry which our *Evangelicals* are raising, and which rings in our ears from every quarter, does not in the least discompose us. In this very cry we hear an additional proof of what we are maintaining. We understand the full significance of this cry. The Protestant masses are escaping from their leaders. The sectarian ministers, especially of the species *Evangelical*, are losing their hold on their flocks, and finding that their old, petrified forms, retained from Luther, or Calvin, or Knox, will no longer satisfy them, — have no longer vitality for them. Their craft is in danger; their power and influence are departing, and *Ichabod* is beginning to be written on their foreheads. They see the handwriting on the wall, and feel that something must be done to avert the terrible doom that awaits them. Fearfulness and trembling seize them, and, like the drowning man, they catch at the first straw, and hope, and yet with the mere hope of despair, that it will prove a plank of safety. They have no resource in their old, dried-up, dead forms. They must look abroad, call in some extrinsic aid, and, by means of some foreign power, delay the execution of the judgment they feel in their hearts has already been pronounced against them. They must get up some excitement which will captivate the people and blind their reason. No excitement seems to them more likely to answer their purpose than a "No Popery" excitement, which they fancy will find a firm support in the hereditary passions and prejudices of their flocks. Here is the significance of this "No Popery" excitement.

But this excitement will prove suicidal. Times have changed, and matters do not stand as they did in the days of Luther, and Zwingle, and Henry, and Calvin, and Knox. The temper of men's minds is different, and there is a new order of questions up for solution. The old watchwords no longer answer the purpose. What avails it to prove the Pope to be Antichrist, to populations that do not even believe in Christ? What avails it to thunder at Catholicity with texts which are no longer believed to have a divine authority? Protestantism must now fall back on her own principles, and fight her battles with her own weapons. She must throw out her own banner to the breeze, and call upon men to gather and arm and fight for progress, for liberty, for the unrestricted right of private judgment, or she will not rally a corporal's guard against Catholicity. But the moment she does this, she is, as the French say, *enfoncée*; for she has subsisted and can subsist only by profess-

ing one thing and doing another. Let our Evangelical doctors, in their madness, rally, in the name of progress, of liberty, of private judgment, an army to put down the Pope, and the matter will not end there. Their forces, furnished with arms against Catholicity, will turn upon themselves, and in a hoarse voice, and, if need be, from brazen throats and tongues of flame, exclaim, "No more sham, gentlemen. We go for principle. We do not unpope the Pope to find a new pope in each petty presbyter, and a spy and informer in each brother or sister communicant. You are nothing to us. Freedom, gentlemen; doff your gowns, abrogate all your creeds and confessions, break up all your religious organizations, abolish all forms of worship except such as each individual may choose and exercise for himself, and acknowledge in fact, as well as in name, that every man is free to worship one God or twenty Gods, or no God at all, as seems to him good, unlicensed, unquestioned, or take the consequences. We will no more submit to your authority than you will to that of the Pope."

This is the tone and these the terms in which these "No Popery" doctors will find, one of these days, their flocks addressing them; for we have only given words to what they know as well as we is the predominant feeling of the great majority of the Protestant people. The very means, in the present temper of the Protestant public, they must use to insure their success, cannot fail to prove their ruin. They will only hasten the issue they would evade. Deprived, as they now are, for the most part, of all *direct* aid from the civil power, the force of things is against them, and it matters little whether they attempt to move or sit still. They were mad enough in the beginning to take their stand on a movable foundation, and they must move on with it, or be left to balance themselves in vacuity; and if they do move on with it, they will simply arrive — nowhither. They are doomed, and they cannot escape. Hence it is all their motions affect us only as the writhings and death-throes of the serpent whose head is crushed.

Regarding it of the greatest importance that the whole matter should be brought to its true and proper issue, and believing firmly, that, when the real alternatives are distinctly apprehended and admitted, the majority of Protestants will choose "the better part," we are not displeased to witness the very decided tendency to Transcendentalism now manifesting itself throughout the Protestant world. It is a proof to us that the internal developments of Protestantism are not only bringing it to its

strictly logical termination, but, what is more important still, to the *term of its existence*. The nations which became Protestant rebelled against the God of their fathers, the God who had brought them up out of the bondage of ignorance, barbarism, idolatry, and superstition, and said they would not have him to reign over them, but they would henceforth be their own masters, and rule themselves. He, for wise and merciful, but inscrutable, purposes, gave them up to their reprobate sense, left them to themselves, to follow their own wills, till bitter experience should teach them their wickedness, their impiety, their folly and madness, and bring them in shame and confusion to pray, "O Lord, in thy wrath remember mercy; save us from ourselves, or we perish!" To this desirable result it was not to be expected they would come, till Protestantism had run its natural course, and reached its legitimate termination. They would not abandon it, till they had exhausted all its possibilities, and till it could no longer present a new face to charm or delude them. In this Transcendental tendency, we see the evidence that it has run or very nearly run its natural course, and in Transcendentalism reaches its termination, exhausts itself, and can go no farther; for there is no farther. Beyond Transcendentalism, in the same direction, there is no place. Transcendentalism is the last stage this side of NOWHERE; and when reached, we must hold up, or fly off into boundless vacuity. In its prevalence, then, we may trust we see the signs of a change near at hand; and any change must certainly be in a better direction.

We think, also, that we may go farther, and assert that the change has already commenced, that the hosts pressing onward have already begun to recoil, and are making efforts to face about. This is evinced in the eminent and very numerous conversions to Catholicity which are daily taking place in Germany, England, and this country. It is also indicated in the new tendencies we discover in old sects, and in the character of the new sects which spring up. The Free Kirk of Scotland, rabid as it is, is a sign, inasmuch as it seeks to free religion from the control of the civil power; Puseyism, as it is called, is also a sign, though in itself considered a very ridiculous affair, and as far removed from Catholicity as Parkerism itself, — but a sign, inasmuch as the temper from which it springs indicates a Catholic tendency, and a longing which will find no satisfaction out of the Catholic Church. There

are also truth and sagacity in the remark, made to us the other day by a Protestant minister of our acquaintance, that all the new movements in old sects, and all the new sects which arise, indicate a growing conviction of the insufficiency of the Bible when taken on the authority of private judgment, and the need of some divine authority back of it to vouch for it. Thus, the present rapid growth of Swedenborgianism is owing to the fact, that it pretends, in the *Memorabilia* of Swedenborg, to a divine authority logically antecedent to the Scriptures, from which their inspiration and sense may be concluded. So, also, we may add, Mormonism gains adherents by its departure from the Protestant rule of faith, and its pretension to a revelation more immediate, and therefore more ultimate, than the Scriptures. Everywhere there seems to be a growing distrust of the Protestant rule of faith, a growing conviction that it is idle to pretend to have divine authority in a book which is itself received as authoritative at all only on private reason.

We think, moreover, that in Transcendentalism itself, or rather in the Transcendental movement, we discover not only the logical and historical termination of the Protestant movement, but an incipient reaction against it. People who know Transcendentalism only from a distance are very likely to mistake the motives in which the more recent Transcendental movement originated, and the end it contemplated. The fathers of the movement had nothing less at heart than to favor incredulity or impiety. The movement, as they would themselves interpret it, originated in a reaction of the religious mind of the community against the open incredulity and impiety so prevalent during the latter half of the last century. Rationalism, which is not generically distinguishable from Transcendentalism, sprang up in Germany from the effort to refute, on Protestant principles, the writings of the English Deists, as Tindall, Toland, Chubbs, Woolston, Collins, Morgan, &c.; and the *Transcendental philosophy* itself was the result of Immanuel Kant's attempt to give a scientific reply to David Hume's skepticism. In France, the movement which was commenced by Bernardin St. Pierre, Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant, and carried on by M. Royer Collard, M. Victor Cousin, Jouffroy, Saint Simon, Leroux, was decidedly a reaction against the Encyclopedists, the incredulity, materialism, and impiety of Voltaire, Diderot, Helvetius, D'Holbach, Volney, Destutt de Tracy, &c. In this country it was the same. The inspiration was partly indigenous, and partly caught from Germany and

France ; and the motive was to overturn the infidel philosophy, to cut off doubt in its source, and to obtain a solid and imperishable foundation for faith. In a word, what is technically called Transcendentalism may be said to have originated in the reaction against the incredulity and impiety which culminated in the French Revolution, and which caused such very general alarm for religious, social, and domestic order throughout the civilized world.

All sober and reflecting people felt the shock of the French Revolution. Some, believing the principles it developed, the incredulity and impiety which originated and marked it, to be the legitimate and inevitable consequences of the fundamental principle of the Protestant movement, abandoned the Protestant principle, and sought refuge in the Church. Others, among whom for a time were we ourselves, looked upon this as a weakness, as timidity, as despair, and held that the horrid infidelity which we in common with them deprecated had resulted, not from the Protestant principle itself, but from the fact, that Protestants had never fully accepted that principle, had never carried it out to its legitimate results, and presented the example of real freedom in religion. We, therefore, thought the remedy was to be found in protestantizing Protestantism, in pushing the principle of dissent to its farthest limit ; and we did not doubt, at the moment, that, if we plunged deeper into that principle, we should find an element of belief on which we could reconstruct the fabric of faith. This, in general, was the view taken by those who have latterly been distinguished as Transcendentalists ; and in motives such as these Transcendentalism, technically so called, originated.

In regard to Transcendentalism, we may be allowed to speak with some authority ; for, though we were never properly a Transcendentalist, and though we never entertained a single principle involving Transcendental consequences for one moment after we saw clearly that it involved such consequences, yet we did entertain and defend most of the leading principles of the Transcendental school, and were among the more prominent actors in the Transcendental movement in this country. We know, personally, that those with whom we acted, or who acted with us, had no disposition to disseminate doubt. We were generically Protestants ; we accepted in good faith the Protestant movement, and we confided in the principle of private judgment ; but we deplored the infidelity we everywhere encountered. It was our grief that the temple had been bat-

tered down, the altar overthrown, the Holy of Holies profaned, and the worship of the Most High suspended. How often have we and our more intimate friends, in those very days when our countrymen were everywhere denouncing us as disorganizers, infidels, seeking to destroy faith and abolish religious worship, mourned together over the desolations of Zion, and given vent to our earnest longings to see the waste places restored, the Church of God rise anew from its ruins, with more than its pristine beauty, symmetry, and glory, and the world once more able to say, "I believe"! We felt deeply that doubt is the death of all real life, that there is no living without faith; and our earnest desire, and our unremitted efforts, were to discover the means of its recovery. We owe this statement in justice to ourselves, and to those of our former friends who have not had the happiness of following us into the Church of God.

We all, in common, however we might divide on other questions, agreed that faith had died out, and religion exhausted itself. We knew this to be true of the Protestant world; we knew — for we had ample means of knowing — that the religion of Protestants was little better than make-believe. It had no vitality; it had no power over the life, no hold upon the conscience. And knowing this to be the case with the Protestant world, we concluded that it must be so, *a fortiori*, with the Catholic world. Of Catholicity we knew nothing. We did not believe all we heard said to its discredit; we did not entertain all the vulgar prejudices of Protestants against it; we held that it had been a great and noble institution in its day, which had rendered invaluable services to general civilization and humanity. But beholding it only through the uncertain light of Protestant travesty, misrepresentation, and denunciation, and the still more uncertain light of our own theorizing from *data* furnished by our Protestantism, we concluded that its time was past, that it had done its work, and could henceforth have no legitimate place among the institutions of mankind. It had, according to our theorizing, ceased to be in harmony with the general intelligence of the race, to respond to the wants of the soul, or to take the lead in any important measure for society. The race had found it no longer serviceable, no longer endurable, — had broken away from it, and must now pursue its march through the ages without it. It was no longer to be made any account of, and the Catholic populations were to be considered as if they were not. By their adherence to Catholicity they had withdrawn themselves from the general

law of development. The human race of to-day disowns them, leaves them behind, and recognizes herself only in the Protestant populations, in whom is all the real human life that is left in the world. The line beginning with Adam came down through the patriarchs, the Jewish people, and Jewish prophets, to Jesus Christ; and from him through the Apostles, Fathers, Popes, and doctors of the Church to the Reformers, and from them through the Protestant populations to us. We were the lineal descendants of the people of God, and had, therefore, no occasion to look from the Protestant world to the Gentiles beyond. Confining our views to the Protestant world, as in duty bound, since good Protestants we were, we assumed as our point of departure that there was really no vital religious faith to be found, and that the nations were living without faith, without hope, without charity, without God in the world. With this we were not and could not be satisfied. We felt something better was needed; we believed something better was possible; and we set ourselves to work, with what skill and strength we had, to realize something better. Here is how the writer of this expressed himself some twelve years ago: —

"All the great institutions of former times have been good in their day and in their places, and have had missions essential to the progress of humanity to accomplish. The Catholic institution, Catholicism, which still excites the wrath and indignation of many a religionist, as well as of many an unbeliever, was a noble institution in its time. It was a mighty advance on the paganism which preceded it. It was suited to the wants of the times in which it flourished, and we are indebted to it for the very light which has enabled us to discover its defects. Its vices — and they need not be disguised — appertain to the fact, that it has lingered beyond its hour. It now has, and long has had, only a factitious existence. Its work was long since done, its purpose accomplished, and it now only occupies the space which should be filled with another institution, — one which will combine all our discoveries and improvements, and be in harmony with the present state of mental and moral progress.

"Protestantism cannot be said to supply the place of Catholicism. *Protestantism is not a religion, is not a religious institution*, contains in itself no germ of organization. Its purpose was negative, one of destruction. It was born in the conflict raised up by the progress of mind against Catholicism, which had become superannuated. Its mission was legitimate, was necessary, was inevitable; but may we not ask if it be not accomplished? Catholicism is destroyed, or at least ready to disappear entirely as soon as a new principle of social and religious organization, capable of engaging

all minds and hearts, shall present itself. And this new principle will present itself. Men will not live always in a religious anarchy. The confusion of the transition-state, in which we now are, must end, and a new religious form be disclosed, which all will love and obey." *

The leading thought with the party with which we were ourselves associated was progress. We could, in the state to which Protestantism had reduced us, conceive no end for which man could exist but to perfect himself, or rather to be always perfecting himself (the Fourierists improve on this, and say his end is to perfect the globe and the universe), and we regarded every thing in its relation to this end. Adopting the doctrine of progress, we contended that all institutions should not only aid progress, but be themselves progressive; that, so long as progressive, any institution is true and sacred; and when fixed and stationary, the noblest institution becomes hurtful and wicked. Catholicity, we believed, had been, during its earlier period, progressive, and had marched with the race, gone on with the improvements of the age, and during that period it was truly and preëminently the Church of God; but, in process of time, it contracted, through some original vice inherent in its constitution, a fixed and stationary character, refusing to move, or to suffer its children to move. The Reformers saw this, rebelled against it, and broke away from its thraldom; but they established nothing in its place. The human race, however, advances only by means of institutions. A state of disorder, anarchy, dissolution, individualism, is a state, not of life, but of death. We cannot, then, accept the labors of the Reformers as final; as provisionary, as preliminary to something hereafter to be, we esteem them, and regard them as sacred; but we must go beyond them, do what the Reformers did not, — organize a religion, found a religious institution, or a new church, which, while it contains the elements of order and authority, shall yet have the capability of indefinite expansion, of uninterrupted progress, by assimilating to itself whatever new thought, idea, discovery, or improvement, the race, or any portion of it, should suggest or bring forward.

Now here, if we mistake not, was a thought which went beyond Protestantism, and, in relation to it, a thought with its face

* *Christian Examiner*, Boston, Sept. 1834, pp. 68, 69. This extract shows that the writer, though well acquainted with Protestantism, totally misapprehended Catholicity.

turned backward, not forward. The type was in what had been, and not, as we supposed, in the future; and so it proved in our individual case. We struggled individually for this new church, which, as it was to have the power of indefinite progress, of realizing constantly a higher and a higher ideal, we called "The Church of Union and Progress," "The Church of the Ideal," and "The Church of the Future"; and perhaps should be struggling for it now, had we not, one day, through the grace of God, chanced to make two rather important discoveries in mechanics, — namely, that there can be no motion where there is nothing at rest, and that a man cannot, as we have often repeated, lift himself up by his own waistbands. Strange as it may seem, these two notable discoveries wrought a complete revolution in our whole mode of theorizing, nay, put a stop to our theorizing, once for all, and made us look, in our own eyes, exceedingly foolish. If no motion without rest, then our new church can aid progress only in so far as itself shall be immovable. If it is movable, the race cannot be progressive by it, but it must be progressive by the race, and the progress of the race will still be to be provided for. Then either our church will be worthless under the relation of progress, or it must itself be immovable, founded upon a rock, able to defy all the wrath of man and all the rage of hell. Wonder we did not think of that before. If a man cannot lift himself up by his own waistbands, then the church, which, if he constructs it, can have no power but what he gives it, that is, no power but his own, will have no power to lift him from the condition he is in at the moment of constructing it. Then no progress by means of a man-made church. Unity multiplied by unity is unity. Man multiplied by himself is only man. From man you can get only man. The church, then, can, at best, be only man projected, or taking himself as his own multiple. Do our best, then, we can get in the church only what we are out of it, that is, only ourselves; and as ourselves = ourselves, it is as plain as any thing in Daboll or Euclid, that we have with the church no power of progress which we have not without it. It is idle, then, to attempt to construct the new church. It must be constructed for us, and embody a power above ours, or it will avail nothing. Then the church, if it is to be at all, must be given us from above and be immovable; and if so given, all we have to do is to accept it and do what it bids us. Arrived here, what were we to do? Simply to ask whether Almighty God has abandoned us to our ignorance and utter helplessness,

or whether he has provided for our wants? Has he given us such a church? He has. Which is it? The Roman Catholic. Then seek admission into its communion. We did, — were admitted, — and found what we wanted, ready made to our hands, — considerably better, we are inclined to think, than we could have made it.

The great objection to the Transcendentalists is not in the motives by which they were governed, or the end they contemplated. They wished to get rid of infidelity, and to have a solid and imperishable basis for faith. But, born and bred in a Protestant community, they sought their end by means of the Protestant principle. Accepting the Protestant principle, they were obliged to accept the Protestant movement, and, accepting this, they were obliged to accept the infidel movement, which they all saw was part and parcel of the same. It is this fact that caused so much misapprehension in the public mind, and brought down upon them so much unmerited reproach. They believed infidelity, positively considered, the greatest of evils, but, provisionarily considered, it had been useful, inasmuch as it was not possible to attain to faith without passing through it. Voltaire and D'Holbach did but continue Luther and Calvin, and their incredulity was but an accident in their lives. The old Church was based on an external authority, which was wrong; or, if it was not wrong, the Reformers were unjustifiable in their revolt, and the glorious Reformation should be condemned and wept over, and not boasted. If the old Church was wrong, the new order must be founded on an internal, not an external, authority. The Reformers, however, while asserting this internal principle against Catholicity, had attempted to reorganize themselves on the principle of external authority, which was a double wrong; for it was to deny their own principle, and to accept what they held to be a false one. The French infidels, like the Reformers, broke away from Catholicity, but were too keen-sighted not to see the absurdity of Protestant communions affecting to be organized on the same principle. Nothing, then, remained for them but to reject all religion; for it was no gain to renounce the Pope, to come under the presbyter, — or the Church, to come under a Presbyterian Assembly, a Genevan Consistory, or Dutch Classis, or even the civil tyrant.

This provisional justification of infidelity was forced upon us by our Protestant principles, and the necessity we were in of vindicating the Reformers. There was no possible ground

on which we could justify Luther, and Melancthon, and Calvin in leaving the Catholic Church, which would not be equally available for Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, and their associates and followers; and we could discover no possible reason any of them had or could have for separating from the communion of the Catholic Church, which would not be an equally strong reason for separating from any actually existing Protestant communion. If, as Protestantism taught us, the revolt of the Reformers sprang from what was good in them, and from what was bad in the Church, so did infidelity spring from what was good in the unbelievers, and from what was bad in the Church and the sects. If we accepted Protestantism as we did, we were obliged to lay down the maxim, that infidelity is a mark of love of truth and virtue, not of vice and error. Protestantism, not we, was answerable for this abominable maxim.

But, if we accepted infidelity as a necessary phase in the development of modern society, it was only to make an end of it. The first effort was to vindicate the Reformation, and to place ourselves in harmony with its principles, and then to derive from it the advantages we supposed it must conceal. But in this second labor there was, on all hands, an unconscious reaction against the very principle of the Reformation. We were all after faith, — in we knew not what, but still faith, — the power to affirm something, and something which belongs to the unseen world of spirit. We wished to attain to an affirmation that should be valid not only for us as individuals, but for all men and for all times, — something certain, absolute, which no one of a sane mind could question. This already concealed a revolt against the Protestant principle, for it was an aspiration to a catholic faith. But this affirmation could not be made on an individual authority. All felt and acknowledged it. A plain reaction this. But on what authority can it be made? Evidently only on a catholic or universal authority, — an authority common to all individuals and independent of all. So all said. But what and where is this authority? We had all renounced all external authority, and therefore were obliged to seek it in the individual; and in the individual we sought it, thinking to find in the individual what is not individual; and we thought we did find it in the Impersonal Reason, as we and the Eclectics said after M. Cousin, — in the Impersonal Nature, as said the Transcendentalists proper. All that we and our immediate friends said of the "Impersonal or Objective Reason," of "Spontaneity," and all that Mr. Emerson and his friends and disciples

said of "Impersonal Nature," "Instinct," "Over-soul," the "One Man in all Men," was only so much theorizing in favor of an authority not individual, but catholic. It matters nothing to our present purpose that in this way we did not and could not get any thing but an individual authority, as is unquestionably true; it is enough for argument that there was an effort to get something more; for every such effort is manifestly an incipient reaction against the Protestant principle.

Transcendentalism has just now in this community changed its phase. It now assumes the form of Fourierism. In Fourierism this incipient reaction is still more manifest. Its publications boldly denounce the Protestant principle, and carry their hostility to individualism so far as to annihilate the individual altogether. They even talk of unity and catholicity, — explaining the terms, however, in a very uncatholic sense. Yet all this is a sign. It shows a reaction is going on against Protestantism, where, at first thought, we should least expect it, and where, as a matter of fact, Protestantism appears in its most hideous forms. The whole body of your come-outers and socialists are, in their own way, protesters against Protestantism, and, at bottom, seekers after something which is catholic, which is one, and not individual and multiple. We say, then, again, there is in this Transcendental movement not only a tendency to carry out Protestantism to its legitimate consequences, but the commencement of a movement in an opposite direction; and therefore we look upon the movement as an indication, a sign, that Protestantism approaches the term of its existence.

We have no occasion, at present, to point out the mistakes the Transcendentalists, under one form or another, fall into. We have already pointed out their mother mistake, that of supposing the institutions which are requisite for our redemption are to be created or can be created by man himself. We showed this is out of the question, in our Essay, *No Church, No Reform*, in our Review for April, 1844. The Church was instituted by Almighty God, and has never ceased to be in the world one moment since the fall of man, and redemption, in every sense desirable, is certain by obedience to it. The other grand mistake is in supposing that any *internal* authority can be a *catholic* authority; since what is internal must be taken on the authority of the individual reason, and therefore is only the authority of the individual reason. It must, then, be external, or not at all. If external, it must have a divinely prepared

embodiment or representation, or it will be tyranny. A catholic authority built up by man, as the Fourierists propose, even were it possible, would be the most oppressive tyranny imaginable. All who, outside of the Church, aspire to unity or catholicity doom themselves to endless contradictions and perpetual defeats. So far as they aspire to unity and catholicity we rejoice, because the aspiration may lead them one day to the Church; so far as they so aspire out of the Church, and to a unity or catholicity which is to rival hers —— we remember our own madness and folly a short time since, and check the utterance of the words which press upon our lips. Yet we must tell them, and we do it in no spirit of exultation, that they labor in vain. Nothing they can do will prosper. They will not believe us now. When we spoke to them from the weakness and ignorance of our own heart, they listened, they believed. Now, when we speak to them, not our own feeble words, not our own darkened wisdom, but the words which have come to us from above, words as true as that God exists, they will not believe us, and we speak but to the winds. O, would to God that they could but know the experience of a Catholic for one hour! O, would they could but for one moment behold the immaculate Spouse of the Lamb, that dear Mother of the faithful, as she looks in her maternal affection on her children! The hardest heart would melt, the most skeptical would believe. O God, must so many souls, for whom thou hast died, be lost? Must that terrible agony thou didst suffer in the garden be constantly renewed each day to the end of the world? O, are we men with hearts, and yet indifferent? Hast thou done all, suffered all, given thyself, to win our love, and we will not give thee our hearts? But let it be as thou wilt. We tell our Transcendental friends that what they crave and seek they may find in the Church, and can find nowhere else. May God give them grace to seek and find. They will do it, many of them, we hope, and the ravages of sin, of heresy, and schism finally be checked, and, in some degree, repaired. For such a result we can all pray, if we can do nothing else; and the faithful need not to be informed that prayer does more for the conversion of the world than argument.

Art. V. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *Poverty and the Baronet's Family:* a Catholic Novel. By the late Henry Digby Beste, Esq. Philadelphia: Wm. J. Cunningham. 1846. 12mo. pp. 287.

Of the author of this book we know nothing except what we learn from the book itself. From a short biographical notice prefixed to the story, it would seem that he was an Englishman, educated at Oxford, and, for a time, a minister of the English Church; that he subsequently became a Catholic, devoted the remainder of his life to the cause of Catholicity, and finally died in 1836, hoping in the mercy of God as "*the reward of an honest life.*" The book itself bears very strong evidence of having been, in part, at least, written by one born on the other side of St. George's Channel, and some eight or nine years after the death of its reputed author. Whether Mr. Beste is a real or fictitious person we know not; and whether the work was really written by him, or by some one in his name, or whether it has been simply compiled by some nameless editor from papers left by him, is more than we know; but if this last, we hope the editor will be more explicit in his next edition, and give us some means of distinguishing what belongs to him and what to the author. It is just as easy to make a straight-forward statement as a circuitous one, and we demand clear and honest statements in a *Catholic* work. The novel itself we have read with much interest. It is written with life and earnestness, with great truth to nature, and many of its scenes are marked by a high order of genius. Most of the characters are admirably drawn and well sustained, the various incidents of the narrative fall in naturally, and the general grouping, if we may so express ourselves, betokens very respectable artistic skill. The moral intended to be inculcated by the novel is excellent. The author has wished to do justice to the virtues of the humbler classes of society, and to show us that all which is really valuable in human character, all that is really desirable in human life, may be found in the hovel of poverty as well as in the palace of wealth. Lady Foxglove may well envy Albert O'Meara's poor widow. He also aims to enlist our sympathies, and to confirm our respect, for the Irish peasantry, by describing their labors, their trials, their privations, their generous sentiments, their self-denial, and, above all, their simple, unaffected piety, and to teach us that the best service we can render them is voluntarily to share with them their lot in life. All this is excellent, and in the very spirit of our holy religion. We raise the poor, not by making them rich, not by changing their external condition, but by becoming poor, and willingly sharing their labors and privations. The cultivated and noble Bryan O'Meara, living the life of the poor cotter, and mingling on equal terms with his poor countrymen, and seeking, by his intelligence, his refinement, his virtues, his piety, to honor the peasant's calling, is a lesson of immense value. It is, in our degree, imitating the sublime example of Him "who for our sakes became poor."

But, unhappily, the author does not continue true to his first thought. The Christian soon loses himself in the man of the world. His hero soon sinks from the Christian hero into the revolutionist. While we thought he was voluntarily placing himself on a level with his countrymen, and

seeking to alleviate their labors and sufferings by sharing them with them, we find he was organizing them for a political movement against the existing government, and placing himself at the head of the *conjurati*. Here is a fall from heaven to earth, and a complete abandonment of the sublime morality with which the work commences.

Having once fallen to the earth, the author cannot rise again to heaven. His peasant must no longer be a peasant. He must be a nobleman, the heir of a princely estate, and marry a baronet's daughter. Bah! Bryan O'Meara, as the peasant, placed by his superior education and refinement, and the munificence of the friends he had won, above his order, and yet voluntarily consenting to remain a peasant, and to limit his ambition to what he can do without going out of his order, content to labor and suffer here, looking only to the reward hereafter, is a character we love to contemplate, for it recalls the heroic virtues of the saints. But Bryan become *the* O'Meara, the possessor of a princely estate, the husband of Sir Cecil Foxglove's daughter, sinks into the class of ordinary mortals, and we have henceforth no more interest in him than we have in My Lord This or My Lord That. If we were to hazard a conjecture, we should say the first part of the story was written by one hand, with one design, and the last part by another hand, with quite another design; — the first part by a Catholic, the last part by some one who thinks true wisdom is to make sure of this world, and leave to Providence the care of that which is to come.

The true Catholic Christian is indifferent to the vain distinctions of this world. Sin reduces and grace elevates all to the same level. All are to be judged by the same law, the prince and the peasant, the lord and his serf, the master and his slave. Where distinctions of rank exist, the Catholic leaves them to exist, for he is too indifferent to them to seek to remove them; and where they do not exist, he does not seek to introduce them, for he knows they are worthless. Before God he knows the master has no preëminence over his slave, and he has learned that heaven lies as near to the lowly cottage as to the lordly mansion. Rank and wealth are of no avail, if the possessor is not elevated by grace to the heirship of heaven; and poverty and want of rank are no evil to him who, through grace, is made a joint heir of all things with the Son of God. He thus is contented with his state in life, whatever it be, and seeks to elevate the condition of all, not by obliterating distinctions, not by changing the external order of things, but by doing his best to bring all to the love and practice of the true religion, and by inducing all, as far as in him lies, to look beyond this short pilgrimage, beyond this vale of tears, to the Holy City, to the eternal heavens, our true home, where alone are to be found treasures worth the seeking.

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2. — *Zenosius; or the Pilgrim Convert.* By Rev. C. C. Pise, D. D. New York: Edward Dunigan. 1845. 18mo. pp. 279.

Mr. Dunigan is one of our most liberal, enterprising, and meritorious publishers. His publications are all sent out in a neat and chaste style, and some of them are fine specimens of the typographic art. The work before us is the first number of a series of publications he is issuing from

time to time, under the general title of "Dunigan's Home Library." It needs no recommendation from us. Its author is an accomplished scholar, a graceful and classical writer, with a rich and fervid imagination, and an earnest and unostentatious piety. Few men among us labor more diligently or successfully to furnish the Catholic public with pleasant and profitable reading, or to create and extend a pure and elevated literary taste. The general plan of *Zenosius* is excellent, and, if the author had allowed himself sufficient space to fill it up, it would have been a work of great and permanent value. It is well adapted to its purpose as it is, but it might have been made to answer a much higher purpose. Yet it may be wrong to say so. In the present state of the public taste, perhaps there is no greater service that we can render our Catholic community than to furnish works adapted to general reading, especially to the capacities and wants of the mass, who will not read elaborate treatises, or works which treat their subjects in any other than a light, graceful, and popular manner. We have no alternative, but either to furnish them with a class of works of our own, adapted to their actual wants, or to leave them to be corrupted by the light, superficial, mischievous literature which is constantly issuing from the Protestant press. What at first, then, we might be disposed to censure in Dr. Pise as a defect, we may, perhaps, upon second thought, find reason to commend as a merit.

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3. — *The Bible against Protestantism.* By the Rt. Rev. Dr. Shiel. Boston: Thomas Swaney. 1846. 12mo. pp. 296.

This is an American reprint of a work by an Irish prelate, if we have been rightly informed, and of a work which has been highly esteemed. Its design is to show that the Bible is against Protestantism and in strict accordance with Catholicity. It is written in the form of a conference between three brothers, one a Catholic, one an Episcopalian, and the other a Presbyterian. It is a work of much solid merit, and is a good reply to those Protestants who are so strongly addicted to Bibliolatry. It is very handsomely printed, and is sold at a reasonable price. We trust it finds a ready and extensive sale.

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4. — *Father Felix: a Tale.* By the Author of "Mora Carmody," &c. &c. *Tears on the Diadem; or the Crown and Cloister. A Tale of the White and Red Roses.* By Mrs. Anna H. Dorsey.

These two little volumes make Nos. 2 and 3 of *Dunigan's Home Library*, but may be purchased separately. They perhaps are all we could ask them to be. The fault we find with them is, that, though they have a Catholic costume and inculcate some Catholic doctrines, they have too many affinities with the spirit of Protestant novels and romances, and tend rather to feed a sickly sentimentalism than to nourish a robust piety. If we are to have romances, we must be on our guard against copying Prot-

estant models. The formal Catholic teaching they may contain will avail little, if the tone and temper be Anticatholic. Romance deals with the passions and tends directly to strengthen them, and therefore to defeat the aims of our holy religion. Romance and novel readers are a helpless race of mortals, always discontented, imagining themselves in a false position, that nobody understands them, and that all things are against them. They are thrown open to every temptation, and unfitted for resistance. We must be exceedingly cautious, then, if we write works of fiction, that their temper, their inner soul, be sound and healthy, that they breathe the spirit of enlightened and solid piety, of heaven, not of earth. The best models to be studied we are acquainted with are the exquisite tales of Canon Schmidt. We never read one of these but we feel armed for the spiritual combat, and strengthened to fight manfully against our spiritual enemies.

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5. — *St. Augustine's Confessions or Praises of God.* In Ten Books. Newly translated into English from the Original Latin. New York and Boston: D. & J. Sadlier. 1846. 18mo. pp. 381.

This work is too well known to require any farther notice than the simple announcement, that a new edition of it is published, and may be obtained of Messrs. Sadlier, at their bookstores in New York and in this city, where, we are pleased to learn, they have recently opened a branch of their establishment.

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6. — *A Short Treatise on Prayer, adapted to all Classes of Christians.* From the Italian of St. Alphonsus Liguori. Baltimore: F. Lucas, Jr. 1846. 32mo. pp. 205.

Let every one who desires to advance in Christian perfection buy, read, and study this invaluable little treatise on prayer, which its sainted author preferred to all his other works.

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7. — *The Way of Salvation; or Meditations for every Day in the Year.* From the Italian of St. Alphonsus Liguori, by Rev. James Jones. Baltimore: F. Lucas, Jr. 1846. 32mo. pp. 409.

A pious book, and admirably adapted to aid the growth of piety in those who use it.

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8. — *The Ursuline Manual.* New York: Edward Dunigan. *The Flowers of Piety.* New York: by the same. 1845.

These two prayer-books are too well known and too highly appreciated to stand in need of any notice. We mention them for the beautiful man-

ner in which they are got up, and for the excellence of their illustrations. The illuminated edition of the first compares favorably with the very best issues from the American press. The second is illustrated with original designs by Chapman.

9. — *The Pious Guide to Prayer and Devotion.* Baltimore: F. Lucas, jr.

A VERY good little manual of piety and devotion, which many individuals will find peculiarly adapted to their peculiar spiritual tastes and devotional exercises.

10. — *Sparks's American Biography*, Nos. VII., VIII., IX. Boston: Little & Brown. 1846.

WE have been trying for some time to find space to notice these volumes at length, but other matters have pressed, and we have been obliged to postpone the fulfilment of our intention. Happily, the reputation of the work stands in no need of a lift from us. As *American* biography, we feel a deep interest in the series, and with the patriotic tone of the work we fully sympathize. We believe the writers aim to be impartial and exact, and we have no great reason to complain of them. The lives which will most interest our Catholic countrymen are those of Father Rale, by Dr. Francis, of Cambridge, and Leonard Calvert, by Mr. Burnap, of Baltimore. The latter, we believe, is acceptable to our Maryland friends; the former appears to have been written with honest intentions, but is not unfrequently inexact in its statements, and inconclusive in its reasonings.

11. — *Martyria: A Legend, wherein are contained Homilies, Conversations, and Incidents of the reign of Edward the Sixth.* By WILLIAM MOUNTFORD, Clerk. First American Edition, with an Introduction. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1846. 16mo. pp. 328.

THIS work is by a Unitarian, and is designed to show that the Unitarian heresy was not unknown or insignificant in the early days of the Protestant Reformation, — a fact we are far from disputing. The work is written with some ability, and its author has studied the epoch of which he treats, under certain aspects, with more success than most of his Protestant brethren have done. We of course have no sympathy with the peculiar views of the author, and can but smile at his allusions to Catholicity; yet we regard his work as not uninstructive. It is well adapted to teach those Protestants who deny the Christian name to Unitarians, that they do so at their own expense. We see no reason why the Unitarian has not as much right to claim the Christian name as has the Lutheran or the Calvinist. He has only travelled a little farther in the direction all Protestants take, and is in reality a little more consistent with himself. The pretensions of Calvinists and Lutherans and Anglicans to orthodoxy are ridiculous, and their claim to treat those who dissent from them as heretics or schismatics is quite laughable. They are all

alike out of the ark, and, though one may stand on a higher hill than another, it avails nothing; for the floods that come cover the tops of even the highest mountains, and those on the hills will be swept away by the deluge as well as those in the lowest valleys. When all are involved in the same sin, none should call one another naughty names. No matter how the Protestant world divides and subdivides, they are all in the same category; and unless divine grace brings them into the Church, they must all share the same eternal destiny.

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12. — *Historical Sketch of the Second War between the United States of America and Great Britain, declared by Act of Congress, the 18th of June, 1812, and concluded by Peace, the 15th of February, 1815.* By Charles J. Ingersoll. In three volumes. Vol. I. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1845. 8vo. pp. 508.

Philadelphia appears to be a doomed city. Its calamities of late have come neither seldom nor singly. It had first to bear the terrible calamity of its *financiering;* and then came riot, murder, and sacrilege; and now comes Ingersoll's *Historical Sketch of the War.* Unkind Charles Jared Ingersoll! Had not thy native city suffered enough already? Was she not sufficiently bowed down by her misfortunes, and afflicted by her sons, but thou, too, whom she had honorably distinguished, must throw thy *Historical Sketch* upon her overloaded back? *Et tu, Brute?* It is too bad, altogether too bad; and if Mr. Ingersoll has one spark of humanity not unextinguished, if he have any the least regard for his native city left, he will stop with this first volume, and publish no more. For his own sake we do not ask him to desist; but, for the sake of his native city, which we hope to see outgrow the disgrace which now rests upon her, and which she may outgrow, we beg him to proceed no farther, but to be content with the laurels he is winning as a statesman and legislator. Of his book we have nothing more to say.

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13. — *Festus, a Poem.* By P. J. Bailey. First American Edition. Boston: B. B. Mussey. 1845. 16mo. pp. 412.

We are late in noticing this book, which we received in due time from the publisher. The poem has been much praised in quarters where praise was hardly to be expected; and perhaps no poem has appeared in our language, for some time, that has really been received with more favor. It must be confessed that the author does not want poetic feeling or talent, and he may have even fancied that he was writing with an honest purpose. There are passages in the work which even we cannot help admiring for their vigor, beauty, and truth to nature; yet, as a whole, we condemn, in the strongest terms we are master of, this much lauded poem. It is a work which should never be opened by one who loves God or man, or has any respect for himself. Genius is never respectable, when enlisted in the service of error and immorality. Moreover, while admitting the author's genius, we must say we have found his work as a whole exceedingly dull, and void of interest. It has all that is objectionable in Faust, and that is contemptible in the Lakists.

14. — *The Belfry of Bruges, and other Poems.* By H. W. Longfellow. Cambridge: John Owen. 1846. 16mo. pp. 151.

We plead guilty to no slight neglect of the current literature of our Protestant countrymen. This neglect is not owing to any diminution of American feeling, nor to a growing indifference to American literature; but mainly to the fact, that our conversion to Catholicity has induced us to change our Journal, in the main, from a general to a special Review. The great theological questions with which we have had to deal, involving, as they do, man's highest and permanent interests, necessarily take precedence of all purely literary matters, however attractive to the mere scholar, or to the man of taste and leisure. We by no means give in to the notion, that the Catholic Church in this country is a foreign church, and that, by uniting ourselves with it, we, in some measure, expatriate ourselves; but it is true, that, in a country like this, in which the Protestant is the dominant party, and Catholics are in a small minority, and, for the most part, belong to the laboring classes, one, by becoming a Catholic, does, to some extent, necessarily separate himself from his Protestant countrymen, and is obliged to take a less active part in what more immediately concerns them. The literature of our country is a matter of deep interest to us, but as a Catholic we are unable to regard with much favor the literary productions of Protestants. We cannot commend them to our Catholic readers, and to censure them is of little use to our Protestant readers. Catholic life and Protestant life lie necessarily far apart, and there cannot be that mutual interchange of thought and feelings, that giving and taking, which there may be between one Protestant denomination and another. All Protestant denominations belong to one and the same family; Catholics are of another family. Catholicity can hold no divided empire with Protestantism. She will be all, or nothing. She is complete in herself, and has nothing to borrow of another.

But because this is so, it does not follow that we are less patriotic or less American in our feelings than are our Protestant countrymen. The honor, prosperity, and glory of our country are as dear to us as to them, and we trust in any hour of trial we shall always be found as ready and willing to sacrifice on the altar of our country as they are. We feel as deep an interest in the creation of a truly American literature as they do or can. But we feel very sure that true American literature will be the product, not of Protestant, but of Catholic America. It is true, we, as Catholics, are at present a small minority of our countrymen, and are likely to continue so for some time to come; but we are the largest compact body in the country, and are sufficiently numerous already for all the purposes of a national literature. We have only to wait a few years, till our colleges and universities send out their thousands of scholars, to have really a larger homogeneous public than any Protestant can command; and when that is the case, the literature of the country will be in our hands. Then the world will see, taking its rank among the literatures of nations, an American literature, a truly Christian literature, free, rich, pure, and noble, worthy of the glorious destinies of the Republic. We are, therefore, content to leave the Protestant literature to take its course, and to confine our labors and our hopes to Catholic America, — the real America for us, the only America which has the promise of the future.

But we are forgetting Mr. Longfellow and his beautifully printed little volume of poems. Mr. Longfellow is one of our most popular poets, and

he certainly possesses a good share of poetic feeling, and more than ordinary skill in versification. He has uncommon command of the language of poetry, and is exceedingly choice in his diction. Some of his translations are exquisite. But, nevertheless, he is no poet, in the higher sense of the term. He has a sort of dreamy, sentimental merit, and recalls the idle days of our youth, when we lay stretched out at length under the old birchen tree, and listened, half asleep, half awake, to the cat-bird and the neighbouring brook. He does not strengthen us for the active duties of life, arm us for the spiritual combat, or kindle our devotion. Yet, if we find not much to admire in his verses, we find still less to censure. He seldom offends against taste or morals. In the volume before us, the poems which have pleased us best are, "The Norman Baron," p. 36, "The Day is Done," p. 77, and "The Old Clock on the Stairs," p. 96. "The Sonnets" we have not read, for, notwithstanding Wordsworth's admonition, we do "scorn the Sonnet"—in English.

15.—Publications of the Metropolitan Press, Baltimore.—1. *Lives of the Saints.* By Alban Butler. 2. *Milner's End of Religious Controversy.* 3. *Catholic Christian instructed.* By the Rt. Rev. Dr. Challoner. 4. *The Poor Man's Catechism.* By John Mannock, O. S. B. 5. *Life of St. Vincent of Paul.* From the French of M. Collet. 6. *Modern History, from the Coming of Christ,* &c. By Peter Fredet, D. D. 7. *Models of English Literature.* 8. *English Reading Lessons.* 9. *Gems of Devotion.* 10. *Think Well On 't.* By Bishop Challoner. 11. *The Cross in its True Light.* By J. P. Pinamonti, S. J. 12. *Spiritual Combat.*

We have received these, and two or three other publications, from the Metropolitan Press connected with St. Mary's College, Baltimore. They are nearly all well known and standard works, and deserve mention at this time chiefly in praise of the laudable efforts of the conductors of that press to furnish the Catholic public with publications at a less unreasonable price than has heretofore been charged for Catholic books.

16.—*Life of St. Vincent de Paul, Founder of the Congregation of the Mission and of the Sisters of Charity.* By M. Collet, Priest of the Mission. From the French, by a Catholic Clergyman. Baltimore: Metropolitan Press. 1845. 12mo. pp. 346.

We have already enumerated this work among the publications of the Metropolitan Press, but it deserves a separate notice. It is an admirably written life of a great saint, and should be in the hands of every man, woman, and child that knows how to read. The translation appears to be made with uncommon skill, and to preserve the freedom, simplicity, and unction of the original. Here and there we detect the foreigner in the translator, and, in two or three instances, he so far mistakes the English idiom as to say precisely the reverse of what he intends. The corrector of the press has also suffered rather more errors to escape his notice than are pardonable. Nevertheless, the book is excellent, and we know not

when we have read any thing so deeply interesting, or better adapted to make one feel how far short he falls of that charity which loves God supremely and exclusively, and his neighbour as himself for the sake of God. It is almost incredible how much good a single poor priest of the living God may effect.

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17. — *Poverty; its Legal Causes, and Legal Cure.* Part I. By Lysander Spooner. Boston: Bela Marsh. 1846. 8vo. pp. 108.

Mr. Spooner is a man who has taken some pains to win notoriety. He has here devised a plan, which, if adopted, would cure all evils, past, present, and to come. The work really indicates some ability and a good deal of hard thinking, but the author's labor is worse than thrown away. He wants to cure poverty, and imagines that he has hit upon a plan by which it may be done. Now, we, for our part, do not believe poverty can be cured; and, moreover, we do not wish it to be cured, for we do not believe that poverty is an evil. One, in whose word we believe, but in which Mr. Spooner does not, for he rejects Christianity openly and publicly, has said, "The poor ye have always with you," and "Blessed are the poor." The evil is not in poverty, but in the spirit with which it is regarded and borne. When submitted to as a penance, it is a great blessing, and the poor are nearer heaven than the rich. If you would cure the evils of poverty, study to cure worldly-mindedness, to wean men's affections from this world, from the low and transitory goods of time, and to place them on things above. Restore the belief, the love, and the practice of Christianity, and poverty will cease to be an evil; men will turn their backs on riches and honors, and voluntarily seek it. All the remedies you seek outside of religion will only aggravate the disease, and redound to your shame. Would you reform society? Go, then, and study at the foot of the cross, and learn to trample the world beneath your feet.

*** The article in defence of the Jesuits, promised for this number of our Review, is necessarily crowded out by the unexpected length of the first article in the number. It will appear in the number for October.

We observe that editors, in referring to articles which appear in this Journal, almost always refer to the editor personally. This is complimentary to the editor, but is unjust to his contributors. The whole of the first and second volumes, with the exception of two articles translated from the French, and two poetical contributions, were from the pen of the editor. But it is unsafe now to conclude from the fact that an article appears in this Review that Mr. Brownson is the writer, for it may turn out that it is not by him, but by an eminent prelate, or a distinguished divine of the Church. In the last number of the Review, for instance, out of five articles, only two were by the editor. The Review must henceforth be regarded as an impersonality, not as the special organ of an individual. It is designed to be a thoroughly Catholic Review, and whatever may be inserted incompatible with the judgment of the Church we condemn and repudiate in advance. On political and other matters, not of faith, the editor is, however, to be held solely responsible for whatever may appear in his pages.